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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past thirteen years the United States has used military force against three 
different Muslim-majority nations. These conflicts have lead to the deaths of many 
Muslims, including many innocent civilians. Meanwhile, American Muslims have 
become conflicted about their identities as Muslims and Americans. However, this 
does not mean that they have become a fifth column within America. What it does 
mean is that they have felt anguish regarding the torment of their religious 
brethren, while at the same time retaining their American identity. Post-9/11, 
Muslim American groups have acknowledged their place in the racial ordering of 
America. Muslim Americans understand that they are second rate citizens within 
their own country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, former USF students Ahmed Mohamed and Youssef Megahed were 
arrested near a Navy base in South Carolina with explosive devices. Mohamed had 
posted videos on YouTube showing how to make and utilize these explosive 
devices, as well as other videos expressing his desire to commit martyrdom. 
Mohamed claimed that his actions were in response to the United States foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. Ahmed Mohamed eventually accepted a plea 
agreement and is currently serving a 15-year sentence for providing material 
support to terrorists. Conversely, Youssef Megahed was acquitted of the two 
charges against him (Tampa Bay Times, December 18, 2008; Tampa Bay Times, 
April 3, 2009).  
 In January 2012 a man from Pinellas Park, FL, Sami Osmakac, was arrested 
in an FBI sting in which it was claimed he attempted to buy weapons of mass 
destruction and attack several sites in the Tampa Bay area. Fortunately, local 
Muslim leaders tipped off the FBI about Osmakac's extremist views. It has been 
reported that Osmakac, who was a Muslim immigrant from Kosovo, was upset with 
what he viewed as wrongdoings toward the Muslim world stemming from American 
foreign policy. A jury convicted Osmakac on terrorism charges, and he has a 
sentencing hearing on Oct. 7. (Tampa Bay Times, June 10, 2014). 
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 What do these cases have in common? In both cases, Muslim American from 
the Tampa Bay area actively displayed their dissatisfaction towards U.S. Middle East 
foreign policy. What is telling about these cases is how these particular Americans 
felt displaced by U.S. foreign policy that they decided to act against their own 
country while embracing a transnational religious identity. Although these cases are 
certainly outlier actions and not representative of the larger Muslim American 
population, they beg the larger question of how U.S. foreign policy towards the 
Middle East affects Muslim Americans that do not engage in actions against their 
country.   
 However, before delving deeper into this question I would be remiss if I did 
not acknowledge that the Muslim American population is quite diverse. In 2010, the 
U.S. census determined that there a total 2.6 million Muslims out of almost 309 
million people in the United States, making them about 1 percent of the population. 
Within the state of Florida in 2010, there were almost 18 million people, out of 
which about 1 percent were Muslim (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life). At 
a more localized scale, in 2010 in the Tampa Bay area (Tampa, St. Petersburg, and 
Clearwater) there were about 2.3 million people, with an estimated 20,000 people 
identifying as Muslim (The Examiner, 2011). Another estimate by Hassan Shibley, 
the Tampa Executive Director of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), 
holds that there are 40,000 Muslims in the Tampa Bay area. By either estimate, 
this makes Muslims in the Tampa Bay almost 1 percent of the population. 
Therefore, numerically speaking, Muslims in the Tampa Bay area are representative 
sample not only of Florida but also of the United States at large (see table 1). 
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Table 1: Muslim Population by Country/State/Region 
 U.S. population 
(2010) 
Identify as Muslim 
(2010) 
Percentage of 
pop. 
United 
States 
309 million 2.6 million ≈1% 
Florida 18 million 124,000 ≈1% 
Tampa Bay 2.3 Million 20-40,000  ≈1% 
 
 It would be misleading to judge representativeness of Muslims on quantity 
alone. Within the Islamic faith, there are many cleavages along both sectarian and 
ethnic lines. Nationally 65 percent of Muslims identify as part of the Sunni branch 
whereas 11 percent identify with the Shia tradition. The remaining 15 percent 
simply identify as “just a Muslim” (Pew Research Center, 2011).  Further, within the 
two main branches, the traditions further disaggregate into sub-faiths (i.e. Sufism, 
Druze, Alawite, Fiver Shi’ism, etc.), as well as Muslims, who exercise more or less 
devotion to their faith. 
 Regarding race, Islam as an inclusive faith draws a multitude of races to the 
religion (see table 2). In the U.S., 68 percent of Muslims self-identify as white; 12 
percent as black; 5 percent as Asian; 14 percent as Hispanic; and 2 percent as 
other/mixed (Pew Research Center, 2011). Obviously, these categories are socially 
constructed and chosen in advance by the Pew Research Institute. Therefore, even 
those who do not neatly fit into one of these categories may feel compelled to 
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choose a category so as to “fit.” Further, the category “white” is a category in which 
the U.S. Census Bureau currently places Arabs and North Africans. This placement 
has more to with religion than skin color, as the early Arab immigrants to the U.S. 
were from Syria and were Christian (Naber, 2000). As such, these early immigrants 
were generally more accepted by early “white” Christian communities in the U.S.  
Table 2: Islam by Race in the United States 
 White Black Asian Hispanic Other 
United 
States 
68% 12% 5% 14% 2% 
 
 One more cleavage among U.S. Muslims is that of nationality. Of U.S. born 
Muslims, 63 percent are first generation, meaning born in the United States; 15 
percent second generation; and 22 percent third generation (see table 3). Of this 
immigrant population, 81 percent of U.S. Muslims have acquired American 
citizenship. This is a much higher number of citizens when compared to other 
immigrant populations (who acquire citizenship at a rate of 47 percent) (Pew 
Research Center, 2011). 
 
Table 3: Muslim Generations in the United States 
 First Second Third 
Generation 63% 15% 22% 
 
 Of the 63 percent first generation U.S. Muslims, 26 percent trace back their 
nationality to the Middle East/North Africa; 9 percent to Pakistan; 7 percent to 
Other South Asia; 3 percent to Iran; 7 percent to Sub-Saharan Africa; 5 percent to 
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Europe; and 6 percent to Other (see table 4) (Pew Research Center, 2011). As with 
ethnicity, these nominal categories tell us little about the diversity within these 
regional groupings. 
Table 4: Nationality of First Generation U.S.  
 Middle 
East/North 
Africa 
Pakistan Other 
South Asia 
Iran Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Europe Other 
National 
Origins 
26% 9% 7% 3% 7% 5% 6% 
 
Socioeconomic Class 
The earliest wave of documented Middle Eastern immigration is traced back to the 
1800’s, with most of the immigrants coming from Lebanon and Syria. These early 
Middle Eastern immigrants were primarily Christian by religion, and therefore were 
characterized as “white” in the United States (Naber, 2000). These early 
immigrants to the United States emigrated primarily due to economic reasons as 
“Greater Syria” (Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Saudi 
Arabia) was experiencing economic decline. Pushing emigration from Greater Syria 
was improvements in sea transportation, while a pull factor was the political 
stability of America relative to the Middle East (Suleiman, 1999). Many of these 
early immigrants to the United States came from the merchant class in the Middle 
East. This occupation typically gave Middle Eastern immigrants the income to move 
from the Middle East (Haddad, 2011). Further, this occupation pushed early Middle 
Eastern immigrants to become “white” by requiring them to assimilate and learn 
the language and culture of America in order to sell their merchandise (Suleiman, 
1999).  
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 After World War II, there was a second wave of Middle Eastern immigrants to 
the United States. Unlike the first wave of immigrants, this second wave was 
constituted primarily by Muslims from the greater Middle East. This second wave 
was mostly composed of educated professionals seeking political refuge in the 
United States (Cainkar, 2006; Naber, 2000). Again, like the first wave, the second 
wave was primarily able to make the trip to the United States due to their higher 
economic class. This second wave of immigrants was more politically active in the 
United States due to their opposition the newly created Israeli state (Haddad, 
2011).  
 The third wave of immigrants from the Middle East came primarily after the 
1960’s. Like the second wave, the third wave was composed of primarily Muslims, 
not Christians. In addition, this third wave of Muslims were mostly high school and 
college educated (Naber, 2000). Differentiating this third wave from the second 
wave, this group of immigrants had stronger national identities, which is attributed 
to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. As a result of this strong national identity, 
during the 1960’s the idea of “Arab-American” came into being to differentiate this 
group from other ethnic groups (Naber, 2000). 
 As stated, these early Muslim Americans were grouped in with others of 
Middle Eastern descent. This meant that in many ways they were understood as 
ethically white. This group therefore had more ability to access the social climb in 
America since they were white. In making the climb to whiteness, Muslim 
Americans sought to access the privilege that came along with white identity, as 
well as the ability to accumulate more wealth. 
 7 
 
 The ability to access whiteness, due to an early assumption about their 
religion, sets early Muslim Americans apart for other immigrant groups, such as 
those from Latin America. Immigrants from Latin America are unable to 
immediately accesses whiteness despite their shared “white” religion. Rather, Latin 
American immigrants are denied whiteness due to their socioeconomic Otherness. 
That is to say, Muslim Americans as a result of their higher economic and 
educational class had given them increased capital to access whiteness in America. 
Conversely, Latin American immigrants typically came from lower educational and 
economic classes, and are understood primarily by the capital they can provide. 
This ability to be socioeconomically white is one reason why Muslim Americans 
came to the United States. That is to say, they wanted to advance their educational 
and socioeconomic capital, not simply have their labor power exploited. 
 Relatedly, there is a push and pull element that differentiates Middle Eastern 
and Latin American immigration. According to Mejia, Pizurki, and Royston (1979), 
in migration, there are both push (donor countries) and pull (receiving counties) 
factors in the sending and receiving countries that influence whether migrants 
decide to leave a country. Push and pull factors operate on both ends in 
determining whether or not someone decides to emigrate, as well as constrains on 
migration. These factors are of political, social, economic, legal, historical, cultural, 
and educational nature (Kline, 2003).  
 In the case of Muslim Americans, the pull factors influencing migration 
include political stability, economic growth, and educational opportunities. Coming 
from donor countries in which they already have a strong ethnic identity due to 
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their higher socioeconomic standing, these immigrants expect to grow within the 
United States. Put another way, they come to the United States to increase their 
status. In the case of Latin American migrants, they come from lower 
socioeconomic groups and consequently have less developed ethnic identities. 
These immigrants come to the United State to sell their labor. They are not here to 
increase their status.  
 With this assumption up front, Muslim Americans that came to the United 
States felt a loss in status after 9/11. As the literature reports, and my interviews 
confirmed, Muslim Americans were almost fully white before 9/11. They now feel 
that they lack the privilege that goes along with being white in the United States. 
This lack of privilege for Muslim Americans goes beyond economic class to an 
overall sense of second-rate status. 
 While I do see the value in class when understanding identity politics, I take 
a position similar to Nancy Fraser in Heterosexism, Misrecognition and Capitalism: 
A Response to Judith Butler (1997). In her response to Butler, Fraser argues that 
social injuries can be based on either cultural or economic injustice. That is to say, 
injuries can be based on recognition or redistribution. At the cultural end of the 
spectrum lies homosexuality, while at the economic end lies the political-economic 
(class). Butler in her critique rejects Fraser’s model. She believes that Fraser is 
trivializing the plight of homosexuality by relegating it to the less important realm 
of culture. Fraser responds that neither end is trivial. Rather misrecognition of 
homosexuals prevents “participating as a peer in social life” (Fraser, 280). This 
denial of status is as equally damaging as claims of political economic 
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maldistribution. Yet, misrecognition need not lead to maldistribution.  This is due 
capitalist systems decoupling of status and class. Therefore, Fraser argues that “the 
essence of misrecognition [is] the material construction through the 
institutionalization of cultural norms of a class of devalued persons who are 
impeded from participatory parity” (Fraser, 283). As such, class is not the 
determinant of misrecognition, as the capitalist system is asexual in that it cares 
about accumulating profits not imposing a sexual norm. 
 Relating Fraser’s argument to my own, the misrecognition that Muslim 
Americans suffer is not a product of capitalism. The misrecognition that Muslim 
Americans suffer is a product of institutionalized cultural norms outlining what 
means to be “an American.” While Muslim Americans may suffer economically as a 
result of their misrecogniton, it does not guarantee maldistribution. Again, the 
capitalist is interested in profits, not identity. Accordingly, my research focuses on 
the misrecogntion that Muslim Americans suffer partially as a result of American 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. Yet, where appropriate, I do note the 
maldistribution suffered because of misrecognition. 
 
American Foreign Policy 
As part of this research, it is critical to discuss U.S. foreign policy. U.S. Foreign-
policy making is driven by the American national style. The style is influenced as 
much by America’s past as it is by today’s challenges.  Some scholars have 
attempted to pattern America’s national style. Glenn Hastedt (2006) holds that the 
pattern of American national style fluctuates between isolationism and 
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internationalism. To be clear, by isolationism Hastedt does not mean America does 
not take actions outside of the Western hemisphere. Rather, Hastedt means that 
while the U.S. has traditionally defined its interests in terms of the Western 
hemisphere, at points in its history the U.S. has also struck out on its own to 
defend its interests abroad. This policy finds reflection in George Washington’s 
farewell address in which he advised the U.S. not to become entangled in the 
affairs of the European states. Simply put, Washington believed that the United 
States’ interests should be narrowly defined and not be coterminous with any other 
state’s interests (Hastedt, 2006). 
 According to Hastedt, a second pattern in U.S. national style was moral 
pragmatism. This pattern is characterized by an almost evangelical promotion of 
American moral standards. This promotion of American moral standards mainly 
came into force after 1900. At this point, the U.S. largely came into its own as a 
rising power after the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War. The resulting 
increase in power for the U.S. caused some within the American government to 
believe that they had both the ability and the obligation to set things right in the 
world. Yet, this belief that the U.S. was a moral standard bearer has had 
implications for America’s foreign policy flexibility. For example, when the U.S. 
must negotiate with another state which is viewed as unmoral, the public sees 
anything that falls short of completely meeting American demands as less than 
moral. Accordingly, the American moral standard can work at cross-purposed with 
the U.S. national interest (Hastedt, 2006). 
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 The third pattern in US foreign-policy, according to Hastedt, is legalism. The 
legalist pattern eschews realist assumptions about the world and instead believes 
that a more peaceful, stable world can come about by institutionalizing behavior 
between states. This pattern finds expression in the emergence of the United 
Nations following World War II. The institutionalization of the legalist pattern with 
the U.N. created transparency and predictability between states and lessened the 
likelihood of war. One drawback to this foreign policy approach is that it does not 
allow the U.S. to utilize its raw power in resolving conflicts. Prior to the 
establishment of the U.N. the use of raw power was a prerogative usually reserved 
to the most powerful state in the system. Instead, when the U.S. does utilize force 
it must couch its actions in legalist principles (Hastedt, 2006). 
 Walter A. McDougall (1997) also believes that U.S. foreign-policy has a 
pattern to it. Unlike Hastedt though, McDougall sees eight patterns rather than 
three. Further McDougall tries to expand on these patterns by breaking apart the 
realist and idealist conceptions of U.S. foreign-policy. 
 Starting with the founding fathers, McDougall calls the first stage of U.S. 
foreign-policy the exceptionalist stage. This stage in American foreign policy held 
that the United States was indeed a light to lighten the world. Yet, this light was not 
to be carried elsewhere in order to enlighten other states. Instead, the U.S. would 
serve as a moral example with its own behavior, which eschewed power politics. As 
such, during this stage of foreign policy, America would not be a crusader state. 
Rather, the U.S. would be the exemplar state. 
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 The second stage of American foreign-policy is unilateralism. McDougall 
makes clear that this stage should not be equated with isolationism. For example, 
the U.S. did interfere in the politics of many Central and South American countries. 
The U.S. also engaged its Navy off the Horn of Africa with the Barbary Pirates. 
These events aside, the U.S. primarily sought to grow at home and only interjected 
itself into foreign-policy problems intermittently. McDougall states that America was 
able to follow this foreign policy due to its unique geographical location, which gave 
it two gigantic moats on both sides of the country. 
 The third stage McDougall calls the American system. The Monroe Doctrine 
epitomized this stage. McDougall notes how the Monroe doctrine was never simply 
about maintaining the independence of the countries in Central and South America. 
Rather, the Monroe doctrine sought to keep the European powers out of the 
Western Hemisphere in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe. 
 The fourth stage McDougall refers to as manifest destiny. This expansionist 
foreign policy traced its roots back to America’s beginnings which saw the new 
country as a special state in the world. As such, if America was to preach reform to 
the world, it had to keep the European powers out of North America. Thus, by 
settling the remaining frontiers America could continue operating with European 
influence and continue shining its light upon the world.  
 It was these first four foreign policies that McDougall sees as sustainable. 
The U.S. in this “Old Testament” could see itself as a special state. This was true as 
long as America did not engage in colonial adventurism and kept its interests 
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narrowly defined. McDougall believes that once the U.S. began expanding its 
interests beyond its hemisphere problems arose in American foreign policy. 
 It was at the fifth stage where McDougall believes America’s foreign policy 
started to go astray. This stage he labels progressive imperialism. This era, to 
McDougall, is best characterized by the Spanish-American war. This war bestowed 
upon America new colonial possessions and new subjects. This was a change in 
past behavior since the U.S. had not been a colonial state. However, rather than 
release these colonies to the inhabitants, American leaders felt that they had an 
obligation to reform and modernize these colonies. Moreover, rather than 
incorporating these colonies, they remained separate from the U.S. due to their 
racial compositions.  
 The sixth stage is labeled liberal internationalism. American President 
Woodrow Wilson spearheaded this stage. Wilson believed that if the U.S. could 
institutionalize liberal values in the League of Nations it would lead to peace in the 
world. This is not to say peace would be automatic. Wilson knew that the League 
charter was imperfect, but he believed that any imperfections would be fixed once 
the League of Nations was operational. Of course, the Senate never approved the 
treaty for the U.S. to join the League of Nations. To McDougall this was a 
reaffirmation of America’s roots as a unilateral state. 
 The seventh stage is called containment. This was an American foreign policy 
tailored to the post-World War II realities. To McDougall this foreign policy was 
representative of the past but also pointed the way towards the future. 
Containment divided the world into spheres, capitalist and communist. Leading the 
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capitalist sphere was the United States. In this sphere, the U.S. could be 
unilateralist and maintain the balance of power, as well as preserve their freedom 
of action. Thus, the United States became the first amongst equals in the capitalist 
sphere, which meant that this sphere’s interests would be tied to American 
interests (McDougall, 1997). 
 The eight stage is labeled global meliorism. This is the foreign policy stage 
McDougall has the most problems with. The United States, unconstrained by a peer 
competitor, used its power simply to use power. Displays of this power include the 
U.S. traveling off to far corners of the world to solve distant problems. This, to 
McDougall, is a waste of American resources and not in America’s national interests 
(McDougall, 1997).  
 Formally defined, national security remains a nebulous concept, subjectively 
framed to meet the demands of the state. Having focused on the different periods 
of foreign policy, the meaning of national security during the War on Terror has 
again been transformed by the state. As a point of reference, national security is 
most basically defined by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as “the ability 
to preserve the nation’s physical integrity, and territory; to maintain its economic 
relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, 
institutions, and governance from disruption from outside, and to control its 
borders” (Watson, 2002: 5). In reference to this point, national security during the 
War on Terror is defined by national security interests including “protecting U.S. 
citizens abroad, guaranteeing access to the assets we need to maintain our 
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standard of living, and protecting the type of government we find important to 
sustaining the nations with which we interact in the world” (Watson, 2002: 5). 
 Foreign policy is also a malleable concept that can be vague, often to the 
point of being self-serving. The U.S. State Department, the instution charged with 
enacting foreign policy defines official American foreign policy as “to build and 
sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world for the benefit of the 
American people and the international community” (U.S. State Department) More 
conceptually for the purpose of this research project, foreign policy is defined as the 
“policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states” (Meltzer, 
2008). 
 Today, the United States finds itself the hegemon of the international 
system. While on its face this position seems easy to comprehend and act out, the 
United States has found it difficult to develop a grand foreign policy strategy. Yet, 
while the U.S. may currently lack a comprehensive foreign policy toward the world, 
America retains elements from its past national identities. Each of these past 
national identities can be seen in our current foreign policy towards the world.  
Nevertheless, at this point, I leave it open as to what constitutes American foreign 
policy. I return to this discussion in chapter 2. 
 
Substantive Focus 
This research comes at a critical juncture for American Muslims. In the past thirteen 
years American troops have engaged in hostilities with three Muslim majority 
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countries, while also engaging in covert wars in other Muslim countries such as 
Yemen and Somalia (Washington Post, 2011). During this time, the U.S. has killed 
or captured many Muslim American citizens it deemed to be terrorists or sponsors 
of terror. This sweeping policy has also led to the detention or killing of many other 
Muslim Americans who had no involvement in terrorism. Moreover, Muslims across 
the world have suffered through humiliation at the awesome military and political 
power of the United States. Thus, whether an American Muslim sees themselves as 
belonging to the global Ummah or merely sympathizes with the plight of the 
vulnerable, it is a conflicted time to be a Muslim American in light of the effects of 
U.S. foreign policy.   
 Those who chose to act violently against the American state and society 
express this confliction most radically. Even those who are members of the United 
States armed service, such as Major Nidal Hasan, have been impacted by American 
foreign policy to the extent that they begin to question their identity. In the case of 
Hasan and others, American foreign policy towards the Middle East caused them to 
react against perceived injustices brought on by their government. To recap, 
Hassan was due to deploy to Afghanistan in 2009. Before his deployment, Hassan 
informed his superiors that he believed that Muslims should be allowed to leave the 
military as conscientious objectors, and if not, the military might face “adverse 
events.” Prior to his attack, Hassan exchanged e-mails with Anwar al-Awlaki in 
which he wrote about the acceptability of violence in Islam. Following this 
exchange, Hassan attacked his fellow soldiers on November 5, 2009 at Fort Hood, 
later justifying his actions by claiming that he was on the wrong side of the war 
against Islam (Washington Post, August 23, 2013). The case of Hassan shows how 
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American foreign policy can impact a group that is nationalistically tied to a 
geopolitical space, meaning the United States and American identity, but whose 
religious identity, meaning Islam, is not contained by nation-states or national 
identity. These two identities can come into conflict, yet the conflict is not always 
violent.  
 That is to say; religious identity is not necessarily compatible with nor 
necessarily differentiated from national identity. As such, it calls into question 
whether religious identity, any religious identity, can coexist with national identity. 
Further, national identity is not necessarily secular. For instance, in the United 
States the government recognizes mostly Christian holidays. This fact is evident in 
that the government shuts down on Christmas, but not during Ramadan. Closing 
down the government on Christian holidays indicates those days are important, and 
the state believes that the population should celebrate or acknowledge that the 
holiday. In essence, the supposedly secular government is favoring one religious 
holiday over another religious holiday. In bringing this issue back to the co-
existence of religious identity with national identity, the example just presented 
indicates that there is a tacit agreement of a preferred religion as part of national 
identity. Therefore, those that do not ascribe to the state religion have to negotiate 
how, or if, they will rationalize their religious and national identities. 
 In sum, the substantive focus of this paper is on the subnational construction 
of Muslim American identity. Whether being an American or claiming another 
national identity, identity is shaped by both external events and internalized beliefs. 
Therefore, this research adds to the literature on identity formation by empirically 
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demonstrating the tension between religious identity and nationalistic identity. In 
particular, my research focuses on Muslim Americans that have radicalized. Rather, 
I focus on Muslim Americans that feel under threat but have consciously chosen to 
accept a path other than violence. Moreover, my research shows the tension 
between two belief systems that cannot be broken down into percentages since 
they both vie for unquestioned loyalty. As such, this confliction calls into question 
the supremacy of national identity in a world in which the nation-state may be 
losing its predominance to other post-national forms of identity.  
 An additional contribution I make to the field is challenging the belief that 
international relations stops at the water’s edge. That is to say, foreign policies do 
not just affect international actors. The two main theories of International 
Relations, Realism and Liberalism, take theoretical positions that either sees states 
being impacted by international forces (e.g. anarchy) or the behavior of states 
being guided by domestic political and economic systems. I claim that this 
dichotomy is too simplistic. Rather, I claim, due to unintended consequences, 
foreign policies can impact domestic audiences. 
 These unintended national consequences can clearly be seen through the 
effects of American foreign policy. In my case, The War on Terror has grouped 
Muslim Americans in with the targeted Other. As a consequence, due to 
ambiguously identifying who was the target during this U.S. foreign policy period, 
Muslim Americans face domestic backlash. Therefore, my case shows the 
permeability of the international and the domestic, and therefore challenges notions 
that foreign policy only affects international relations. As such, my study directly 
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challenges Political Science literature that claims when analyzing international 
politics one cannot also analyze domestic politics. 
 
Chapter Outlines  
In chapter 1, I discuss the literature on nationalism, ethnicity, and minorities and 
multiculturalism. I then discuss the connection in the literature between race and 
nation, racialization, racial hegemony, the eugenics movement, and the myth of a 
colorblind society. Following this review of the literature, I discuss key concepts in 
my research such as foreign policy, identity formation and understanding, and 
double consciousness. After these concepts are defined, I detail my research design 
in order to inform the reader on how I will either confirm or disconfirm my 
hypothesis. This section is followed by a discussion of the methodology for this 
research project and how I intend to collect the data to test my hypothesis. I 
conclude chapter 1 with a discussion on my personal biases and how I will go about 
mitigating them during the course of my research. 
 In chapter 2, I discuss the demographics of the Muslim Americans in my 
sample. In order to provide context to this demographic discussion, I review the 
literature on Muslim Americans. Returning to my sample, I discuss the primary 
influence on the identity of my respondents. I also detail the responses by my 
subjects as to whether they believe that Islam and American nationalism are 
compatible. In the next segment, my respondents provide word associations to the 
concept of American national identity. In the proceeding sections, I discuss the 
effect of other variables on Muslim American identity including, age, gender, 
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education, and economic class. I conclude chapter 2 with data and analysis on the 
interaction between Muslim Americans and other social groups, and the 
discrimination that Muslim Americans face post-9/11. 
 In chapter 3, I discuss the impact of American foreign policy on the identity 
of American Muslims. In order to show the Othering that Muslim Americans face is a 
result of American foreign policy towards the Middle East, I detail the similar 
experience of Japanese Americans during World War II. In the proceeding section, I 
analyze how 9/11 impacted the identity of Muslim Americans in my study, and the 
exclusion that they face today. As detailed in chapter 2, this exclusion has brought 
Muslim Americans together. Moreover, this exclusion has impacted how Muslim 
Americans view American foreign policy towards the Middle East. Therefore, in 
chapter 3, I analyze the reciprocal relationship between Muslim Americans and U.S. 
foreign policy. This reciprocal relationship has caused Muslim Americans to become 
racialized and to view American foreign policy towards the Middle East with 
concern. In turn, racialization has impacted how and whether Muslim Americans 
integrate or assimilate into the American national identity.  I conclude the chapter 
with a comparison of my subjects’ responses to those from Pew. These responses 
indicate that my Muslim Americans sample convergences in terms of similarities 
and attitudes with what has been reported in the literature.  
 Chapter 4 records and analyzes an in-depth interview I conducted with a 
Muslim American in Tampa Bay. The responses from this subject indicate that she 
feels Othered, as a result, of American foreign policy towards the Middle East. My 
discussion with this subject range from her arrival in the U.S. to the First Gulf War 
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and the Israeli peace process to 9/11 and the War on Terror to the Second Iraq War 
to Syria. I also discuss her reaction to American foreign policy to uncover how her 
racialization via American foreign policy has impacted her views of America policies 
towards the Middle East. I conclude this chapter with a discussion on whether this 
respondent believes that she can ever become part of the American national 
identity. 
 I conclude my research with a chapter summarizing my findings. I detail how 
Muslim Americans have come to feel Othered via American foreign policy. The 
racialization that Muslim Americans have experienced during the War on Terror has 
caused them to reevaluate how they interact in American society and political life. I 
also discuss the effects of other variables on Muslim Americans and how they 
interact with American foreign policy. Furthermore, I analyze the double 
consciousness that Muslim Americans are experiencing, as a result, of American 
foreign policy and the ways in which they operate from behind a veil in response to 
American foreign policy and domestic discrimination. As such, the ways in which 
Muslim American operate from behind the veil impacts their decision on whether to 
integrate or assimilate. I close chapter 5 with avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1: Theory and Methodology 
Over a five month period, from August through December 2013, I investigated how 
America’s Middle East foreign policy impacted the identity of Muslim Americans. 
This research allowed me to experience the lives of American Muslims in different 
settings, such as at their homes, local mosques, and my office at the University of 
South Florida. These interviews provided me with insights into the everyday lives of 
Muslim Americans and how these lives differed from “common sense” 
understandings of Americanness.  I then compared the responses from my subjects 
with the Pew Research Center’s data from 2007 and 2011 to identify trends and 
changes amongst Muslim Americans.   
 In what follows, I first discuss the literature on nationalism. I then discuss 
the literature on race and nation. These first two sections are critical as they frame 
the way in which I understand my subject’s responses. I define my key concepts in 
the third section. In the following two sections, I explain my methodology and 
research design. I close this chapter by discussing my personal bias and ethical 
responsibility. 
  
Nationalism 
Following Eric Hobsbawm (1992), Ernest Gellner (1983), Rogers Brubaker (2004), 
and Benedict Anderson (2006) I treat nationalism as arising from an interrelation 
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between state formation and nationalism. Benedict Anderson (2006) famously 
conceptualizes of the nation as an 'imagined community,' meaning that even people 
who will never meet each other think of themselves as belonging to the same 
community. In his classic, Imagined Communities, Anderson holds that there are 
several variables that caused the nation-state to become the main source of 
identification in the modern world. 
 One of these variables was the introduction of printing technologies. Print 
capitalism made it so that people in unconnected places could read about events 
that happened elsewhere within the nation-state. Accordingly, print linked together 
these communities through the compression of space and time.  
 Another variable in the creation of the nation was the resistance to the 
colonial state. America serves as a primary example. The colonial Americans were 
dispersed along the eastern seaboard and had few common connections. Yet, their 
fight against English empire welded these people together and created the 
American nation.  
 Another source of nationalism was the transfer of bureaucratic forms of 
government onto former colonized people. Those individuals who worked in the 
bureaucratic colonial administration came to learn the concept of the nation-state, 
and then used it to turn on their colonial rulers. If every person had a nation, these 
individuals rationalized, than they too must have a nation. To this end, the census 
and mapmaking also played a key role in creating nations (Anderson, 2006).  
 The census was a tool of the colonial administrator to organize and 
rationalize control over the people under its domain. The problem for government 
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administrators is that once a new social category is created, new forms of identity 
come into being. With these new forms of identity people come to organize 
themselves within these externally imposed categories. These externally imposed 
categories were often racial, which meant that race became tied to the state. This 
created a unitary movement which challenged colonial rule. Thus, in the case of 
colonial rule, governmentality made national identity.  
 Another variable discussed by Anderson are the use of maps. These 
externally imposed boundaries give people a point of reference to which to tie their 
identity. With maps, people can view their sameness and differentiate themselves 
spatially. Thus, the map classifies a people, and in the process makes their 
nationality more “real.”  
 A final variable is the museum. To Anderson the museum is a highly political 
project. The museum and its collectors re-create history through what is included 
and the context in which objects are displayed. Included in the museum are those 
objects which celebrate the state, while those that do not fit in within the narrative 
of the nation are left out. Therefore, the symbols one finds in the museum are 
representative of how the nation views itself (Anderson, 2006). 
 Brubaker extends this discussion by demonstrating how nationalism is 
framed. This framing causes the group to interpret information in a particular way, 
thus transforming a particular event into whatever elites make of it. This is due to 
the social world being incredibly complex, and as a result, being simplified for the 
masses through elite framing. Framing simplifies for the masses what is important 
through emphasizing particular aspects of phenomena. The complexity of social 
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reality is made comprehensible through concepts and theories that organize, 
communicate, and perceive reality. Framing involves concepts and theories that 
constructs reality, and thereby makes sense out of reality. Elites can selectively 
influence what concepts and theories are important by way of their control over 
mass media. Thus, elite framing is a driving force in how the masses understand 
their reality (Benford, 1997). Elite framing informs the masses that they belong to 
the 'good' nationalism while others on the outside belong to the 'bad' nationalism. 
 Complementing these theories on national identity is the work by Michael 
Billig (1995) who expands general theories of nationalism towards their everyday 
dimensions and daily practices. His concept of “banal nationalism” holds that 
nationalism is all around us every day. In fact, we take nationalism for granted 
since it is so deeply embedded in American culture. Since this national symbolism is 
so commonplace, our identity can be called into action to defend the nation when 
necessary. Billing states that this type of nationalism claims to represent a 
universal morality that is shared by all civilized people since it does not challenge 
the status quo (Billig, 1995).   
 Connected to the question of nationalism, Mary Waters (1990) addresses the 
selectivity of ethnicity in Ethnic Options. Echoing the literature discussed above, 
Waters treats identity, and thus ethnicity, as socially constructed. In her work, she 
demonstrates how white ethnics have an ability that most other ethnic groups do 
not have, in that they can activate their ethnicity when it works to their advantage. 
This white-European identity is relatively cost-free to other socially constructed 
ethnicities such as Hispanic and Asian, which carry a social cost due to the stigma 
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associated with those identities. As a result, this European identity is reinforced as 
acceptable given that it reflects “old” American immigration, while other ethnicities 
are viewed despairingly due to them not reflecting the “old” ideology1 of American 
identity (Waters, 1990).   
 Parallel to the nationalism literature is the work done on national minorities. 
Several academics have addressed the right to create and maintain communities 
within larger states. One such academic, Will Kymlicka (2005) advocates for the 
rights of minorities under the liberal argument that as a sense of justice people 
have a right to maintain their identity. However, this claim to special rights raises 
questions about how minorities within a newly minted minority-majority culture will 
be treated. Clearly stated, does this minority-majority community have the right to 
culturally homogenize their community? To Kymlicka this answer depends upon 
whether these minorities are ethnic or national. According to Kymlicka, the former 
have the responsibility to assimilate into their new culture. The latter, however, 
cannot be forced to assimilate. These minorities share the territorial state and truly 
make it multicultural. This creates a conundrum in which minorities are unable to 
maintain their own distinct traditions separate from minority-majority culture 
(Kymlicka, 2005). 
 Charles Taylor in Multiculturalism takes a different approach than Kymlicka. 
To Taylor, liberalism and identity itself are problematic concepts. Identity is not 
frozen in time. It changes over time and is influenced by its environment. 
                                                             
1 Ideology in this research project is understood as “the themes, concepts and representations through which men 
and women ‘live’ in an imaginary way, their relation to their real conditions of existence. Ideologies are the 
languages, the unconscious categories through which people give meaning to experience. They constitute the 
taken for granted ways in which we come to see the everyday world as natural.” (as opposed to the cultural 
construction which it is) (Hall, 2012: 262) 
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Accordingly, culture changes depending on the circumstance and time period. 
Therefore, how can the liberal demand that we honor certain values be respected 
when cultures are constantly in flux? Taylor claims we cannot. Instead what is 
needed is to dignify these different values and the demands that each person, and 
each group, aspire to reaffirming their identity. Thus, ultimately, groups recognize 
the dignity of “others” within a liberal, multicultural society (Taylor, 1992). 
 Following the ways in which nationalism and identity are framed, several 
authors discuss the role of Islam in American national identity post 9/11 (Cainkar, 
2002; Cole, 2003; Howell and Shryock, 2003; Elaasar, 2004; Nisbet, 2005; Abdo, 
2006; and Peek; 2007). This identity situates Muslims as 'others' within the 
American identity. Moreover, it creates situations of bias and hostility towards these 
American-Others. 
 
Race and Nation 
The literature on inclusion and exclusion within the nation-state also addresses the 
discursive elements of who belongs and who does not in the nation. Howard Winant 
is the preeminent source on racial formation (racialization) and racial hegemony. 
Winant (2001) notes how racial formation is a dynamic process that is constantly 
being renegotiated. This means that race is renegotiated in relation to several 
factors such as politics, economics, and social forces. In addition, racial formation 
occurs at two levels. The first level is within the group. The second level is within 
the larger society. These two levels interact and change meanings of race. As a 
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result of this dynamism, the concept of race is constantly in tension over what it 
actually constitutes. 
 Winant (2001) also tackles the issue of racism on a global scale and its role 
in modernity and development. In fact, he notes that white supremacy was a 
crucial factor in developing the major power centers of the world up until World War 
II. Winant sees the end of World War II as a crucial breaking point with the past. 
That being said, he still sees race as a fundamental concept in the contemporary 
world. This concept of race, Winant notes, is not rooted in biology but instead is 
created to place others at a disadvantage in relation to “white” peoples. What this 
means is that if a person is not white they do not deserve the advantages that are 
bestowed upon that racial category. 
 This construction of race was carried the world over through colonialism. It 
granted the colonizer the right to rule over others, defined conveniently as “less 
civilized” and “non-white.” Scientific racism and its applied branch, eugenics, which 
supposedly proved the inferiority of nonwhite peoples, reinforced this belief. Of 
course, as nonwhite peoples and white peoples began to congregate, some of them 
challenged notions of white supremacy. The resulting hybridization and 
miscegenation challenged white rule, and in some cases posited it as superior to 
white rule.  
 Accordingly, race is an ideology, as well as a way to categorize and 
understand the world in order to “make sense” out of it. This ideology has become 
less explicit in the contemporary world, but it does not mean that race does not 
exist as a category of exclusion today. To Winant (2001), race has changed from a 
system of domination to a system of hegemony. What this means is that racial 
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domination no longer has to be imposed simply by power. Instead, race has 
become “common sense.” As it is now hegemonic, racial discourse leads by 
consent. By leading in this manner, it allows itself to incorporate oppositional 
movements. This incorporation means that race as a category remains dominant 
through co-opting opposition. Moreover, it means the racial hegemony can make 
concessions without ever really losing power (Winant, 2001).  
 Closely tied to Winant’s discussion on a colorblind society is the work done by 
Michael Brown who questions the myth of the colorblind society. This myth, 
according to Brown (2003), is perpetuated by the focus on some successful African-
American families to reach the middle class. Eduardo Bonilla Silva (2003) makes a 
similar argument claiming that we supposedly live in a colorblind society due to 
particular frames, rhetorical styles, and stories. To Bonilla Silva, racism is systemic 
and institutionalized. Although he does not contend that race is socially 
constructed, he claims that social structures are racialized. Accordingly, whites are 
able to maintain privilege, and reproduce that privilege, by appealing to the status 
quo (Bonilla Silva, 2003). Therefore, to both Brown and Bonilla Silva, race is so 
deeply embedded in our everyday institutions that racism is taken for granted. 
  In assessing how far Muslim Americans have been racialized, I will apply 
these insights by operationalizing some of the terms introduced by these authors. 
For instance, I will incorporate the understanding of national identity to 
demonstrate the malleability of the term and how it used to both include and 
exclude. Related, I will use the term racialization to understand white privilege, and 
how Islam has been placed at a disadvantage relative to white religions, such as 
Christianity. 
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Key Concepts Defined 
There are several key terms which need further explication so as to refine the 
understanding of this research study. Central to this endeavor is to define the term 
foreign policy. Glenn Hastedt (2003) takes a roundabout way to define American 
foreign policy by first explaining the concept of the national interest. To Hastedt, 
national interest is a composite of the fundamental goals and objectives of a state's 
foreign policy. I add to this definition that the national interest is not an objective, 
democratic concept. The national interest is created by and the elites. In the United 
States elites control the state, with the masses playing a minimal role, if at all, in 
foreign policy. That is to say, elites frame and order the options of the national 
interest and the masses may influence or choose what is the national interest 
through methods such as voting. With this in mind, American foreign policy is the 
means by which the U.S. pursues the national interest and all other official relations 
with other countries. 
 Another definition central to this research is that of identity. In this research, 
I do not assume whether or not Muslim Americans have adopted an overarching 
communal conception of identity. Instead, I utilize a more open-ended definition 
which states that identity is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives 
from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with 
the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Moghaddam, 
2006: 160). In operationalizing this term, I asked individuals if they self-identified 
as Muslim Americans. I then further categorized this Muslim group by asking what 
branch of Islam they were a member. 
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 Henri Tajfel, in his discussion of identity, holds that this concept is 
understood as relational dialectic, holding that you cannot understand who “we” are 
without knowing who “they” are (Tajfel, 2001).  It is the differences between 
groups, real and constructed, that gives rise to identity. This Othering takes place 
both within the group and externally. For instance, in reaction to foreign policy 
actions taken against the Muslim world, many Muslim Americans chose to view their 
Americanness in a different way than non-Muslim Americans. In some cases, 
Americanness may be viewed as a less prominent identifier, while in the most 
extreme cases this identity may be rejected altogether. Externally, Othering occurs 
when other non-Muslim Americans became exclusionary about it means to be an 
American. This act results from a need to defend the racialized American identity 
when it is viewed as under threat. 
 Othering is a social construction in which a subject is identified as not 
belonging to the dominant culture. As a result of this social construction the subject 
is made a second-class citizen with a state (Malavet, 2004). The process of being 
forced out of the American identity by external actors affects internal identity 
formation. Those within this new supposedly un-American Muslim group may 
believe that they only have each other and that they need to band together to 
preserve their sense of self. This feeds back into internal group formation, which in 
turn affects how external actors view Muslim Americans and whether they are 
“American enough” to carve out an identity within the larger group. Accordingly, 
the process of identity formation is a reciprocal process in which groups define 
themselves in relation to another. In sum, the boundaries of identity are fluid and 
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are shaped by external stimuli, which affect a group’s sense of belonging and 
security.   
 Another key concept is that of “double consciousness.” Defining this term is 
critical for my research project, as I hypothesize that Muslim Americans are 
experiencing a variant of this self-understanding. W.E.B. Dubois in The Souls of 
Black Folk brought this term into the academic literature.2 As Howard Winant 
explains in Racial Conditions (1994), to Dubois, double consciousness meant that it 
“permitted a person to see her/himself not only from within, as a black person with 
a particular identity, but also for an externalized self-recognition: a person could 
learn, out of necessity, to see her/himself as the white does” (Winant, 1994: 165). 
I adapt this understanding to my study to understand Islamic identity and the way 
in which Muslim American understand American foreign policy. As such, the double 
consciousness of Muslim Americans is the way in which people within this minority 
group see themselves and the way in which non-Muslim Americans, as a result of 
War on Terror, perceive these individuals. Muslim Americans are aware of this 
external perception, and struggle to overcome these negative identifiers. 
 Nationalism is another critical concept in this research that must be defined. 
I start by discussing more of the literature on nationalism, and then refining what I 
mean when discussing American nationalism. Accordingly, I embrace a Foucauldian 
notion of the nation in this research. As Foucalt states: “Discipline makes 
                                                             
2
 Although the concept of “double consciousness” is often used in relation to W.E.B. DuBois, the term was used 
much earlier and in two difference contexts. First, Ralph Waldo Emerson in his essays “The Transcendentalist” 
(1843) used the term figuratively to discuss one taking a transcendental perspective of self and world. Emerson 
spoke of man’s desire to know the divine, all the while struggling with the pull of life.  A second way in which 
double consciousness was used is as a concept in Psychology to describe cases of split personality. Du Bois relied 
on both of these conceptualizations when discussing his idea of double consciousness (Dickson, 2014). 
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individuals” (Foucault, 1995: 170). The state, the ultimate disciplinarian, also 
makes citizens. As Foucault notes, the state casts an ever present gaze over the 
population which shapes how people act and react. This gaze need not be enforced 
through coercion. Instead, simply knowing that surveillance is ever-present, even if 
not seen, regulates the soul of the person. In a modern sense, regulating the soul 
is a more thorough way to normalize behavior since it regulates unconscious 
actions. It is this invisible, deeper power that makes the national, the citizen, and 
the Other.  
 This invisible power of the state is enforced and perpetuated through the 
very institutions that it creates. For example, the state creates the identity and 
meaning of the Other (delinquent), thereby creating a binary opposite of the law-
abiding citizen. That is to say, there is not a pre-existing identity of the Other 
(delinquent). As a result, the creation of the Other (delinquent) shows the model 
citizen how not to behave. In sum, state authority via regulation of the soul 
disaggregates the law-abiding citizen from the Other (delinquent) (Foucault, 1995). 
 Over time, this state authority becomes normalized. In the context of 
citizenship, what becomes normalized is a particular national representation and 
behavioral code. People are implicitly socialized into believing that the citizen looks 
a certain way or acts a certain way. Moreover, the way of the citizen becomes an 
unchallengeable fact.   
 The debate on national being is extended by two schools of thought: the 
primordialists and the instrumentalists. The former school of thought believes that 
nations are in some sense “natural” and can be defined unambiguously by 
particular criteria. This school of thought has lost much currency in the debate over 
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national identity in recent decades. The second school of thought, the 
instrumentalists, holds that elites manipulate myths and symbols in order to give 
identities political meaning. The second school thought is the dominant explanation 
behind national identity construction today. 
 Anthony Smith pursues a quasi-Primordialist argument to explain the modern 
attachment that people have to ancient nations. To Smith, the masses do not just 
soak up the framing of nationalism produced by elites. Rather, the ethno-symbolic 
approach to nationalism holds that while elites may produce nationalism, the 
environment in which they operate constrains their efforts.  This ethno-symbolic 
approach holds that there is something to the past, that is a national identity, which 
is present in modern national identity. To Smith, pre-modern national identities 
leave behind a historical record which helps to contextualize the modern nation. 
Smith holds that the more detailed this pre-modern record, the more rich the 
current national identity. Accordingly, by rediscovering the pre-modern nation, 
modern elites are able to create strong contemporary nations. That is to say, pre-
modern ideas, myths, memories, symbols, and traditions legitimize the current 
nation. Consequently, the current nation knows how to behave based upon its 
ability to communicate with the past. Further, newer citizens to the nation take 
their cue on how to act as part of this national past (Smith, 1999). 
 Rogers Brubaker focuses on the historical division between civic and ethnic 
nationalism and its connection to jus sanguiness and jus soli. In bridging the divide 
between primordialism and insstrumentalism, Brubaker contrasting notions of 
citizenship in France and in Germany, Brubraker details the historical connection 
between inclusion and exclusion in both countries. The perceptions of who can be 
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included in the modern state are traced back to the beginning of the modern French 
and German states. Brubaker displays how early Germany, which initially was a 
confederation of sub-national states, had a common understanding of what the 
nation should be. In the case of Germany, it simply needed a state to 
institutionalize the nation. The idea of a German nation was facilitated by the 
shortened distance between towns and people which helped to thicken the idea of 
an early imagined community.  
 In contrast, in neighboring France, there were no early notions of what the 
nation was. Unlike Germany, the French imagined community was hindered by the 
distances between towns in pre-modern France. This distance meant that the 
imagined community had difficulty in coming together due to distance and time, 
which slowed the transmission of an idea of what the French national identity was. 
  In Germany, the nationalizing project was also influenced by its 
surroundings. A would-be greater Germany was denied by Poles who had their own 
understanding of who they were. Likewise German inability to become assimilated 
into Slavic states due to their supposedly distinctiveness strengthened the notion of 
who Germany was. This distinctiveness became the bedrock of what was recognized 
as German tradition. This is an important point to make since tradition is 
normative, thereby making it unchallengeable. To clarify, tradition is part of the 
past and it is continuous into the present. This continuity means that it must hold 
some sort of unchanging value to a society. 
 With the 1789 revolution in France, the state came into being without a firm 
grasp of what the French nation was. This was partially due to the many linguistic 
communities within what is modern-day France, as well as the different cultural 
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traditions. With the French Revolution breaking the back of to the traditional power 
holders in France, a new modern institution arose, the state. The French state 
therefore had to create the French nation. This French nation promoted notions of 
political equality. This republican ideology was institutionalized in the school 
system, which regularized political equality amongst all French citizens. Assimilation 
by necessity also became part of the French nation. If you were receptive to French 
values, you could be French. As a consequence of these historical factors, 
citizenship became broadly defined in France, while narrowly understood in 
Germany (Brubaker, 1999). 
 Brubaker also addresses the contest for who can belong to the nation in 
modern Germany since this is still dependent on blood rather than assimilation. 
Interestingly, Brubaker concludes that it may be less important for non-citizens in 
Germany to formally be labeled citizens as much as it is important for them to get 
the benefits of citizenship. This prescription is troubling on two fronts. While I 
understand that Brubaker is trying to create a stepping stone toward full citizenship 
by leaving the door slightly ajar for German non-citizens, the suggestion wreaks of 
“separate but equal.” Yes, access to the state is important so that people may work 
and live. However, separate access does not guarantee that non-citizens will get 
the same quality of services and treatment from the state. They will continue to be 
seen as qualitatively different and, thus unequal since they do not have the legal 
standing of citizen.  
 Secondly, I think it is problematic the Brubaker assumes that a majority of 
immigrant population in Germany would be content with state services alone. 
Humans are political animals and therefore desirous of being included in the 
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political system. There is a psychological need to be part of the in-group, and 
separate but equal status will not suffice. Accordingly, Germany’s self-
understanding of who is “us” needs to be rethought of by the state. Among the 
leading liberal democracies of Europe, the notions of citizenship need to be updated 
in Germany to meet the realities of a more compact, heterogeneous world where 
“other” and “us” are increasingly coming into contact within the same state. This 
means that the idea of the imagined community has changed. It is time that 
Germany recognizes this change. These legalized others contribute to the building 
of the state and adopt the myths of the nation. Therefore, they should be accepted 
as full and equal members of the German nation-state. 
 Not only do academics differ on when the nation came into being they also 
differ on why the nation came into being. Franz Fanon in his classic work The 
Wretched of the Earth understands national construction through the prism of 
colonial domination. Fanon views new nations in the postcolonial era arising out of 
solidarity and fighting their former colonial masters. That is to say there is no such 
thing as a “real” Algerian nation. Instead there are various peoples becoming 
conscious of their exploitation by external others, as well as by their own internal 
bourgeois. These supposed co-nationals who look like us but act like “them” have 
actually been educated abroad and thus have become infected with the mindset of 
the colonialist. They are therefore no longer representative of the people. Once 
disavowing these puppets, Fanon believes that the masses differences melt away in 
their battle for independence. It is in this crucible that the colonized become a 
nation (Fanon, 1963). 
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 While Fanon focuses on the construction of the nation out of the colonial 
experience, Mahmood Mamdani examines the role of inclusion and exclusion in 
post-colonial states. Mamdani argues that the way in which the colonizers ruled 
over the colonized still affects notions of inclusion in African states today. During 
colonization the colonizers folded categories of customary rule into one conception 
of customary rule. This created a binary within the state between the customary-
periphery and urban-core. The urban core was able to rule over the periphery by 
way of indirect rule. The colonialist found chiefs in the periphery who are powerful 
enough to rule over the tribes but who would also follow the rule of the urban core. 
This system of rule would have implications for postcolonial Africa. 
 White colonizers (and a few Africans) characterized this dualism at the core 
and otherness at the periphery. This tribal periphery of the subjects was ruled over 
by way of individual customs, which eventually became known as ethnic difference. 
In this sense ethnic difference was made in Africa. Likewise, the urban core was 
ruled over through contemporary notions of citizen and state relations. This duality 
left the tribal periphery unprepared for ascension into statehood following 
decolonization 
 With the end of colonialism, the ethnic elites from the core attempted to 
create national identities. This was done through further attempts to detribalize the 
customary, deracialize civil society, and develop the economy. These attempts were 
not successful. In fact, colonial methods of rule remained after the colonizers have 
left. The periphery was still ruled over by the core but this time through patron-
client relations. The social structure of the state remained with the binary between 
 39 
 
citizen and subject too entrenched to be reformed. As Mamdai notes, even 
pressures within civil society in the core failed due to the countervailing pressures 
of “deracialization within and detribalization without” (Mamdani, 1996: 293). As a 
consequence, what occurred in postcolonial Africa was not a transfer of political 
rights from the colonizer to the colonized. Rather, it was a transfer of power from 
one colonizer elite to another colonized elite and the retention of the structure of 
colonization (Mamdani, 1996). 
 Margaret Moore takes a different approach in her study of nationalism. She 
argues the national identity is an ethical obligation since it provides a sense of 
belonging. This feeling of belonging is important in itself as people value the groups 
that they belong to. Yet, to Moore, nations need not be coterminous with ethnic 
groups. She states that nations can be multiethnic and this multi-ethnicity can be 
the basis of their identity. In fact, Moore states, the difference between nations and 
ethnic groups is that the latter are politically conscious. 
 Moore also addresses secession. This is a right inherent in liberalism to 
Moore. Liberalism requires fair treatment and equal respect. If these liberal rights 
are not granted than a minority group has the right to challenge the state and push 
for its own legally recognized nation-state. To clarify, Moore restricts this right to 
national groups. She also brings to the fore the reality that it is not always an entire 
national minority population that is calling for secession. In some cases, it is simply 
an elite minority that wishes to secede from the state. This obviously makes the 
issue of secession problematic since it is not always clear who is speaking for the 
national minority and whether they are representative (Moore, 2001). 
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 The discussion on inclusion and exclusion within the nation-state also 
addresses the discursive elements of who belongs and who does not. Winant and 
Michael Omi discuss the three approaches to race, which are ethnic-based theory, 
class-based theory, and nation-based theory. Each of these theories by Winant and 
Omi is criticized for lacking sufficient analytical clarity for discussing race in the 
United States.  The ethnic-based theory is criticized for subsuming race under 
ethnicity. This means that the diverse experiences of minority racial groups is not 
given sufficient attention in ethnic-based theory. The class-based theory is criticized 
for its over emphasis on economics in explaining racial outcomes. Finally, the 
nation-based theory is criticized for being overly tied to geography and history and 
thus not reflective of the experiences of racial minorities in the United States. 
 Since race can be negotiated, Winant looks to the civil rights movement in 
the 1960s as a prime example of this renegotiation. He notes how the hegemonic 
discourse on race at the time made small adjustments to accommodate African-
Americans. This accommodationist stance split the civil rights movement and 
caused some within the movement to be co-opted by the majority, while those who 
were left out became radicalized. Further, Winant claims, reforms for African-
Americans were often hollow and programs that were proposed often went 
underfunded. 
 Moving on to the 1980s and the Reagan revolution, Winant focuses on the 
emergence of a debate around “reverse racism.” This discursive challenge to 
progress made by the civil rights movement sought to reclaim advantages that 
were accruing African-Americans. Reverse discriminationists claimed that 
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affirmative action had gone too far. Now it was the “white man” who was 
disempowered by another racial group. Moreover, the neoconservative movement 
pushed forth the idea of a colorblind society. This colorblind society was in fact not 
colorblind. Instead this way of seeing the world froze the racial inequalities between 
groups and supposedly looked elsewhere outside of race to explain inequality. This 
caused a significant change in the discourse as even African-Americans’ political 
allies, the Democratic Party, began using code words which attacked the victim. For 
example, Democrats begin speaking of welfare reform and the dependence of 
welfare mothers, when in fact they meant African American race as the cause of 
welfare’s problems. Thus in downplaying the significance of race, Democrats also 
implicitly blamed race as the cause of inequality (Omi and Winant, 1994; Winant, 
1997).  
 Following this literature on the nation-state, in this research project American 
identity is defined in elitist terms. Again, this is not because elitist democracy is 
somehow right and good, but rather because American identity is understood by a 
sense of privilege. Therefore, those that are not included in the American identity 
are repressed and unable to make changes to the government. Conversely, those 
that are included in this selective democracy champion idea such as freedom and 
liberty, not because it helps all citizens within the state, but rather because it helps 
their exclusive group (Vickery, 1974). These ideas of freedom and democracy are 
perpetuated to provide the repressed with the illusion that they too can one day 
become part of the select few within a democracy. As such, I formally define 
American identity liberally as “resting on notions of freedom, rights, self-
government and insuring equality of opportunity to pursue self-interest (Thomas, 
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2000).” In addition, American identity is also represented by traditions included 
civic republicanism, ethno-culturalism, and incorporationism (Schwartz, Luyckx, 
and Vignoles, 2011). While these concepts and traditions define American identity, 
they are a rhetorical illusion. The idea of universal inclusion into the American 
identity is erroneous. America is characterized by advantage and disadvantage. For 
one group to have privilege another must operate at a loss. Accordingly, I operate 
on the assumption that “non-whites” that are at a disadvantage wish to be included 
in the American identity in order to claim the privileged status that this identity 
bestows. 
 This idea of a white, privileged class is critiques in the field of Critical 
Whiteness out of the need to identity “white” as a racial category. This field defines 
white privilege as “an invisible package of unearned assets that one can count on 
cashing in each day but about which one was meant to remain oblivious. These 
privileges are conferred not because they have been earned but merely on the 
basis of one’s skin color” (McIntosh, 1988).  According to Ruth Frankberg, white 
privilege is institutionalized so that “those who engage in antiracist activism must 
look at their own whiteness from the perspective of having been socialized and 
constructed by racial ideology” (Frankenburg, 1993). Accordingly, critical whiteness 
attempts to contest the dominance of whiteness as a racial ideology. 
 Building off of the illusion of the inclusive American social contract is the 
work by Charles Mills in the Racial Contract (1997). Mills argues that the idea of an 
inclusive contract is a chimera. Rather than the idea of the social contract, Mills 
argues that there is a racial contract that keeps European peoples ascendant and 
Others submissive. This racial contract between European whites is mostly tacit, 
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and has divided the world into those that matter (whites) and peoples who do not 
matter (non-whites). For those that matter, there are separate rules, be they 
moral, political, economic, and military. All non-white peoples exist outside of these 
rules. As such, these rules have become institutionalized around the world via 
colonialism. All claims to racial progress are simply “window dressing” to make 
racial equality seem real. Rather, racial equality is used to keep non-whites in a 
subservient position and make them complacent with the current racial order (Mills, 
1997; Winant, 1994; Brown, 2003). 
 Therefore, in this research, I embrace the term “white ethnic,” not because I 
somehow take it as right and good, but rather to place it in contradistinction of 
what is non-white and Other. The idea of a white ethnic arose in the early 1970’s in 
response to the civil rights and black rights movement. Those included in the white 
ethnic community were previously understood as the urban poor (e.g. Poles, Irish, 
Italians, etc.). These individuals were seen as under attack and oppressed by the 
recognition that non-white groups were receiving in the 1970’s. Therefore, 
immigrant populations of European ancestry became celebrated and included within 
the constructed white community (di Leonardo, 1994).  
 Based upon the historical construction of the white ethic community, I define 
this “ethnic group” by the white privilege that membership as a “white” confers. 
White privilege is a symbolic experience that provides comfort and opportunity 
(Hyde, 1995). Therefore, a white ethnic is defined as someone belonging to the 
constructed and ever-changing “white community.” This belonging comes about 
either by birth into the privileged white ethnic community or status recognition, 
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which can include economic success, and allows an individual to refer to themselves 
white and be accepted into the white community by others.  
 Since the identity of whiteness confers privilege, non-whites have sought to 
enter this constructed identity in several different ways. Moreover, states have 
sought ways in which to “whiten” their population in order to portray a privilege 
image of the state. In the Brazilian census, Brazilians tend to fill in the lightest color 
they could possibly correspond to their image, while most Brazilians refuse to fill in 
the darkest categories.  
 The denial of race in the Brazilian census does not square with everyday 
reality in Brazil. Nonwhites and poor whites continue to be concentrated at the 
lower end of Brazilian society. These groups attempt to move up the racial ladder 
by marrying more desirable color categories. For instance, blacks try to marry 
whites in order to improve their standing in society. This means that the value 
places on race can improved through a relationship to a white. Interestingly, even 
poor blacks are more inclined to marry poor white for the very same advantage it 
bestows. These relations within communities and between classes display the two 
tendencies of racism in Brazil: vertical and horizontal.  For the former, it is more 
difficult to advance up the latter since marrying someone of a darker color is not 
socially desirable. For the latter, when people are in the same community and come 
into contact with racial others more often, social stigmas against marrying darker 
colors are lessened (Telles, 2004). 
 As the discussion on Brazil shows, Race is a socially constructed concept. 
Therefore, race has no biological grounding. Race is arbitrary and subjective. It is 
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negotiated through the political process. (Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, and Peck, 2007). 
Therefore, race is not based on anything in the real world, but rather race is 
“widespread grouping of individuals into certain categories by society” (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy).   
 Moving past the connections between nation, and race, another key term to 
define is elite. To be understood as elite, a respondent had to hold a leadership role 
within the local Muslim community. These roles ranged from leaders of NGOs to 
lawyers to religious leaders to academics. What each of these roles has in common 
is that they claimed to represent a larger subset of Muslims, and therefore these 
elites spoke for and potentially influenced other Muslims. This reciprocal 
relationship was important to capture, since it showed how different attitudes were 
created and shaped. In general terms, attitudes are shaped by what Rogers 
Brubaker has labeled “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” (Brubaker, 2004). These 
opinion makers, according to Brubaker, mobilize and energize putatively natural 
groups, which in turn evokes and reifies these groups.  
 Therefore, understanding elite conceptions of a community is an important 
aspect in recognizing how individual Muslims understand themselves. This is due to 
elites serving as leaders of their community, which in turn means that they make 
sense of complex events and offer their own interpretation of reality to others, as 
analytical frameworks. As such, Muslim American elites were an important source 
for my research in understanding how the local Muslim American community 
understands the effects of America foreign policy.  
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  To be clear, these ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, or elites as I refer to them, 
may be self-appointed representatives of the community. Further, these elites may 
use a position of power to claim their representativeness. As such, this is not to say 
that these elites are neither fully constitutive nor fully necessarily representative of 
the Muslim population. Rather, as stated, these individuals may shape what it 
means to be a Muslim American. Yet, these individuals in no way capture the entire 
essence of what it means to be a Muslim American. For this reason, I also chose to 
interview non-elite Muslim Americans for this study. The elites may influence these 
non-elite masses, but they may also have desires which are not represented by the 
elites. Therefore, it was critical to interview non-elite Muslim Americans to 
understand their interpretations of the social world. 
 Another important definition is that of state. I really on the most widely 
recognized conception of the state which was legally codified in international law at 
the 1933 Montevideo Conference by the Organization of American States (OAS).To 
meet the threshold of statehood, the OAS held that a state must meet four criteria. 
The first criterion put forth by the OAS was that you must have a permanent 
population. The second criterion that the OAS agreed upon was that you must have 
a defined territory. The third criterion is that you must have a government. Finally 
the OAS members stated that to be a state, you must have the capacity to enter 
into relations with the other states (Malanczuk and Akehurst, 2002). 
 A final key concept and one that which is related to understanding U.S. 
foreign policy towards the Middle East is the War on Terror and 9/11. Both of these 
terms are highly contested, and therefore have different meanings to different 
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people. To vary vagueness of the War on Terror allowed the U.S. to meet short 
term needs. Therefore, rather than perpetuate this vagueness, I conceptualize the 
War on Terror as “in opposition to Arabs and Islam, signified as terrorists and anti-
American” (Jamal and Naber, 2008). Rhetorically, the War on Terror is defined as a 
“way to rid the world of evil” (Nohrstedt, 2007). More conceptually, the War on 
Terror includes the goal of spreading democracy, as was pursued in the 2003 Iraq 
War, and as a secondary goal in Afghanistan in 2001. The War on Terror is also 
understood as U.S. involvement in Afghanistan stemmed from Al Qaeda’s terrorist 
attacks on 9/11 against the United States. Therefore, the primary U.S. foreign 
policy strategy in the War Terror towards Afghanistan was to dislodge and kill or 
capture Al Qaeda operatives who were responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A 
secondary goal of the War on Terror in Afghanistan was nation building and 
democracy promotion, so that terrorists could return and use the state as a staging 
ground for attacks against the U.S. (Comras, 2010) 
   
Research Design  
In this exploratory research project, I investigated how American foreign policy 
affects the identity of American Muslims. Despite the exploratory nature of my 
study, my research starts from somewhere. That is to say that I come to this 
research project with some initial hypotheses. These hypotheses stem from 
interactions with colleagues and friends who are Muslim Americans, as well as from 
reports in the media about Muslim Americans being disenchanted with U.S. foreign 
policy. With this background information, I hypothesize that American foreign policy 
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towards the Middle East is Othering Muslim Americans. This exclusion of Muslim 
Americans from the exclusionary American identity is a result of framing that 
constitutes the dangerous Other. A secondary hypothesis is that this subjective 
framing occurred after September 11th, and during the War on Terror.  
 The empirical evidence to prove my initial hypothesis correct, or incorrect, is 
based on whether a majority of Muslim Americans express a rising sense of double-
consciousness as a result of being racialized and treated as “others,” and if this 
change in attitude can be related directly to a changing foreign policy, then my 
initial hypothesis will be confirmed. To test this, I juxtapose changing attitudes to 
changing foreign policy so that I can establish the strongest possible co-variation. 
In turn, I interpret strong and direct co-variation in terms of causality, arguing that 
in the absence of other, potentially relevant factors, a changing foreign policy must 
have caused changing attitudes and self-identification of Muslim Americans.  
 
Methodology  
The methodology of this research project is qualitative, exploratory, and interview-
based. In finding research subjects, I utilized the snowball sampling technique. 
While snowball sampling can lead to problems with reliability, it is also a key 
strategy for outsiders who do not know the internal workings of a community. 
Accordingly, I had to start with a small group of Muslim Americans and ask them to 
refer me to others.  
 Since I did not know beforehand the exact number of people who are 
representative of Muslim Americans in Tampa Bay, I relied on Schensul and 
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LeCompte’s (2010) recommendation of using at least thirty informants. Ultimately, 
I ended up interviewing twenty-five participants, at which point no new information 
was gained, thus closing the hermeneutic circle (Reiter, 2006). I came to this 
conclusion once variability began to decrease, meaning that I got similar responses 
from all respondents.  
 As stated, my sample consisted of twenty-five respondents. Of these 
respondents, women composed a little more than half of the respondents (14).  The 
sample size was also overwhelmingly composed of those belonging to the Sunni 
group. In fact, I was only able to interview five Shia Muslims. The sample ranged in 
age from 19 to 65. The average age of the respondent was 30.6 years old. The 
median age of the sample was 27 years old. The sample’s political affiliation 
consisted of the following in descending order: 11 Democrats, 9 no political 
affiliation, 2 Libertarian, 2 independent, and 1 Republican. Ethnically, the sample 
respondents identified themselves as the following: 6 Palestinian, 3 Arab, 3 Iranian, 
2 Pakistan, 2 Syrian, 2 Egyptian, 2 African-American, 2 Caucasian, 1 Moroccan, and 
1 Hong Kong. The sample consisted of eleven elites in the Tampa Bay Muslim 
community  
 Of these elite Muslim Americans, some founded and operated interest 
groups3 as one expression of their Americanness and desire to work within the 
political system. That is not to say that “Americanness” is equated as a desire to 
work within the political system. Rather it is to show that interest group formation 
is one way in which some Muslim Americans have chosen to protect their rights in 
                                                             
3 Interest groups are defined as “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain 
claims upon other groups in the society, most importantly including the government.” (Knoke, 1990: 16) 
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the United States, and possibly to pursue their own selfish class-interests. Of these 
interest groups, some were created after the start of the War on Terror (2001). As 
such, these groups symbolize that there has been a change in the idea of American 
identity for Muslims. As a result of this change, Muslim Americans created these 
groups to defend not only their identity, which is under threat by the white 
majority, but also to reassert themselves as Americans.  
 However, it would be a mistake to rely solely on these individuals as the 
authentic voices of the Muslim community. Although in many cases, they did 
represent the Muslim community, in other cases the elite Muslim’s beliefs did not 
coincide with the masses. This demonstrates that not all viewpoints within this 
community flow from top-down, but rather there is a range of beliefs within the 
non-elite community that are not chosen by the elites to be represented. Therefore, 
by also including the viewpoints of non-elite Muslim Americans, I provide a fuller, 
though more disorderly view, of how American foreign policy impacts Muslim 
Americans in the Tampa Bay community.  
 After the conclusion of my interviews with Muslim Americans, I decided that 
it was necessary to add a control group. This group allowed me to compare and 
contrast the views of Christians and Jews against those of Muslims. The differences 
in attitudes, if any, allowed me to ascribe causality as to whether religion affects 
American identity.  
 The control group was collected via snowball sampling. My control group 
consisted of seven individuals that self-identified as Christian (4), non-religious (2), 
and Jewish (1). All of the respondents had at least a Bachelors (3) or Masters 
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degree (4), indicating that there may have been an educational bias. The 
respondents ranged in age between 28-36. 
 As discussed further in Chapter 4, the Tampa Bay Muslim community 
strongly resembles the American Muslim community. In Chapter 4, I replicated part 
of two Pew studies on Muslim Americans, the methodologies of which can be found 
in the appendix. Pew is a non-partisan think tank provides information on the 
issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. Pew does not take 
positions on policy issues. Both Pew studies were funded by grants from The Pew 
Charitable Trusts.  
 The Pew Research Center decided to conduct attitudinal studies on Muslim 
American in both 2007 and 2011. The reason, Pew states, is “Muslims constitute a 
growing and increasingly important segment of American society. Yet there is 
surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of this 
segment of the public...” The Pew study in 2007 was the first ever nationwide study 
to “attempt to measure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of 
Muslim Americans.” This study in 2007 attempted to survey nearly 60,000 
respondents. The 2011 study was a follow-on to the 2007 study and attempted to 
measure a change in Muslim American attitudes. The 2011 study repeated key 
questions from the 2007 study and followed the same methodology as the 2007 
study. The 2011 study attempted to survey nearly 41,000 respondents. 
 My study disengages from the 2007 and 2011 study in two key ways. First, 
my study was concluded in 2013, and therefore provides an update to the previous 
Pew studies. While my study is not nearly as representative as the Pew studies in 
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2007 and 2011, my findings do converge with the Pew data. Accordingly, while my 
sample is different than Pews, I can still focus on similarities in attitudes between 
the samples.  Secondly, my study is different in the types of questions I ask and 
those asked by Pew. Of the thirty-four questions I asked my sample, only six were 
replicated from the Pews study. Moreover, Pew asked closed-ended questions which 
limit the way in which researchers can understand Muslim Americans. Conversely, 
twenty-eight of my questions were open-ended questions, which allowed me to 
gather much more detail than Pew on how Muslim Americans interpret American 
foreign policy. Relatedly, my study is completely on how Muslim Americans 
interpret American foreign policy, while Pew focuses on broader attitudes and 
beliefs by Muslim Americans. Therefore, my study drills down deeper than the Pew 
study, while using the Pew study as a reference point for my findings.  
 On all but one of the questions, my respondents’ responses came close to the 
responses provided by Pew. As such, these similar responses on both the localized 
and national scales indicate that my subjects converge in terms of similarities and 
attitudes with what has been reported in the literature. Further, as already 
discussed, numerically the Tampa Bay Muslim community resembles the Muslim 
American population in its diversity. In 2010 in the Tampa Bay area there were 
about 2.3 million people in 2010, with between 20-40,000 people identifying as 
Muslim in 2011. By either end of the range, this makes Muslims in the Tampa Bay 
almost 1 percent of the population.  
 As such, in this exploratory research project, I investigated how Muslim 
Americans interpret American foreign policy and how it impacts their identity. One 
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source of evidence in this project came from interview data from Muslims 
Americans. This data was collected through both semi-structured, open-ended 
questions and close-ended questions. The majority of the semi-structured, open-
ended interview questions I wrote because I felt that they would be the most direct 
way to get at the question I wanted to answer: how American foreign policy 
towards the Middle East impacts the identity of American Muslims. Indeed several 
respondents commented that the questions got to the core of the question, and in 
fact, made them think about their identity in ways that they had never before 
thought of. 
 During my research, I also used a psychological method of word association. 
The subjects were given a concept such as “American national identity” or 
“American foreign policy,” and then encouraged to say the first words that came 
into their mind. I engaged in this method of word association to uncover deeper 
meanings, or maybe unconscious thoughts, about these concepts. Respondents 
were allowed to list as many words as they wanted. I then tallied the number of 
responses, and drew inferences from the types of responses that I received from 
the subjects. 
 I also compared my close-ended questions interview responses with the 
questions asked by the Pew Research Center. The attitudinal questions and data 
from 2007 and 2011 addressed racial profiling and harassment experienced by 
Americans Muslims. Any resulting change during the time I asked my interview 
questions and the time Pew Research Center asked their questions allowed me to 
provide a diachronical assessment of how American foreign policy impacts the 
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identity of American Muslims. The resulting cohort study adds reliability to my 
research by showing that my findings come close to those reported in the literature. 
 Using a content analysis within a discourse analytic approach, I analyzed my 
semi-structured, open-ended responses. This approach assumes that meaning is 
constructed in a particular context, within which both the subject and researcher 
play a role in constructing that meaning. Further, this approach assumes that both 
meaning and context comprise one another. This approach does not deny that 
researchers approach their work with certain theories and ideas which provide an 
initial frame of reference. The approach does claim that certain abstract categories 
will emerge from within the data. Rather than just accepting these categories 
uncritically, researchers using this approach must move back and forth, between 
what participants claim and the categories that emerge. Accordingly, when 
explaining the findings, researchers must contextually place their analysis in order 
to demonstrate that the patterns that emerge represent reality (Hardy, Harley, and 
Phillips, 2004).   
 The main assumption of critical discourse analysis is that power and 
discourse are linked. That is to say, discourse reproduces a social hierarchy. In 
critical discourse analysis, discourse is analyzed to uncover ideologies and power 
relations. These ideologies and power relations are found in constructed texts which 
determine what will be included and how it is represented. Accordingly, constructed 
texts reproduce an ideological discourse, meaning discourse is not objective. 
Discourse is selectively constructed by using certain terms, quotes, statistics, and 
perspectives which in turn portray and reinforce a particular ideology. For the 
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purpose of this dissertation, where I focus on the discourse of selected Muslim 
Americans, I define discourse as “situated language use or language use in 
everyday texts and talk” (Jorgenson and Phillips, 2002: 103). 
 Critical discourse analysis, as an empirical method, seeks to provide insights 
into how discourse reproduces, or challenges, social inequality. Upon uncovering 
inequality, critical discourse analysis advocates for social justice by showing how a 
text can biased towards a particular ideology. Discourse is analyzed by assessing 
the context in which it was created. That is to say, what is the broader relationship 
between the discourse and broader social processes of the time? Critical discourse 
analysis examines the linguistic devices and how it portrays ideologies. For 
example, critical discourse analyzes whether the discourse uses active or passive 
voice, naming, pre-modifiers, and indirect quotes. All of these characteristics 
represent different ways to reinforce the dominant ideology. Passive voice 
reinforces the dominant ideology by not naming a particular person and creating 
ambiguity as to who performs a particular action. Naming also is used to perpetuate 
ideology by giving a specific picture of what occurred. Pre-modifiers present a 
different view of a topic thereby portraying something that is the same as being 
different. Indirect quotes reify ideology by o not providing evidence as to who 
reported a speech, thereby providing legitimacy free of context (Jorgeson and 
Phillips, 2002).  
 Further, analyzing discourse allows the researcher to trace the development 
of language, and how it has been changed over time and reconstituted. Focusing on 
these changes allow the researcher to identify the historical developments which 
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generate particular uses of language. In this way, researchers identify the 
discursive processes, including the dominance therein, as well as the sociohistorical 
development of language (Collins and Jones, 2011).  
 Dominance in discourse can be found in both discursive and non-discursive 
practices, meaning domination can also have a structural component. Therefore, 
the dominated are constituted through the societal structures which dominate. To 
Foucault, this is the unseen and unthought-of domination which affects how we 
think, feel, and act. The unseen domination is when the ways of belonging are 
maintained through discourse. This discourse comes in the form of constructs which 
naturalize differences in social relations. Naturalizing differences justifies and 
maintains particular social relations. An example of naturalizing discourse is the 
debate around fairness in society. This term has been institutionally renegotiated 
not to mean social justice, but rather to mean to social and economic conservatism 
(Smith, 2011). 
 Michel Foucault is perhaps most well-known for analyzing discourse. 
Foucault’s analysis focuses on power relationships in the form of language and 
practices. Using Foucaudian discourse analysis uncovers how authority uses 
language to convey dominance, as well as how to demand obedience. As such, the 
social world is expressed through language, which in turn is affected by power. In 
this sense, existing power relationships reflect the composition of society. These 
power relationships are embedded in institutions, ideology, and politics. In order to 
uncover these power relationships, researchers must identify how statements are 
created; what can be said and what cannot; how space is created for new 
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statements; and how material and discursive practices are made at the same time 
(Howarth, 2002; Elder-Vass, 2010).   
 To Foucault, the study of language can also be used as a form of resistance 
to those in power. In resisting power, Foucault uncovers how “truth” is constructed 
over time. That is to say, there are is no such thing as true or false statements. 
Rather, true statements are constructed by the ideologically dominant discourse. 
Moreover, to Foucault, the subject remains dependent on previously constituted 
social relations and discourse. According, subjects are dominated by 
unacknowledged connections to discourse, which is embedded in the foundational 
institutions of society (Howarth, 2002; Elder-Vass, 2010). 
 Another method of critical discourse is outlined by Norman Fairclough which 
follows a three-dimensional framework, wherein three separate forms of analysis 
are mapped on to one another. These three analysis include spoken or written 
language texts, analysis of discourse practice (meaning how the text is produced, 
distributed, and consumed), and analyzing discursive events of sociocultural 
practice. The analysis of discourse has five common features. These features 
include: the character of social and cultural processes and structures is partly 
linguistic-discursive; discourse is both constitutive and constituted; language use 
should be empirically analyzed within social context; discourse functions 
ideologically; critical research (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002). 
 The first common characteristic holds that discourse includes visual imagery 
in addition to written and spoken language. These visual images are understood 
and communicated by the ideologically-dominate language that makes sense of the 
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social world. This language is both produced and consumed, thereby making it 
constitutive of the world. As such, discourse has created concepts such as racism 
and nationalism, both of which are not objectively constituted in the world 
(Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002). 
 The second common characteristic holds that discourse both constitutes and 
is constitutes in a dialectical relationship. This means that discourse provides 
identities which affect the world. It also means that discourse only acquires 
meaning based upon the social context in which it is situated (Jorgeson and Phillips, 
2002). 
 The third common characteristic claims that critical discourse analysis is 
based upon the empirical examination of documents. Documents can include the 
transcription of interviews. The examination of documents uncovers the relationship 
between speakers; how identities are constructed; and how wording, grammar, and 
metaphors reinforce the dominant ideology (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002). 
 The fourth common characteristic maintains that ideology is discursively 
reproduced. Accordingly, discourse reproduces unequal social relations. Fairclough’s 
critical discourse analysis differs from Foucault in that it focuses both on how 
discourse is practically reproduced and how social groups benefit from the 
reproduction of discourse (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002).  
 The final common characteristic asserts that the role of critical discourse 
analysis is to be critical. Hence, critical discourse analysis requires social change. 
Upon uncovering the ideologically dominant discourse, the aim of researchers is to 
challenge the social order (Jorgeson and Phillips, 2002). 
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 In relating critical discourse to my own research, I uncover how American 
national is constituted in the United States by way of the dominant ideology. This 
dominant ideology of the American citizen is constituted as white, meaning 
privileged individuals. In critically analyzing discourse, I ask how American national 
identity is constituted and how is it is reproduced to benefit the dominant groups in 
the United States. To analyze this discourse I repeat the dominant national 
discourse to ascertain whether Muslim Americans view themselves through this 
ideological frame or whether they challenge the dominant national discourse. The 
dominant national discourse, wherein being an American means being white, is 
contextually understood to be a product of the War on Terror. To undercover how 
this dominant discourse is contextually placed, I ask questions of my respondents 
to uncover whether this discourse was present pre-9/11. I also question whether 
this dominant discourse can be unseen, and therefore, if it is more deeply 
embedded in United States institutions. Finally, I challenge the notion that 
American nationalism should be understood in terms of whiteness and recommend 
that the current conception of American nationalism be overturned and instead 
understood in terms of inclusion.  
 When conducting my interviews, I relied on the Georg Gadamer’s (1975) 
solutions to the problem of understanding historical utterances. As such, relying on 
Gadamer, I had to understand the context in which my subjects made their 
comments. After becoming familiar with the Muslim American literature and the 
literature on nationalism and Othering, I was able to partially make sense of the 
comments made by subjects. Yet, this was not enough. I also had to become 
familiar with the ways in which Muslim Americans spoke to me, which could be 
 60 
 
rather guarded, given their experiences with the U.S. government. Relatedly, since 
I work for the U.S. government, I had to make clear my affiliations and politics. 
That is to say, I could not be a neutral observer, and as such, my own accounts 
impacted my analysis. To resolve this issue, I had to become aware of my politics 
and prejudices, and thereby make my position to the reader explicit. This explicit 
positioning allowed my audience to understand the context in which I placed my 
subject’s responses. In following Gadamer’s “hermeneutic circle” I compared the 
specific utterance to the general information and the background within which the 
person spoke, thus going forth and back between the specific and the general up to 
the point where the specific lines up with the general, thus “making sense” out of 
their utterances. Yet, I still could not claim a perfect overlap in meaning between 
what my respondents said and how I interpreted it. As such, I had to limit the types 
of claims I made given my subjects and my own historical situatedness (Reiter, 
2006). 
 Although I interviewed Muslim Americans in many different locations, my 
interviewing style remained consistent and the order in which I asked the questions 
stayed constant. When interviewing Muslim Americans I asked a standard set of 
semi-structured, open-ended questions which can be found in the appendix. I 
initially told the informants that I would like to have an hour of their time. However, 
in some cases the interviews ran over this time. I only met once with each 
informant. 
 Another source of evidence was derived from an in-depth interview with one 
Muslim American. This method put a face on the research and personalized how 
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American foreign policy has affected this subject. This opportunity also allowed me 
to explore an earlier time period by finding out how this person felt about American 
foreign policy pre-9/11. Since this individual is thirteen years older than me, not to 
mention a Muslim, her experiences showed me how vastly different her 
interpretations of American foreign policy are when compared to my own. 
 
Personal Bias 
My personal biases frame how I interpret my data. Therefore, before explaining my 
research in the following chapters I engage in what I call personal reflection. This 
reflection allows me to become aware of my influence on the research project 
through my situatedness in relation to my research subjects. To paraphrase Reiter, 
only through understanding my reality can I reach the most complete possible 
understanding of another culture (Reiter, 2006). Therefore, while I cannot eliminate 
all my biases, I can become aware of them and attempt to limit them.  
 As a Political Scientist, I focus primarily on the geographical-cultural area 
known as the Middle East. I am not a neutral observer of the politics of the Middle 
East or of the Islamic religion. Given my long-term exposure to the region, I have a 
tendency to view events in the Middle East in a manner that is sympathetic to the 
people who are living there. For example, I frequently find myself at odds with U.S. 
foreign policy towards the region given the way in which it tends to favor 
authoritarian dictatorships that provide stability over whatever might be the will of 
the people. While I understand the U.S. geopolitical interest in the region, I do not 
agree with the harm it causes to the people who live in the Middle East.  
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 The very fact that I chose the dissertation topic shows that I am biased in my 
research.  While there are many possible dissertation topics to choose from, I chose 
the topic that I have an emotional attachment to, and as a result, a scholarly 
attachment to. I chose a topic that interests me because I do not agree with the 
way in which my fellow human beings are being treated as a result of U.S. foreign 
policy. Accordingly, I do not pretend that this is objective research. No research is 
ever truly objective. Rather, researchers should aim for a partial perspective, 
embracing situated knowledge, so that we can more accurately and holistically 
understand the world (Haraway, 1988).  
 While there are some biases that I can mitigate, such as being overly 
sympathetic to the subject, there are other biases which I cannot alter, such as my 
gender or religious background. As such, these and others factors bias my research 
in that I am not able to speak to the entire Muslim population. For instance, women 
might not have talked to me like they would have with a fellow woman. They may 
have also been uncomfortable in speaking with me due to my status with the 
government. Accordingly, I am aware that a deeply practicing Muslim might not 
have told me all they would have told another practicing Muslim. In the future, I 
hope that women and Muslims will conduct similar research so that my findings can 
be compared to their research.  
 
My Politics 
I come from an un-militaristic, military family. My grandfather served in the Navy 
and saw combat in the Korean War. He never spoke of his military service nor 
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glorified the military. My father also served in the Navy before being medically 
discharged. Besides knowing that he briefly served in the military, I know nothing 
of his military service. My brother served in the Army and saw combat in 
Afghanistan from 2005-2007. He has never told me about his time in Afghanistan. 
For my part, out of high school I almost joined the Marines. I took a trip to Parris 
Island, South Carolina, site of basic training for the Marines, before realizing that I 
did not enjoy the military culture, and therefore decided not to join. 
  I became interested in the Middle East as a child. I grew going to church and 
hearing about faraway places that existed much before my time. I wanted to know 
where the Phoenicians lived, as well as Cyrus the Great, among others. I was 
surprised to find out they places still existed in a place called the Middle East. I also 
grew up with the advent of CNN. Therefore, I was part of the generation that 
watched Palestinians throwing rocks at Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). As a child, I 
wondered why a U.S. ally was occupying these people. I also wondered why the IDF 
responded to rock throwing with live gun fire. This thought stayed with me until the 
end of the First Intifada and the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords. Rather, than 
celebrating the signing, I questioned who this previously unbeknownst actor to me, 
Yaser Arafat, was and how he was representative of an entire people. Moreover, 
even as a young man, I felt that he was selling out his people and instead 
becoming a proxy-policeman for the Israelis. As such, I became a sympathizer of 
the oppressed and the disenfranchised, first in Palestine, and then in the wider 
Middle East. Then 9/11 occurred and I watched the hysteria against Muslims, 
Middle Easterners, and anyone who did not look “white.” I also had friends at this 
point who did not fit the white category, and I listened to the awful stories that they 
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shared. I wanted to do something for them. Perhaps, this dissertation, is my 
contribution to telling their story. 
 Retuning to my family, they are a mix of Democrats and Independents that 
favor dovish foreign policy.  As such, they, myself included, have been extremely 
critical of U.S. foreign policy. While I currently work for the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (IC), I believe, perhaps naively that I can impact U.S. foreign policy. 
My impact will not be felt immediately. Instead, my time in the IC will hopefully 
create change in the long term. I want to see the U.S. disengage from the Middle 
East and to treat the people there with respect. I want the U.S. to end the War on 
Terror not only in name, but also in practice. My contribution to these IC changes is 
to provide analysis which incorporates my politics. In order to make these changes 
I have to stay true to my politics and not become incorporated into the IC culture.  
 Moreover, it is important for me to state that as part of the IC, I cannot 
collect or analyze intelligence on U.S. persons. This is important because it means 
that the data from this dissertation cannot, by law, be used by the U.S. 
government. Although those who are unfamiliar with the laws of the U.S. 
government will say that this stipulation is for show, I have seen this stipulation 
enforced. For example, when Mohammed Morsi was elected president of Egypt, the 
IC was forbidden from collecting intelligence on him since he is a U.S. citizen. It 
took months of legal and bureaucratic wrangling before the IC could get intelligence 
on Morsi. The point of this example is to show there are legal protections in place 
that do not allow me to collect intelligence on U.S. persons, such as the subjects in 
 65 
 
this research. Therefore, I assert that in no way is this research done for 
strategic/national security reasons, nor is it sponsored by the U.S. government.  
 
Ethical Responsibility 
There is a tension arising from the fact that I was an intern with the U.S. 
government during the time I was collecting data on a vulnerable U.S. population. 
This tension is due to the history of the social sciences and their work with the U.S. 
government. This led to the American Anthropological Association’s statement on 
ethics (Appendix) to keep Anthropologists’ research separate from government 
work.  
 One such academic using her social scientific knowledge in the services of the 
government is Montgomery McFate, an anthropologist. The “human terrain 
systems” (HTS) work that she conducts humanizes conflict. It shows that the other 
side is not an interchangeable enemy but a real person. She works to show the U.S. 
military that their enemy is misunderstood. Indeed, she informs the military of the 
many nuances of “the enemy.” She brings culture into the discussion, which brings 
awareness and understanding to the military. Accordingly, the military now tries to 
work with the population rather than implementing a blanket strategy against the 
population. This work in turn reduces conflicts (Shachtman, 2008). Put another 
way, the military in conjunction with social scientists are rethinking the term enemy 
and are instead looking for partners rather than opponents.  
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 On the other hand, as both Maximilian Forte and David Price have noted, 
working with the government can endanger vulnerable sources. Despite best 
intentions, whether it be working in HTS or using one’s work in the name of 
nationalism (Price, 2000), social science has either been abused by the government 
(Forte, 2010) or used to knowingly collect intelligence on populations. In the case 
of HTS, the Wikileaks scandal exposed how the military was taking private field 
notes from well-intentioned social scientists and using the information to target 
populations. In the latter case of working in defense of the nation, social scientists 
have used the cover of their fieldwork to spy on local populations. This damages the 
name of the discipline; ruins the field for future researchers; and most importantly 
endangers vulnerable populations. Obviously, despite attempts to reform 
institutions or to protect the nation, the government can abuse the most well 
intentioned researcher in the name of the national interest. 
 While I do acknowledge the problems of social scientists working for the 
government, I still hold that it is better to try and reform these institutions than to 
leave them to their own devices. This latter action is much more dangerous for 
vulnerable populations since it allows the government to continue operating on 
outdating and invalid assumptions. Taken a step further, not consulting social 
scientists may be one reason as to why these institutions have become so 
calculating and dehumanized in their work with vulnerable populations. What are 
needed are not less social scientists but more informed individuals working within 
and reforming these stale institutions. Moreover, in reforming these institutions, 
there need to be an effort to adopt oversight mechanisms to guarantee that social 
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scientific work is not corrupted in name of national security. This is the role I see 
myself enacting in my work with the government. 
 Borrowing from Queer theory, I understand myself in terms of fragmented 
identity. I am a doctoral candidate, an intern with the U.S. government, father, 
male, friend, agnostic, son, brother, political independent, heterosexual, as well as 
many other identities. There is no coherent self-concept that makes me. Rather, I 
constantly switch from one present to the next. I experience the fragmentation of 
the narrative self (Rudy, 2001; Atkinson, 2001). 
 My fragmented identity shifts depending on time and space, as well as in 
relation to others. Put another way, my identity is situationally dependent. 
Moreover, my identity is dependent upon both the way that I frame my identity, 
and the way in which others receive my framing. I may frame myself as a friend to 
someone, yet the way in which I present myself as a friend to someone may be 
denied. Accordingly, the framing of my identity is contingent both on self and other. 
 In the case of my doctoral research, there is a tension between my selves as 
a doctoral candidate and an intern with the U.S. government. My main ethical 
obligation is not to expose the people from one world I inhabit to people in other 
worlds I also inhabit, here: research subjects in the academic world and military 
personal at Centcom. The same is true for all the other roles and identities we all 
routinely take on as fathers, children, friends, etc. As a social scientist, I hold an 
ethical obligation to do no harm to my research subjects. As an intern with the U.S. 
government, I am legally forbidden from collecting intelligence on any U.S. person. 
These are two ethical obligations for two different identities. Moreover, in following 
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the American Anthropological Association guide to ethics I am supposed to keep 
research separate from government work. There is no way to completely reconcile 
those identities. Yet, I need to complete a doctoral dissertation on a very sensitive 
topic. As such, I have chosen to embrace my identity as a doctoral student while 
working on this dissertation, all the while following ethical guidelines and keeping 
my research separate from my government work. When I assume my other identity 
as a government worker, I did not conduct research on my dissertation. Instead, I 
focused on international actors. While cannot assume either of these identities at 
the same time, I have made the conscience decision to keep these selves separate.  
 Therefore, in being transparent, while conducting my research, I also 
interned with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from August 2013 to June 
2014. In order to protect my subjects, and not give them the perception that I was 
spying on their community, I informed each of my subjects of my role with the 
government. The goal of this exercise was to be totally transparent with my 
subjects. I did not want to endanger these subjects or mislead them. I let them 
know that my work for the university is separate from my work at the DIA, 
meaning that I would not share any data from my dissertation with the 
government.  
 To codify this separation of myself from the government and to guarantee 
that this work will only be used for dissertation, I presented the subjects with a 
form of informed consent. I had two copies of this form. One copy was for my own 
records and the other copy will be for the subjects to keep. This form gave my 
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subjects a legal understanding of the separate nature of my work, as well as what 
my dissertation work entails.  
 At the beginning of the interview, I assured my subjects of their anonymity 
and confidentiality. I informed them that I only want to know what they think and 
what their observations are. I reassured them that their individual responses will 
not be taken as representative of the larger population. As such, I let them know 
that I am only trying to learn from them. I also let subjects interrupt me during the 
interview if they had a question about the interview process (Bernard, 2011). 
 While it is impossible to totally provide for the secrecy of my subjects, since I 
will know who they are and people saw me interviewing them, I took steps to 
reduce their visibility. One way in which I reduced their visibility was to use 
pseudonyms; making adjustments to biographical information; and disguising the 
site and/or time in which the data collection occurred (LeCompte and Schensul, 
2010).  By reducing their visibility my aim was to reduce any negative 
repercussions resulting from my interviews. Moreover, if the informant felt that 
they would be in danger by speaking to me, I did not coerce them into engaging 
with me. All interviews were voluntary.  
 
Summary   
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on critical concepts in this research. I also 
defined and operationalized key concepts in this research study. In the 
methodology section, I discussed how I went about obtaining data for the research 
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study, which was primarily qualitative, exploratory, and interview-based. In the 
research design section, I discussed the sources of evidence for my research 
project, including my interview questions. I also explained my analytic approach in 
this section. In the personal bias section, I made clear that any claims that I make 
in my research project are situated and context specific. In the last section, I 
argued that I have an ethical responsibility to protect my subjects, given the history 
of government abuses of minority groups.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Minority group in this study are defined as "a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural 
characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential 
and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective 
discrimination”  (Linton , 1945: 347). 
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CHAPTER 2: What is a Muslim American? 
Before discussing the effect of American foreign policy on the impact of Muslim 
American identity, I sought out what Muslim America actually is. In what follows, I 
asked each of my participants a series of questions about factors outside of U.S. 
foreign policy that could impact their Muslim American identity. In the process of 
asking these questions, I came to know much more about Muslim American 
identity, including the many nuances within this minority group. 
 The key finding to emerge from these interviews was that my sample of 
Muslim Americans closely matched with the Muslim Americans found in the 
literature. Most of this research in the literature was conducted on Muslim 
Americans across the United States. As such, this finding implies that my sample of 
Muslim Americans residing in the Tampa bay area converge in terms of similarities 
and attitudes with what has been reported in the literature. In fact, not only did my 
sample match in areas where there are large areas of convergence in the beliefs of 
Muslim Americans (e.g. the view of the immigrant generation, hijab), my findings 
also reflected areas of heterogeneity within the community (e.g. wealth or class 
issues). Therefore, due to the large convergence between my sample and what the 
literature states about American Muslims, I believe with a high degree of confidence 
that I am well suited to draw conclusions about the attitudes of Muslim Americans 
in the Tampa Bay area– even if my methodology cannot provide a mathematical 
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formula that is able to capture the numerical significance and reliability of my 
sample.  
 In this chapter, I will first discuss the literature on Muslim Americans. Then I 
will discuss my findings on how Americans understand American national identity. 
Next, I will discuss separately how age, gender, education, and social class 
influence American identity. I will then address how Muslim Americans interact with 
other cultural groups and the discrimination they face in America. Finally, I will 
conclude this chapter with a summary of my findings. 
 
Muslims in America or Muslim Americans? 
The literature on Muslim Americans is as diverse as the population I encountered. 
In fact, it would be a misnomer to speak of “the” Muslim American. Muslim 
Americans are a collection of individuals from all across the world. They have come 
to the U.S. at different times and for different purposes. Further, upon arriving in 
the U.S., Muslim Americans have settled in many different areas. Therefore, this 
geographical disbursement has further hindered the formation of a singular Muslim 
American identity, which in turn has made it difficult to unite the Muslims of 
America (Haddad and Esposito, 1998).  
 According to the Pew Research Center, in 2012, there were 3 million Muslim 
Americans in the United States. Of these 3 million individuals, about 1.4 million 
were adults. Pew goes on to state that about 40 percent of the Muslim Americans in 
the United States were born in America. Among those Muslim Americans that were 
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born in the United States, about 56 percent identify as black or African American 
(Pew Research Center, 2007; Skerry, 2011). Demographics aside, Muslim 
Americans have been able to preserve and recreate traditions from their homeland. 
Typically, these individuals not only exercise traditional elements in new locations, 
they engage in acts that were barred in their homeland. For example, Iranian 
American immigrants are able to listen and dance to music, which was outlawed in 
Iran following the 1979 revolution. This ability to selectively blend homeland with 
American traditions in the United States is what makes these immigrants American. 
Put another way, these immigrants, through expressing their religiosity, are buying 
in to what into one conception of what it means to be an American (Leonard, 
2003).  
 Muslims immigrate to America for many different reasons. One of the most 
poignant reasons is to escape totalitarianism and to reach a country where they can 
grow spiritually, and in many cases financially (Haddad, Smith, and Esposito, 
2003). This reason is particularly true if their beliefs are not recognized or if they 
are persecuted in their homelands, as is the situation of Sunni Muslims in Iraq, or 
Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia. As previously stated, Muslims immigrating to the 
United States today face an uphill path towards integration. The reasons for this 
difficult path are multifaceted. For one, stereotypes of Islam and hostility towards 
Muslims in America do not make the newly immigrated Muslim feel the desire to 
adopt an American identity. Rather, this climate to the newly immigrated Muslim 
breeds contempt and alienation (Haddad, 1998). Another obstacle to immigrating 
Muslims is self-imposed. Many of these individuals have escaped sexist, 
authoritarian regimes. However, upon entering the United States, many of them 
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have difficulties adapting the often very secular, liberal environments that they find 
themselves surrounded by and immersed in. This creates barriers to assimilation 
and contributes to questions regarding split loyalties for these newly immigrated 
Muslims (McCloud, 2006). 
 Within the Muslim American population, cleavages exist between Muslims. In 
the United States, Muslim Americans remain distinct based upon the rituals, 
doctrines, and institutions they brought with them from their home country and 
recreated in the U.S. While Islam has a universalist appeal, its practice is always 
embedded in local cultural norms and practices that are not easily overcome 
between Muslims and which can potentially lead to fragmentation of Islam in 
America (Ghanea Bassiri, 1997). These conflicts cause sectarian identities to 
reemerge, which in turn create a perception among “white” Americans that Muslim 
Americans are alien to the United States (Haddad and Smith, 1994). 
 The perception by white Americans that Muslim Americans were alien to the 
U.S. was only strengthened by the events of 9/11. However, the isolation and 
exclusion of Muslim Americans following 9/11 created a formal Otherness. That is to 
say, U.S. foreign policy in the War on Terror created a group of Muslim Americans 
that now shared a common American experience. Hence, for U.S. foreign policy to 
create a group of Othered Muslim Americans, American nationalism had to be 
understood in terms of whiteness. American foreign policy, implicitly or explicitly, 
was able to whip up this exclusionary identity. 
 As such, prior to 9/11, many Muslim Americans only had loose attachments 
to one another based upon their religion. Most importantly, since Muslim Americans 
were excluded from engaging in the national catharsis following 9/11, it meant that 
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they had to come closer together to heal within their group. In turn, this more 
closely-knit group led many Muslim Americans to feel rejuvenated in their faith 
(Peek, 2011; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009; Abdo; 2007). 
 Viewing Muslims as terrorists since 9/11 has been a source of conflict both 
inside and outside the Muslim community. As such, Muslims as terrorists are 
equated with the dangerous Other. They are characterized in the media and by 
some in the masses as a security risk and the oppressor of women (Ewing, 2008). 
In fact, some in the United States oftentimes portray Muslim Americans as 
undeserving of citizenship. This is especially true of the conservative media outlets 
and opinion-makers that hold that Muslim Americans should have their loyalty 
tested.  
 Due to their relative heterogeneity, Muslim Americans still have difficulty in 
coming together to challenge these claims. That is to say that Muslim Americans as 
of yet do not have enough common ground or clout of other minority groups to 
reshape the narrative (Bukhari, 2004). This common ground can come about 
through the processes of Othering, which might also be referred to as processes of 
“racialization,” has not pushed them together enough to forge one coherent, 
political identity. As such, Muslim Americans are stuck between being considered 
and treated as the potentially dangerous and threatening Others, but not enough so 
as to overcome their internal ethnic, national, and religious divisions.  
 Given the stereotypical profile of Muslim Americans that existed before 9/11, 
it was easier for an insecure and hyper-nationalist America to identify who was the 
dangerous Other. This dangerous Other in the United States matched the profile of 
the external dangerous Other. For instance, non-Muslim Americans would identify 
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women wearing headscarves as a dangerous Other, since it was foreign to them. In 
this instance, it was easier for men to escape scrutiny since they did not necessarily 
have outward identifiers. This racialization of Muslim Americans in turn made it 
easier to gain support for foreign policy abroad against Arab and Muslim states 
(Ghanea Bassiri, 2010; Cainkar, 2009). 
 Connecting these two trends, Anny Bakalian and Mehdi Bozorgmehr claim 
that following 9/11 Muslim Americans lived a life of double consciousness. On the 
one hand, they were Americans who had witnessed the horrors of 9/11, just as 
other citizens. On the other hand, many of them fit the description of what was 
considered the dangerous Other. Muslim Americans were now seen as distrustful 
and expected to explain their religion. This backlash in turn increased group 
solidarity amongst Muslim Americans, but it also left a back door open to those who 
could escape this association due to their appearance. The hyperbolic trial of Islam 
after 9/11 put the religion in the public eye, and as a byproduct made Islam an 
official U.S. religion (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr, 2009). 
 Another cleavage for Muslim Americans is age. Youths were particularly 
affected by the events of 9/11. Many youths have grown up in an America in which 
they are viewed as terrorists rather than as equal citizens. Often, these youths are 
held responsible for actions that they are unconnected to. This environment has 
created a world of missed opportunities for many young Muslim Americans. Further, 
it has created a world of resistance, anger, and ambivalence. These dynamics have 
led to cultural anxiety amongst many young Muslim Americans (Sirin and Fin, 
2008). 
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 Another cleavage for Muslim American is gender. In Islam, women are seen 
as oppressed (Sarroub, 2006). Following 9/11, it became the West’s responsibility 
to liberate these women from the patriarchy of Islam. The most glaring symbol of 
this patriarchy to the West is the hijab. Yet, many Muslim American women wear 
the hijab not as a sign of oppression, but rather a sign of strength. To these women 
the hijab carries many symbols such as a representation of free choice or as a 
demonstration against the hegemony of the U.S. (Haddad, Smith, Moore, 2006). 
 To be clear, the hijab refers to the Islamic dressing for women, although 
veiling dates to pre-Islamic times. The hijab was originally a sign of status as not all 
women could afford the headscarf. The hijab is typically understood as the 
headscarf on a Muslim women, although the niqab, or face veil, is sometimes 
grouped in with the hijab. Islam holds that the hijab is meant to preserve a Muslim 
women’s modesty. In protecting modesty, the hijab symbolizes that the women has 
been sanctified to a man and is therefore off limits to all others. In addition, the 
hijab is meant to symbolize that a women is much more than just her physical 
appearance when engaged in social interaction (Beliefnet.com, 2014). 
 Yet another significant cleavage for Muslim Americans is race. African-
Americans constitute the largest racial group within Islam. However, the majority of 
African Americans express their version of Islam differently than other ethnic 
groups, such as Arabs and Asians. Within the African-American Muslim community, 
one of the most important issues is whether to incorporate themselves into the 
larger population of Muslim Americans, or rather to separate themselves and 
develop a separate identity, as advocated by the Nation of Islam. This tension is 
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found in the traditional Islamic view of community. One view is of the ummah, 
which is boundary transcending and unifying in the pursuit of creating a worldwide 
Islamic community. The second is view if of ‘asabiyah, which holds that boundaries 
should be erected between one’s own community and the outside to strengthen 
kinship relations (McCloud, 1995). 
 That Nation of Islam is a leading Black Muslim separatist group. This group 
claims that all who do not belong to their group are “evil” and “ungodly.” Therefore, 
the Nation of Islam advocates a struggle to separate their group from other Muslim 
American groups (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2013).  As such, the Nation of 
Islam is an ethnic nationalist group.  
 Through the lens of Michael Billig, the Nation of Islam is a “bad nationalism,” 
while the traditional view of the American community, as well as the Islamic 
community, are “good nationalisms.” Billig claims that many people consider ethnic 
nationalism to be dangerous, radical, and a challenge to the status quo. 
Conversely, civic nationalism is the good nationalism since it is supposedly more 
stable, given that it is not a challenge the status quo (Billig, 1995).  
 As stated, the Nation of Islam is an example of such bad nationalism. This 
version of Islam is expressly radical. In opposition to the agenda of the Nation of 
Islam are other Muslim American communities. As noted in the literature, many 
other Muslim American communities seek to find its place within the idea of the 
American community through integration and accommodation (Johnson, 2012). 
While there are some radical elements within the Muslim American community, 
these individuals constitute a minority. Therefore, I place the Muslim American 
community as a group within the larger civic nationalism of America. 
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 While on the surface this dichotomy of good nationalism and bad nationalism 
seems straightforward, it is undoubtedly more complicated.  For instance, what 
constitutes an African American?  In the United States, race, ethnicity, and skin 
color is a dynamic that is constantly renegotiated by forces such as politics, 
economics, and social forces. This racial formation occurs not only within the group, 
but also within the larger society. These two levels interact and change meanings of 
race. As a result of this dynamism, the concept of race is constantly in tension 
(Winant, 2001). 
 An example of racial formation in America and how it is defined from without, 
as well as from within, is provided by the story of the orthodox Greek priest who in 
2009 was attacked in Tampa. The priest had become lost and went out looking for 
directions. As is customary with Greek Orthodox priests, this gentleman had a long 
beard and was also wearing a robe. The Greek priest eventually found and 
approached a reservist Marine. The Marine ended up beating the Greek priest with 
a tire iron and claiming that the man was a terrorist who started to yell “Allah 
Akbar!" Eventually, the Marine pinned the non-English speaking priest to the 
ground and waited for the police to arrive (Tampa Bay Times, Nov. 10, 2009).  
 This case illustrates the ambiguity of reading and interpreting ethnic markers 
and attributing “race” in America. To some Americans, if you do not look the part, 
you are not American. This means that many Americans have a clear idea of what a 
Muslim American looks like. Simply put, they do not look like “us.” Accordingly, 
African American Muslims are more likely to fit with what an American is supposed 
to look like given the history they have in the United States. However, an Arab or 
Iranian is less likely to match with the image of American. This exclusion is due to 
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several factors, such as historical experience, political and social access, and media 
bias. Nonetheless, darker skinned Muslim Americans are less likely to “pass” as 
Americans when compared to their African American cohorts.  
 Given the ambiguity of what constitutes race in America, as well as the 
choice by members of the Nation of Islam to exclude themselves from civic 
American nationalism, I am not including African American Muslims in my sample. 
Hence, their exclusion from my sample brings my sample size down to twenty-four 
Muslim American participants.  
  
Getting to Know Muslim America 
During the course of my interviews, there were broad areas of overlap between the 
responses I received from my subjects. The portrayal of the responses from my 
subjects is not meant to homogenize Muslim Americans. Rather it is to show that 
there are some commonalities in the types of responses I received. In what follows 
I avoid very general and sweeping statements. Instead, to be more specific I speak 
of “some groups among” or "certain individuals.” When I could not be more specific 
and group responses, I discuss the range of responses that I recorded from the 
subjects. The purpose of displaying these responses is to show that American 
Muslims cannot be universalized. 
 During the course of my interviews, I asked all respondents what the primary 
influence is on their American identity. This question by far was the most difficult 
for respondents to answer. They often stated something to the effect that they had 
never given consideration to what made them American. After contemplating the 
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question, most respondents answered that Islam was the primary influence on their 
identity. For me, this was an unexpected finding. I expected respondents to say 
something to the effect that because they were born in the United States it 
influenced their sense of national being. Instead, most respondents tended to put 
their religion first before their national identity. That is to say that they viewed 
themselves as Muslim Americans rather than American Muslims. 
 As X, age 19, female, born in the US, undergraduate student stated:  
Growing up my identity was more driven by my Arabness, from watching Al 
Jazeera at home and see[ing] my family and their pain from things happening 
overseas, and not really understanding it. I think growing up I have taken a 
step back my Arab identity and started to explore my Muslim identity all the 
while being an American. I was told that you can be whatever you want to be 
and that you have all the opportunities in the world. I live in a country where 
you can walk down the street and meet people from all over the world. Within 
that country, I focus on my religion to become the best person I can be. 
(Interview conducted October 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
 
Another respondent, D, 27, male, born in the US, undergraduate student said:  
 
I’ve been raised here my whole life. I feel American since I’ve lived here. The 
thing that I do is make sure that my religion always stays with me. My 
religion always comes first before anything else, whether or not society 
believes I should be doing something else. I look to my religion before I look 
to American society. (Interview conducted September 11th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
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 I do not believe these statements to be particular to Islam. In fact, I expect 
that many different religious groups identify their religion as the key driver in their 
life. To the religious, their religious identification is eternal, while their national 
identity is only temporary. Therefore, while the two identities are not mutually 
exclusive, the religious identity does have deeper, longer lasting bonds.  As such, 
religion is a primary driver in how Muslim Americans live their lives during their 
time within the United States. 
 
 I followed the question about the primary influence on one’s identity with a 
question asking whether Islam and American national identity were incompatible. 
Many respondents stated that their religious and national identities were not 
incompatible. In fact, a majority of respondents claimed, the American national 
identity reinforced their Muslim identity. Of these respondents, they stated that this 
reinforcement was particular to America since in many other countries the legal 
protections enjoyed in the United States do not exist. Therefore, by expressing their 
American identity, some Muslim Americans were actually empowering their religious 
identity.  
 As Y, 21, female, born in the US, head of a Tampa-based NGO stated:  
There is a lot of dialogue and debate about this in Islam....We were giving guidelines 
like, Sharia, for example, a really contested word.... we were giving guidelines by 
scholars which say punishments for death or adultery or gangs. These are the things 
that were ruled upon after the time of the Prophet, things that God deemed 
problems all throughout the civilization of humanity.  Everything else was open to 
interpretation. Everything else a metaphor....You have to listen to the people in 
higher positions of leadership, and be respectful to one other, to be open and fair 
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and just. So we were given these guidelines, but the guidelines do not dictate our 
way of life. Our way of life is to be dictated in consultation with one another. America 
is a country that has a history of many different ethnicities, each with their own 
niche. Right now, it’s about American Muslims finding their niche. In creating what it 
means to be an American Muslim. (Interview conducted October 22nd, 2013, Tampa, 
FL) 
Another participant, A, age 41, male, born in the US, leader of a local mosque 
stated:  
I’m a traveler. One thing I noticed is that once you go out in the world, you realize 
that no matter where you go, you’ll never fully fit in. You always like American food. 
You’ll like the music. We like the way we talk. No matter how well I speak their 
language, it’ll never be good enough.... The certain way we think as Americans, 
though not necessarily un-Islamic, is open-minded, reasonable, logical, scientific. 
Here we listen. We hear you out and try to accommodate and be reasonable with 
others. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
 As such, certain respondents did not believe that there is anything 
incompatible with being Muslim and an American. To these respondents, their 
national identity is simply one more layer to who they are. That is to say that there 
is no conflict between their religious and national identities. These respondents did 
not believe there was a requirement to take sides, or to believe that Islam or 
America is always in the right. Instead, to these individuals, it was a much more 
nuanced way of understanding oneself.  This viewpoint corresponds with the Quran, 
which states that God created all mankind and placed them in different nations and 
tribes. Therefore, to be a Muslim American is permissible since each individual has 
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a duty to their own nation. This duty is both to be a good Muslim and to be a good 
citizen within the territory that they reside. 
 My control group expressed similar sentiments about religion and nationality. 
To these non-Muslims respondents, religion could be understood as just one more 
aspect to their identity. However, this religious aspect was not in conflict with their 
national identity. Many respondents in my control group also noted that as part of 
their Christian faith they were required to be a good citizen.  
 As part of a psychological method of word association, respondents were also 
asked to name words that came into their mind when I mentioned the word 
“American national identity.” Of the responses, one definitive trend emerged. The 
trend was that most respondents would either mention all words that had a positive 
or negative connotation. Put another way, if a respondent mentioned all positive 
terms, they would not mentioned negative terms when describing American 
national identity. The converse was also true. Some of the more frequent positive 
responses were: passport, citizenship, free, choice, liberal, encompassing, no-fear, 
freedom of speech, open mindedness, exceptionalism, idealism, tolerance, 
opportunity, and coexistence.  As seen in Table 5, the two most frequent positive 
responses were freedom of speech and opportunity. Some of the more frequent 
negative responses were superpower, hegemon, policeman of the world, credit 
cards, debt, disenfranchisement, consumer, corporations, wealthy, economic 
barriers, banks, loans, and deceived. As seen in Table 6, the two most frequent 
responses were corporations and bank.   
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Table 5: Top positive responses to words associated with American 
national identity 
Top Positive Responses Number of responses 
freedom of speech 12 respondents 
opportunity 12 respondents 
free 11 respondents 
choice 9 respondents 
liberal 9 respondents 
no-fear 7 respondents 
Passport 6 respondents 
open mindedness 5 respondents 
exceptionalism 5 respondents 
idealism 5 respondents 
tolerance 4 respondents 
citizenship 4 respondents 
coexistence  2 respondents 
 
Table 6: Top negative responses to words associated with American 
national identity 
Top  Negative Responses Number of responses 
corporations 14 respondents 
banks 10 respondents 
policeman of the world 9 respondents 
credit cards 9 respondents 
debt 8 respondents 
disenfranchisement 6 respondents 
consumer 6 respondents 
superpower 6 respondents 
wealthy 5 respondents 
economic barriers 3 respondents 
hegemon 3 respondents 
loans 2 respondents 
deceived 2 respondents 
 
 I interpret the positive responses, especially the two most frequent 
responses, to mean that respondents believe that America is a country of 
acceptance. Even as the Other within the United States, these individuals still 
believe that they can cross over and fulfill the “American dream.” The responses 
show that no matter what their current situation, they believe that they can still 
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mold their future. That is to say, they do not subscribe to a determinist outlook, a 
viewpoint which is often credited with keeping the countries they and their families 
immigrated from socially and politically impeded. In essence, these respondents 
subscribe to narrative put forth in “white America.” 
 Regarding the negative responses, people in the developing world share 
many of these downbeat word associations. These responses illustrate the 
connection between immigrants and their homeland. Although these individuals live 
in America, they are still connected to the lands from which they or their families 
emigrated from. Therefore, I believe that the people who shared negative 
responses are taking a critical view of what it means to be in an American as a 
result of the War on Terror. Although these respondents may feel repressed, they 
are still expressing their American right to dissent. Through this act, these 
individuals are negotiating what it means to be an American. 
 That being said, one respondent noted that there is not one word to describe 
American national identity. Instead, he said, there are many different subsets 
within America who define the national identity in many different ways. Yet, this 
respondent noted, there are some who wish to monopolize what it means to be 
American, and this he stated, is un-American. 
 
The Effect of Age on Muslim Identity 
The first question I asked my sample is if there are “differences in how older Muslim 
Americans understand their American identity when compared to younger Muslim 
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Americans.” This question was almost universally interpreted to mean differences 
between the immigrant generation and second generation Muslim Americans who 
were born in the U.S. and became U.S. citizens. A high number of respondents held 
that indeed there is a difference between these generations in that the first 
generation typically was fleeing repression in a home country or looking for better 
economic opportunities, which caused them to come to America. The majority who 
held this view claimed that these first generation immigrants did not assimilate into 
the American culture but instead remained distinct. This choice to remain distinct 
was not a result of choosing not to assimilate into the new culture. Rather, the 
distinctiveness of these immigrant Muslims was due to these individuals placing 
more emphasis on other endeavors such as providing for one’s family. Restated, 
these immigrants did not have the resources to assimilate into their new culture. 
 As Y informed me:  
The older community has this mentality that I'm going back home. I'm here 
to make some money, to take care of my kids, and I go back home. They 
never do. They never go back home. They have a very disenfranchised and 
disconnected identity. They're not civically involved Americans....In the 
younger community they're in this phase were they are trying to understand 
who they are in the Muslim American community. The older community, I 
kind of look of them like the immigrant community. Mentally they have 
created their own identity. This identity is not mutually exclusive to the 
American identity. They do not understand what it means to be an American, 
whereas in the younger community are trying to mold this identity. (Interview 
conducted October 22nd, 2013, Tampa, FL)  
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 Again, a high number of respondents believed that there is a difference 
between generations because most of the elders did not see America as the home 
for them. That being said, I was unable to interview any older Muslim Americans 
holding this view, and therefore cannot confirm the validity of this belief. 
Respondents also claimed that those who were born in the U.S. it was easier for 
them to assimilate into American society. When pressed, respondents who held this 
view claimed that the reason that many had a hard time with adjusting was 
attributed to the land that they left behind. If the immigrant came from the Middle 
East, these respondents claimed, they remained connected to the land and culture. 
However, for the younger generation, they grew up learning the history and stories 
of the West. For this younger generation, it was easy to move and pick up since 
they did not have roots to a land going back hundreds of years. As such, it was 
harder for the older generation because they still had a strong attachment to the 
land that their families had resided on since time immemorial. While the young 
were exposed to these lands through the stories they heard, in practice they were 
more familiarized with America. This disjunction became most pronounced when 
the young would go back to visit the lands that their parents had told them about. 
Interestingly, some participants informed me that when they would go back home, 
that was the moment when they felt most American.   
 A smaller proportion of respondents believed that the reason these 
immigrants remained distinct from U.S. culture is that in the societies they come 
from, they are not used to engaging with the state. These are often repressive 
regimes where it is better to keep one’s head down and not cause problems rather 
than to engage with the state. This lack of experience in engagement meant that 
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when these immigrants arrive in the United States they do not absorb their new 
culture since they are reluctant to engage in an exchange of ideas.  
 As Hassan Shibley from the Tampa chapter of the Council on American 
Islamic Relations (CAIR) put it:  
They are not used to having the freedoms that we have taken for granted 
often in this country. You find them a little more hesitant to be involved, to 
voice out their opinions, to object more. They have more deference to 
authority. There you question authority, you get locked up... They don’t want 
to create a scene, don’t want to create a ruckus. (Interview conducted August 
26th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
 These same respondents went on to tell me that as a Muslim family begins to 
spread its roots in the United States, the second generation that grows up in 
America has more opportunities to assimilate than the first generation. Of course, 
these statements do not compare with my claims to racialization and Othering. This 
is due to identity, in that one might hold a view about oneself that is at odds with 
what other feel. It also may mean that although these individuals may not be 
“white” today, in the future, with more resources, these individuals can access 
white America. Accordingly, some Muslim Americans in my sample still bought into 
the idea of the American dream, while also recognizing their diminished status in 
America. These views are not necessarily at odds. One can be racialized and 
Othered. Yet, the pull of the idea of the American dream can be so powerful that 
these individuals look past their misrecognition in the hopes that one day they can 
access the reverence of being white in America.   
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 These same respondents reported that the second generation is not 
burdened with a lack of time and money. Indeed, the first generation makes sure 
that the second generation has ample resources to adopt the American culture. 
Moreover, this second generation does not grow up with the mentality that they are 
guests in another country. They see themselves as belonging in the United States 
as much as anyone else does. Physically they are encouraged by the first 
generation to fit in. That is to say, they are discouraged from growing beards or 
wearing the hijab. In fact, in some households individuals are encouraged to “be 
American” first and Muslim second. 
 This corresponds with what A stated:  
With immigrants, generally when they come here as adults for education or 
business or whatever purposes they retain their identity. It is still tied to 
where they’re from in India, Pakistan, wherever. When they have kids here 
and the kids are born and raised here then there’s a difference between these 
groups and the immigrant who is still a Pakistani, Iranian, Iraqi or whatever. 
They’re just attaining their citizenship, while their kids are much more open to 
becoming acculturated. They like hamburger and fries and not the food of the 
homeland. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 These same individuals believed that the older generation practiced their 
faith in a traditional way, while the younger generation tended to get away from 
tradition. This act was attributed to those who were born here more ably connecting 
with what it means to “be American,” all the while still practicing Islam. Therefore, 
a main difference between the old and the young was in religious practice, with the 
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younger practicing what they believed to be modern Islam and the older practicing 
“traditional” Islam.  
 These second and third generation Muslims Americans, a minority of 
respondents believed, were more progressive than the first generation. However, 
several respondents reported that as the second- and third generation Muslims 
grow older, they tended to grow more conservative. This change in political 
orientations was attributed to these individuals looking back on the history of their 
family and noticing the changes that had occurred over the generations. This 
retrospective assessment supposedly caused some Muslim Americans to reach back 
to their roots and to re-identify with the values that were cherished in earlier 
generations. In fact, during the course of my interviews I met with several third 
generation Muslim Americans who expressed conservative views of Islam, and who 
felt that their generation had gotten away from “the roots” of Islam. 
 When compared to the Muslim American subjects, my control group 
expressed dissimilar views about age and nationality. In fact, they interpreted the 
question in a completely different way. This was a result of these individuals having 
a completely different experience in America. They were not recent immigrants, 
and all were either non-religious or of a Christian sect. The majority of these non-
Muslims were white, with one African American. Therefore, these individuals 
constituted the mainstream of American identity, while Muslim Americans remain 
part of the Other within America. 
 Interestingly, most of the non-Muslim respondents answered this question by 
focusing on military veterans. These older Americans, most respondents believed, 
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associated their identities with important military historical events, such as World 
War II and the Vietnam War. Accordingly, these older Americans shared a common 
sense of what constitutes American national identity through their common 
sacrifices. By contrast, most respondents claimed, many younger Americans did not 
have these common experiences. Younger Americans were seen by most 
respondents as more individualistic and disconnected from traditional notions of 
American national identity.  
 These dissimilar responses by Muslim Americans and non-Muslim Americans 
display how these two very different groups understand American identity. For the 
former, it is about adapting to America and carving out their space. For the latter, it 
is about understanding the roots of American identity and how it changes across 
generations. 
 
The Effect of Gender on Muslim Identity 
In regards to gender and identity, almost all respondents in some way discussed 
the hijab. To most respondents, this was the mark of a Muslim woman’s identity.  
Despite this identification, many respondents were split on whether or not it was 
required in Islam to wear the hijab. Respondents noted that some women wear it 
all the time; some wear it sometimes; and some wear it only on Friday. Overall, 
determining how much to wear the hijab was believed to be a function of one’s 
interpretation of the faith, as well as societal pressures. 
 About half of respondents believed that the hijab was a way to assert a 
Muslim women’s identity in a climate which is not hospitable to Muslims, i.e. the 
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War on Terror. Rather than being seen as a sign of oppression, the hijab in many 
instances was viewed as a positive sign of expression. These same respondents also 
agreed that women who wear the hijab are putting themselves on the frontline in 
defense of the faith. Therefore, it was held, one does not have to wear the hijab to 
be a Muslim women, yet those women who were the hijab were the most strident 
defenders of Islam. These Muslim women were on the forefront, the ambassadors 
of the faith. Therefore, dressing in their faith, these respondents held, strengthened 
their religious identity. 
 Further, some respondents held women get more sympathy from the public 
since they were seen as having made it in the white collar world. In the business 
world, Muslim women were viewed as breaking through the ceiling, which in this 
case was the “oppression” that they face by male Muslims. As a result, these 
women had the right to wear to hijab since they had battled the sources of 
oppression in their community, society, academia, and the business world. 
Accordingly, Muslim women could actually use the hijab to express the drive and 
desire to make it in the business world. 
 Most respondents believed that men could more easily fit into the everyday 
American life than women. One respondent held that a Muslim man could claim to a 
Mexican or Italian or even a hipster and deny being from the Middle East or a 
Muslim. These respondents claimed that Muslim men were more able to self-select 
when to identity as a Muslim and when to fit in to everyday life. One respondent 
claimed the men “get fuzzy around the edges.” What this subject meant was that 
men could pick and choose when to be Muslim. For instance, men could pick and 
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choose when to wear a beard or at what length to keep their beard. In another 
instance of their selectivity, Muslim men could wear form-fitting business attire to 
work, whereas Muslim women have to go out of their way to find modest dress 
which could also be considered acceptable in the business world.  
 B shared this point, age 20, male, born in the US, undergraduate student 
who stated:  
In this issue of identity, men and women probably share the same 
complexities, the same issues. If anything the women may be may feel a bit 
more comfortable with their identity, with some of the inherent complexities 
that are there because of being a Muslim and an American. For me, it is the 
men generally; the men have much more of a problem with that [i.e. being 
Muslim and American]. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
 My control group again expressed dissimilar views about gender and 
nationality when compared to Muslim Americans. To these non-Muslim respondents, 
traditionally in America there were differences in how male and female Americans 
understood their national identity. They claimed that historically the male identity 
was seen as superior due to their sacrifices in war, while the female identity was 
inferior since they were not viewed as making the same sacrifices as men. 
However, the majority of respondents held that gender differences were decreasing 
among male and female Americans. 
 Both Muslims and non-Muslim respondents saw women as making strides in 
overcoming gender differences. To Muslims, women were on the frontline in 
defense of the faith. To non-Muslims, women were finally achieving gender 
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equality. Therefore, when comparing both groups, women are assuming more 
important positions within American society. 
 
The Effect of Education on Muslim Identity 
More than half of respondents viewed education as bridging the gap between reality 
and ideals. These respondents did not believe that all Americans were born equally 
and have the same chances. As such, respondents believed that they had to work 
harder than those who were born into privilege in order to achieve success in 
America. Accordingly, these same Muslim Americans believe that they are 
empowered by formal education. It should also be noted that many Muslim 
American respondents believed that there is a relation between the Islamic faith 
requiring all followers seek to knowledge and their need to seek further education 
in order to achieve success in the U.S.  
 These respondents believed that education would bridge this gap in that, by 
attending school, immigrants could learn the unofficial language of the United 
States. It was stated by one respondent that once an immigrant mastered the 
English language, they could converse with the majority, and through language, 
become part of the majority. Conversely, those who do not master the English 
language were seen as being locked out of the American identity and were more 
likely to become disgruntled outsiders within American society. Further, some 
respondents claimed that education enables Muslim Americans to adopt certain 
values and symbols of the dominant culture. In the process of this exposure to 
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other ways of life, these respondents claimed that Muslim Americans became more 
Americanized, and more consumer driven. 
 As C, age 20, female, born in the US, undergraduate student claimed:  
Education is the key to success, meaning without a degree you can’t do very 
much. Education is what gives you the ability to move up in status and 
acquire jobs and make a better income. Education is the foundation. For 
someone that doesn’t take their education seriously, their lives become 
disrupted. These people find that it’s harder to find a life here and to progress 
as an American Muslim, even within our community. We are very 
sophisticated and educated and contribute to the sciences and medicines. We 
contributed to the Renaissance. We are not unintelligent people. But 
unfortunately in some situations we are painted as backwards. (Interview 
conducted October 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
However, education was not seen as an end in itself. As Y put it:  
Being a doctor does not necessarily make you a more open minded person in 
the community. Your level of education is not always going to drive your level 
of humanity. If you are more educated and more driven to succeed in terms 
of attaining different degrees, it says something about you but it doesn’t 
really say anything about your enlightenment. (Interview conducted October 
22rd, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 On the whole, education was believed to solve many conflicts of identity. This 
was attributed to a secular education, which makes individuals deal with a whole 
wide variety of people. This experience gave Muslim Americans exposure to 
different peoples, cultures, and backgrounds. However, some held that religious 
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education was also important. Respondents claimed this was due to Islam already 
providing the answers to the conflicts of identity.  To respondents, if they knew 
about their religion, they knew about themselves. This confidence enabled them to 
find their place within America. 
 My control group expressed similar sentiments about education and 
nationality when compared to Muslim Americans. To the majority of non-Muslim 
respondents, education allows one to become more worldly and tolerant. It also 
provides access to social and economic mobility. Finally, many respondents noted 
that education helps to sort out the many conflicting identities. That is to say, it 
helps people understand who they are. 
 
The Effect of Economic Class on Muslim Americans 
Many respondents believed that economic class impacts Muslim American identity. 
Virtually every respondent mentioned that in the Muslim community there is an 
emphasis on becoming economically successful. In fact, there is an inside joke that 
all Muslims go to college to either become a doctor or engineer, two careers which 
pay lucratively. This joke bases itself on the belief that in the Muslim community 
you want to become financially successful so that you can find the best possible 
partner. 
 As Y, age 19, female, undergraduate student informed me:  
Money is a big thing in Islam. It’s either a big blessing or a big test. A lot of 
the elements with education are perceived to be worldly. When you have 
wealth, you supposed to give to charity. You’re not supposed to be miserly. 
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One of the tenants of Islam is giving. If you seek a higher education, you 
receive more money. If you receive more money, you should give back to the 
community. Your income helps to form your identity, makes you more 
comfortable in connecting to the American lifestyle.....If you have more 
money, you’re taken more seriously. (Interview conducted October 17nd, 
2013, Tampa, FL) 
 Other respondents believed that Muslims who were better off had a religious 
obligation to give back. This was due to God bestowing upon them good fortune. As 
such, these better off Muslim Americans were able to give more Islamic obligatory 
charitable contributions, or zakat, than other Muslims who were not as well off. 
 As X put it: 
Islam is very much a lifestyle since you’re taught to take care the poor and 
give back to charity. This is very much a part of who we are from a very 
young age. You’re told take care of those less well off. Socially it brings 
together people from different classes.  It creates more understanding for 
people from different economic backgrounds.  (Interview conducted 
September 30th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
 One consequence of this economic fortune is that when Muslims have their 
basic needs taken care of, they increasingly want to showcase their Muslim identity.  
Thus, if you are better off, you were able to travel more. For instance, a wealthy 
Muslim American can participate in the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, or the Hajj, 
that all Muslims are supposed to make at least once in their lifetime. However, the 
Hajj is a travel destination that is unattainable to those who lack the means.  
 99 
 
 Further, if Muslim Americans have the means, they could travel to other 
countries and become more worldly. Therefore, a better financial position allowed 
Muslim Americans to become more globalized. For instance, if they had the money 
they could travel back to the land of their ancestors. This experience allowed 
participants who were better off to engage in more cross-cultural experiences than 
those who came from the lower class strata. 
 The other side, some respondents held, is that as Muslims become better off 
they also may want to not show off their faith. That is to say, they want to 
downplay their Islamic identity so as to fit into some social circles. One respondent 
noted that he knew of a Muslim family who gained good fortune only to move into a 
gated community and downplay their Islamic faith. Another respondent held that he 
knew of a secular Muslim family where one child wanted to adopt the secular 
identity and another child wanted to adopt a more traditional Muslim identity. The 
parents ended up forcing the second child to act against his will and to dress more 
modern and secular so as not embarrass the family.  
 Conversely, one respondent claimed, that if one is not well off, the Islamic 
religion is blamed by outsiders as being the reason that a Muslim family is poor. If 
Islam is one’s religion, some subjects believed that government assistant providers 
looked down on them and held that it was their oppressive religion which caused 
their economic backwardness. This plays into the stigmatized view of the Muslim 
faith as originating in a land of poverty, sexism, and social impediment.  
 When compared to Muslim Americans, my control group expressed similar 
sentiments about economic class and nationality. To many non-Muslim 
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respondents, economic class was tied to the American dream. This connection 
meant that in America everyone has the chance to succeed and do well 
economically. Several respondents noted that the better off economically Americans 
become, the less attachment they feel to American national identity. Several other 
respondents also noted that the better off one is economically, the more chances 
they have to travel and to become more worldly. Again, these responses were very 
similar to those made by the Muslim American subjects. 
 
Interaction 
Regarding the question whether certain groups, political or otherwise, treat Muslims 
better than other groups, a majority of respondents noted a conflict between the 
Republican and Democratic parties. On the one hand, many noted how Islam fits 
with the conservative movement with its focus on traditional family values. 
However, it was also noted that the Republican Party has become a party of 
exclusion, and that if you were not white you were treated as a dangerous Other.  
 E, age 31, female, doctoral student told me:  
I am more affiliated with the Democratic Party, especially after the Republican 
convention in seeing that there’s nobody else but white people there. You 
don’t have to be educated to see that....I don’t fit in with them just because 
of my skin color, my hair color, my background. I know in the past 
conservative Muslims have gone on to be Republicans because they think of 
the conservative religious values that they provide. I wish there was a middle 
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party. That’s the road I really fit in. (Interview conducted September 18th, 
2013, Tampa, FL) 
 Conversely, it was stated that although the Democratic Party is much more 
inclusive, the progressive values of the Democrats do not fit with the values of 
Islam. Despite this view, it was claimed that the Democratic Party is much more 
tolerant and allows conservative values to exist under their movement. As such, 
although many respondents have attachments to the Republican Party, they are 
actually embraced by the Democratic Party.  
 People who are “of the book” such as Jews and Christians were seen by most 
respondents as willing to engage with local Muslims. A few respondents mentioned 
that they had engaged in inter-faith dialogue with other Abrahamic religions.  There 
were no reported instances of these other religious individuals attempting to 
convert Muslims. Instead, these respondents commented on the positive experience 
and the opportunity to “better know how others think.” 
 As C put it:   
A lot of other religions are accepting of my Muslim identity. I’ve been to 
churches and they’re pretty accepting. I can’t hide the fact that I’m a Muslim 
and they’re very welcoming. They’ve never tried to convert me. They’re very 
welcoming. Other religions are always very accepting. (Interview conducted 
October 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 As the statement by C indicates, the Muslim Americans in my sample 
did not encounter much, if any, discrimination by other religions. Rather, 
these participants were often at odds with the internal politics of America. 
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Perhaps, due to other non-Islamic religious groups encountering persecution 
at times over their history, they are open to dialogue with Muslims. This 
acceptance by other non-Islamic religious groups indicates that Muslim 
Americans are not necessarily under threat by other religions, but rather by 
nationalist sentiment that is defined in non-Islamic terms. 
 
Discrimination 
Regarding discrimination, many respondents held that they are targeted. Some 
subjects responded that they had met people who did not understand that Muslim 
and Islam is related or who believed that Islam is a violent religion. Several other 
individuals informed me that they had come across people who claimed that all 
Muslims are terrorists. However, many of these same respondents stated that these 
experiences were limited. They also held that the discrimination they face today is 
not different than the discrimination that other minority groups faced in the past.  
F, age 20, female, undergraduate student said:  
In high school, there were a lot of people who didn’t understand where I 
came from, who I really am. They were more influenced by others. I went to 
a school where there were lots of cliques. The majority of the students there 
were white and they were from the upper-class in South Tampa. There were a 
lot of school clubs. Some of them wanted me to join. There was Jewish club 
that wanted me to join and I told him no. The girl then asked where I’m from, 
and I said from here. They said no. What’s your religion, and I told her I’m a 
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Muslim. She took the paper [away about the school club] from me and walked 
away.... (Interview conducted November 4th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 Other respondents felt that they are not equal under the law, regardless of 
whether they were born in the United States. It was noted that if a white person 
says that they hate the president, they are expressing freedom of speech. 
However, if a Muslim says that they hate the president they will be arrested for 
making threats against the president. Several subjects stated that this lack of 
equality stemmed from Muslims having few leaders in American politics. Several 
Muslims informed me that they could overcome this inequality if, as a group, they 
became more politically active. Still, many of the same respondents mentioned that 
another obstacle to achieving equality would only occur after changing the narrative 
that the United States is a Christian country.  To overcome this bias, subjects 
claimed that those on the right needed to be reminded that America was founded 
on religious freedom. 
G, age 47, female, teacher said:  
There been times where I’ve been discriminated against when it comes to 
jobs. I was to get a catering job when the whole issue happened in Benghazi. 
The day after that the women called and told me I’m sorry but I don’t want 
you working with us. I asked her why and she said it might cause a little bit of 
tension. She said it would be better if you didn’t work with us, but I can refer 
you to someone else. I was like wow but okay. I didn’t take it any further. It’s 
not the end of the world. It’s your loss, you know... (Interview conducted 
November 4th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
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 At the same time, several Muslims held that they understood why they are 
discriminated against. These individuals stated that as long as individuals such as 
themselves “blew stuff up” they understood why they had to go through extra 
scrutiny. In this way, several participants normalized the discrimination that they 
face every day. These individuals had grown used to added scrutiny in the post-
9/11 world. What really brought this normalization to the fore was that several 
individuals made jokes about this discrimination.  This flippant talk seemed to mask 
a deeper desire to become part of the dominant group and to dispel and notions 
that they are radical and dangerous. 
 
Conclusion 
The Muslim Americans of Tampa Bay are as diverse as Muslims that can be found 
anywhere in America. Given that they identify by religion, they tend to emphasize 
their religious devotion over their national patriotism. However, this does not mean 
that they are some sort of fifth column within the United States. Rather, these 
individuals are no different than any other religious individual. They see Islam as 
their guiding principle within America. This is similar to how a Christian or Jew lives 
within their religious principles in America. 
 The principles and values of America are very important to Muslim 
Americans. Respondents were aware that they could not exercise their religion as 
they do in America if they were located in some other country. In fact, this 
openness of America allows Muslim Americans to become even more religious. 
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Again, this increased religiosity does not displace their sense of Americaness. 
Rather, it adds to their sense of identity. 
 Age, gender, class, and education, were all seen as variables that impact the 
identity of Muslim Americans. To the young, they have less difficulty in assimilating 
to American culture. Conversely, older Muslim American immigrants retain their 
traditional identity, but are supportive of their kin, in that they wanted them to 
adopt the American identity. In regards to gender, women are seen as being on the 
front line in defense of the religion. The hijab was seen not as a sign of oppression, 
but rather as a symbol challenging the hegemony of the West. Class was seen as 
both negatively and positively impacting Muslim American identity. Depending on 
whether one was rich or poor would either add to or decrease the image of their 
Muslim identity. Finally, education was seen as bridging the gap for immigrant 
Muslims. It also allowed American Muslims to come into contact with others, which 
in effect taught them toleration. 
 Muslim Americans had no problem interacting with other social groups. 
Respondents claimed that they were most likely to interact with people from other 
Abrahamic religions. While respondents did encounter some discrimination in 
America, it was not overly pervasive. Of note, many respondents made jokes about 
this discrimination which could signal their desire to join with the dominant group at 
any cost. In the next chapter, I will be discussing the impact of US foreign policy 
towards the Middle East on Muslim Americans. 
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CHAPTER 3: How Muslim Americans Interpret American Foreign Policy 
In this chapter, I discuss How Muslim Americans interpret American Foreign Policy. 
In what follows, I detail respondents’ overwhelmingly negative view of U.S.-Middle 
East foreign policy. In my study, most respondents expressed the belief that as a 
consequence of the United States foreign policy towards the Middle East, they 
ended up being grouped in with the Others that America was fighting in the War on 
Terror. This finding confirms my hypothesis that U.S. foreign policy towards the 
Middle East has racialized Muslim Americans, in that the discourse of the War on 
Terror has placed them at a disadvantage relative to white America. Further, my 
findings show that as a result of this racialization Muslim Americans are aware of 
their double consciousness, in that they are forced to view themselves from their 
own unique perspective, but also through the eyes of another who sees them as 
part of the dangerous Other. Accordingly, from this perspective, Muslim Americans 
view their identity as detached from the American identity.  
 In what follows, I first discuss the literature on the impact on the identity of 
Japanese Americans as a consequence of World War II. I discuss this literature in 
order to draw parallels between the two war time periods, WWII (1939-45) and the 
War on Terror (2001-current) to demonstrate that radicalizing American citizens is 
a familiar experience in American national history. Second, I address the impact of 
what became known as 9/11 on American Muslim identity. In order to show impact 
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I address perceptions pre- and post- 9/11. Third, I discuss how Muslim Americans 
perceive American foreign policy and how America addresses the Other we are 
fighting “over there” impacts how they view themselves “here.” Next, I discuss the 
responses from my subjects relating to their difficulty with integration. Finally, I 
compare the responses of my subjects with the responses given by Pew Research 
respondents. I make this comparison to demonstrate the impressions expressed by 
those in my sample that lived through some experiences and to reveal any changes 
in attitude over the past 7 years.- 
 
Japanese Americans and American Foreign Policy 
Racialization of minority groups as a result of foreign policy has precedence in the 
United States. During World War II, Japanese Americans were labeled as 
untrustworthy Others by the U.S. government, as well as by popular opinion. As a 
result of this racialization, Japanese Americans were interned in camps across the 
United States. The rationale behind this internment was that Japanese-American 
citizens could not be trusted as the United States was at war with their ethnic 
homeland (Peters, 2004).  
 During this time period, many Americans on the west coast believed that 
Japanese Americans were setting up a fifth column in the U.S. for the purpose of 
preparing the region for a Japanese invasion. The belief of a Japanese American 
fifth column could not have been farther from the truth. In fact, many second and 
third generation Japanese Americans were loyal Americans who wanted to advance 
in American society. Yet, they were not perceived and treated as American because 
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they were not white. Herein lies the linkage between racialization and foreign 
policy; when a domestic group within America has not attained the status of 
'whiteness' they are easier to Other in times of crisis. No matter their dedication to 
the nation, if they are not white they are viewed as untrustworthy and unpatriotic 
(Peters, 2004).  
 While seemingly contradictory, the interment of German- and Italian 
Americans during World War II displays the fluidity of whiteness and 
trustworthiness in the United States. In addition to Japanese Americans, German- 
and Italian-Americans were also interned despite their allegiance to the United 
States (Years of silence: The untold story of German-American internment). As 
Edward Blum notes, although German Americans by the time of World War II were 
accepted within the social boundaries of the American nation, the contents of the 
“white” category were not quite settled (Blum, 2005). Therefore, German 
Americans were racialized just as Japanese Americans were during WWII seen they 
were viewed as an untrustworthy, fifth column within the U.S. Yet, of note, no 
Japanese Americans were convicted of committing treason against the United 
States. This fact stands in contradiction to some German- and Italian-Americans 
that were convicted of treason against the United States. 
 The foreign threat becomes even more of a danger when there are a large 
proportion of that country’s people living in a country. For instance, there were 
127,000 Japanese Americans living in America at the time of Pearl Harbor.  As 
such, Japanese Americans were viewed as collaborators with the enemy. Therefore, 
by detaining these people, the threat perception of the enemy lessened since 
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Japanese Americans could not supposedly assist the enemy. However, this 
supposed lessening of the foreign danger through internment comes at a price. 
These Americans were no longer treated as Americans. Their rights as Americans 
were stripped in the name of security. In essence, their American identity was 
called into question. They became the Other within (Peters, 2004). 
 In a display of the construction of ethnic color and identity, Chinese 
Americans during WWII attempted to disaggregate themselves from Japanese 
Americans and the larger Asiatic 'threat.' Americans during this period grouped all 
of those from Asia in one category and labeled them as depraved and immoral, 
regardless of any educational or professional attainment. As a consequence of this 
racialization of Asians during WWII, the United States, who had allied with China, 
had to de-racialize Chinese Americans and label them as productive individuals, and 
more importantly, part of the United States. Accordingly, in order to please the 
Chinese government, Chinese Americans were separated from Japanese Americans 
through the modification of the color scale. Chinese were no longer “yellow” like the 
Japanese. Instead, they were now more 'brown.' Another way to separate the 
Chinese from the Japanese was to frame them as naturally more democratic, like 
the U.S., while the Japanese Other were seen as naturally more imperialistic 
(Muller, 2007).  
 The artificiality and political purpose of such racial constructs and 
classifications becomes even clearer when considering that in late 19th-centiry 
Brazil, Asians were classified just the opposite way. According to  Jeffrey Lesser, 
Japanese migrants to Brazil were able to label themselves as the “white man of 
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Asia” in order to find acceptance among Brazilian elites who thought of themselves 
as white, whereas the Chinese, were framed as “yellow,” “sneaky,” and “lazy” and 
denied to enter the country as migrants. The Japanese were able to attain white 
status for several reasons, such as Japan being a world power at the turn of the 
twentieth century, whereas China was a lesser power. While Japanese were 
considered inferior in regards to other immigrants, they came from a developed 
country and therefore were considered industrious, a supposed quality of being 
white. Therefore, there is an economic dimension to whiteness in that immigrants 
that are viewed as having qualities that contribute to development can more easily 
become white (Lesser, 1999). 
 Similar to the experience of other minority populations, Japanese Americans 
were viewed as needing to be controlled by the superior white population during 
WWII. With the beginning of WWII and the transfer of Japanese Americans to the 
south, southern politicians portrayed Japanese Americans as hypersexual beasts 
who were a threat to white women. This portrayal was used to frame white people 
as moral and sexually normal, while the Other was portrayed as having 
uncontrollable sexual desires, and thus they needed to be closely monitored, if not 
policed (Howard, 2008). 
 Regarding policing, within the camps some Japanese Americans volunteered 
to police others of their same ethnicity. These collaborators helped inform their U.S. 
overseers of planned disobedience within the camps. In return, their captors 
treated collaborators much better. Another way in which the Japanese could 
separate themselves from the larger Japanese American population was to join the 
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military after passing a loyalty test. Those who joined the military were able to 
move more freely in the U.S. during and after the war. These servicemen saw 
themselves as different, and indeed as part of the American citizenry (Howard, 
2008). 
 Finally, I would be remiss if I did not discuss the parallels between the 
problems in closing down these camps and the problem with closing Guantanamo 
Bay. With Japanese Americans, the government faced the difficulty of where they 
were to be placed after the camps closed. Across the U.S., many communities did 
not want Japanese Americans to be released into their community. The U.S. 
President for his part suggested dispersing them across the U.S. in small numbers 
so that they would be forced to assimilate into white America. These Japanese 
American citizens, much like those currently in Guantanamo did not know where 
they could go following the end of their internment. They had been stripped of their 
constitutional rights and had their property taken from them. In some cases, 
Japanese Americans had renounced their citizenship, for various reasons, and now 
were stateless persons with nowhere to go. This led many Japanese Americans to 
stay in the camps until the government forcefully vacated them (Robinson, 2001).  
 There are many obvious parallels between WWII and the War on Terror. For 
starters, the public labeled Japanese Americans and Muslim Americans as 
untrustworthy others during a time of foreign crisis. As a result of their large 
populations within the U.S., both groups were seen as fifth columns within America, 
that somehow collaborated with the Other. Today Japanese Americans, due to their 
success, are labeled as white in America, while Muslim Americans, also due to their 
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success, were nearly white before 9/11. Yet, after September 11th, 5000 
individuals, many of whom were Muslim- or Arab-Americans, were rounded up 
across the United States and were incarcerated as suspected terrorists (Cole, 
2002). This is the same fate that befell Japanese Americans during WWII. Both 
groups were not American enough to be trusted amongst the white population. 
Their danger needed to be isolated. In the popular imagination, what was American 
was redefined, and the United States went to war against the homeland of the 
Other. Simply put, the foreign policy of the U.S. was to defeat the Other over there, 
which had domestic consequences over here. In the process, the U.S. racialized an 
entire group of people and in this process classified them as potential enemies. Yet, 
the enemy also lived here, which domestically made an entire group of people un-
American. This racialization has affects o the psyche and makes these Other groups 
reluctant to assimilate when they know that are not as seen as part of “us.” These 
groups end up living a life of double consciousness in which they are aware of their 
subordination within the larger group. They are in affect living two lives.  
 
How 9/11 Impacted Muslim American Identity 
In my study, many older Muslim American respondents noted how the majority of 
their community was more concerned with issues of foreign policy prior to 9/11. 
During this pre-9/11 period, the primary issue for them was the Israeli occupation 
of the Palestinian people. However, after 9/11, as a result of their civil rights as 
Americans being infringed upon, the Muslim American community began to look 
inward at domestic politics. Yet, in the past couple of years, they noted that 
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Muslims have become more assertive and have achieved balance in civil rights and 
foreign policy. Regarding foreign policy, these individuals noted the injustices 
happening in the Middle East, especially concerning the Afghan and Iraq wars. 
These issues in particular have caused older Muslim American to voice their 
concerns about how their tax dollars are being spent on American foreign policy 
through voting and contacting their congressman. 
As G, age 47, female, born in the US, local educator stated:  
We should look more at long-term rather than short-term election cycles in 
order to fulfill our own self-interest. We need to really work on our principles 
of justice. I think we need to make sure our tax dollars are not being used to 
fund war crimes, such as the Israeli occupation. We need a policy that is not 
dominated by special interest groups on the domestic side. We need to 
uphold the principles of law and justice, not butcher them and abuse them to 
further our agenda. Guantánamo Bay and the NSA exist because the people 
who are sworn to a law are twisting the law. We need to return back to our 
traditions. (Interview conducted November 4th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
 These older respondents wanted to regain the America that they grew up in. 
Several of these individuals expressed that being critical of foreign policy towards 
the Middle East did not make you un-American. Rather it makes one more patriotic 
to engage with the political system, the same system which is trying to force them 
out. As one respondent so poignantly put it: “We would not tolerate this exclusion 
from our enemies.” As such, the older American Muslims from my sample have 
learnt to work within the system. This system, as so many of the respondents 
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acknowledged, is their system. They pay the taxes to support this system, and to 
sit idly by does not change the system. Accordingly, these individuals felt that it is 
their duty as Americans to engage the system to bring about a change in U.S. 
foreign policy.  To put in the words of O: “the cost of not engaging the system is 
much higher than the cost of engaging the system.”  
 Given that the median age of my respondents was 27 years old, when 9/11 
occurred most of my subjects were still very young. The factor of age was 
significant in my study in that these young Muslim Americans tended to view this 
event as an important milestone in their life. The majority of these respondents, 
who are now in their early- to mid-20s, believed at a young age that America was a 
place for people to seek protection and generally be accepted. However, after 9/11 
these same individuals found themselves labeled as the enemy.  
As M, age 25, female, born in the US, employee of a local Muslim American NGO 
stated:  
Because of the war on terror, because of 9/11, Americans think that the US 
government is allowed do things like drone strikes, which are illegal. 9/11 has 
kind of served as an excuse for us to embrace the goal and ambition that 
started in World War II. If this is the completion of this ambition, we are in a 
dangerous place. As a consequence of 9/11, I don’t think others understand 
international law and what sovereignty is. They can’t send missiles into any 
country. I think it’s a dangerous world we are in. (Interview conducted 
September 10th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
F, age 20, female, born in the US, employee of a Muslim American NGO adds:  
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I was really young when 9/11 happened. [I was] in the fourth grade. I always 
thought that coming to America, I came from the Middle East, from Dubai, 
that everyone’s really nice, very welcoming, very humble.  People were like 
that before 9/11 happened. After 9/11, I got a lot of negative attention. As I 
grew up, my friends all became Muslim, except for one. It’s made me feel 
more comfortable to be with people of the same view as me, just because 
I’ve had a hard time growing up after 9/11.  I was really embarrassed to say 
that I was Arab or Muslim a lot of [the] time. I would just say that I was 
Cuban. I felt ashamed. I never really even consider myself an American. 
(Interview conducted November 25th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
 These subject’s responses lay bare the danger and exclusion brought 
on by the War on Terror. To them, 9/11 was the starting point at which what 
it meant to be an American meant that one had to be white. The second 
respondent, of Arab-Cuban ancestry chose to identify with the “whiter” of her 
identities in order to be part on the American identity. Despite this ability to 
melt into the whiteness of America, this individual knows that she can never 
really be an American since she is doubly ostracized with her Middle Eastern 
and Muslim identities. As such, she has chosen to isolate herself from other 
Americans and to self-select Muslim friends who understand her identity. 
D, age 27, male, born in the US, undergraduate student adds his insight to this new 
America:  
After 9/11, the same people that I would say good morning to [and] have 
good relations with, our spitting at you. All of a sudden, you feel like I’m no 
longer part of you. I believe that if Osama bin Laden committed that crime, 
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[so] it is my duty as a Muslim to fight against them. They put me on his side 
and treated me like the rest of them, even though I’m saying what they did is 
wrong. Before 9/11, American identity was supposed to be about different 
religions and different people. (Interview conducted September 11th, 2013, 
Tampa, FL) 
 
 This subject wanted to part of the American group who was hurt by the 
events of 9/11. Further, he was willing to be part of the American group that would 
fight Islamic extremism. However, despite the attack being on U.S. soil, many 
Americans perceived that there was help within the Muslim American community. 
As such, individuals such as this subject, were grouped with the evil Others, and 
made to feel un-American and guilty by association. 
 Despite these experiences, most of my respondents chose to embrace their 
Islamic identity, which is viewed by many in America as part of the dangerous 
Other. However, these individuals do not subscribe to the belief that Islam is a 
dangerous, subversive religion. Rather, they view themselves as embracing an 
identity which can one day hopefully thrive within the mélange of what is 
Americanness. To achieve this end, most respondents felt that they had to work 
harder to educate Americans. 
 In explaining, why some Muslim Americans may turn to radicalism, these 
individuals may instead turn to adverse identification. This identification refers to 
people who try to assimilate but are not allowed to be part of the in-group and then 
take on an oppositional or adverse identity. Some individuals, such as African 
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Americans, chose to embrace Otherness because they know that no matter how 
hard they try, they will not be accepted by the white mainstream. 
As P, age 27, male, born in the US, leader of a Muslim American NGO stated:  
Since 9/11, the government does treat you differently. It’s getting a little 
better, but it’s a constant struggle for freedom and civil rights. It’s difficult to 
be a Muslim in America. Our religious freedom is at stake. It’s critical to 
defend, all the while not losing American values and freedoms. (Interview 
conducted August 26th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
A, age 41, male, born in the U.S., leader of a local mosque adds: 
My identity didn’t change terribly much [after 9/11]. Muslims were still being 
attacked and assaulted as terrorists before 9/11. The event of 9/11 has 
solidified that [Muslim] identity. The Muslim identity was strengthened 
because the public came to identify us more with the Muslim identity than 
they did previously. We are expected to answer for our community. We were 
expected to talk with churches, which is very positive. People saw us as 
Muslims, but not for what Islam is, but rather as a threat, and other negative 
connotations. We do a lot of work to justify ourselves as Muslims and 
justifying our American identity. (Interview conducted August 26th, 2013, 
Tampa, FL) 
 
  Many respondents remarked how much more difficult it became to be a 
Muslim in the United States since September 11. This significant event served as a 
catalyst and a wake-up call for many Muslim Americans. Some respondents noted 
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that this event caused them to reflect on what it means to be an American, and 
that in retaining their sense of citizenry they realized that they needed to engage 
the system, such as through working with NGOs. As such, these individuals chose 
to critically reflect on their status within America and acknowledge “the reality.” 
These younger respondents felt that they could more easily identify their problems 
of their community and address them through the political process.  
 
How Muslim Americans View U.S.-Middle East Foreign Policy 
As part of my research, respondents were again presented with a psychological 
method of word association about all the ways in which they view American foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. During this word association exercise, every 
respondent provided words that had negative connotations. Some of the most 
frequent terms, as seen in Table 7, were hubris, violations of international law, 
global ambition, policeman, hypocrisy, oppressive, and double standard. 
Table 7: Word Associations with American Foreign Policy 
Responses Number of responses 
hubris 11 respondents 
violations of international law 9 respondents 
global ambition 8 respondents 
policeman 7 respondents 
hypocrisy 6 respondents 
oppressive 6 respondents 
double standard 4 respondents 
 
 I interpret the fact that every Muslim American respondent provided negative 
responses to be a product of their experiences with Othering. As will be detailed 
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shortly, my respondents typically experienced discrimination and negative attention 
from their American co-nationalists. In fact, it is more apt to describe these 
individuals as co-citizens in that some people are formally citizens, but not 
imagined as part of the imagined community. Accordingly, citizenship and 
nationhood, in the case of American Muslim citizens, does not overlap. 
  Muslim Americans went from being almost one of “us” or “white” prior to 
September 11to being in cahoots with those who plotted and carried out the attacks 
on the United States. As it became imagined in the minds of many Americans that 
the War on Terror was a war on Islam, many Muslim Americans became targets of 
hatred. They were the Other that America was at war with. Although most Muslim 
Americans correctly realize that they are not explicitly the targets of the War on 
Terror, they also realize their otherness as a result of the War on Terror. As such, it 
is not surprising to learn that all of my respondents thought of American foreign 
policy in a negative light. They realize that in the current social-political climate 
they lead a double life as one of “us,” Americans by citizenship, and as one of them, 
in which Muslim equates with Other.  
 Subjects were also asked an open-ended question if American foreign policy 
treats Islamic countries different than other countries. Universally, my subjects 
agreed that the U.S. does treat these countries differently than non-Muslim 
countries. However, when pressed on their answers, most expressed the belief that 
the reason the U.S. treated these countries was because of their oil wealth and not 
necessarily because of Islam.  Put another way, to my respondents U.S. foreign 
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policy towards the Middle East was about what the U.S. could get out those 
countries rather than the country’s identity as an Islamic country.  
As M, stated:   
They treat oil countries different than non-oil countries. A good example of 
that is how we have reacted to the specter of the massacre in Benghazi and 
the situation in Syria. Syria is not oil rich and is not hotly contested. Since we 
need oil, we’ve treated oil states like national security interests. (Interview 
conducted September 10th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 
W, 29, male, born in the US, graduate student agreed that American policy 
towards the Middle East is not just about Islam: 
American foreign policy treats Islamic countries different than other countries. 
I know why. It’s because the Middle East has oil. It’s very important. That is 
the reason why the Middle East is treated differently than Africa. The fact that 
Israel is located there is another reason why the US has a major interest in 
the Middle East, because the US is a major supporter, it wants to protect 
Israel and make sure it’s safe. The U.S. just won’t let them go. Once there, it 
takes a long time for the US to leave. They want to make a base and want to 
have tightly fisted relations with these countries. (Interview conducted 
October 1st, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
As part of my focus on American foreign policy, research subjects were 
asked: as the U.S. has started to withdraw from the Middle East has it changed how 
you feel about American foreign policy?” Overwhelmingly the responses were 
unenthusiastic. 
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T, 23, male, born in the U.S., undergraduate student stated: 
There’s a degree of suspicion in Muslim countries because America feels that 
it has a right to impose itself on those countries. The Iraq war is over, I guess 
it’s over, but it is more dangerous and violent and war-torn there than ever.  
We moved troops around and we’re supposed to get out of Afghanistan, but 
were training the Afghan army. If anything, we’re fighting battles more 
remotely and trying to hand off the battle capacity to Afghans. I wish that we 
would get off oil and get out of the Middle East. It would not give us a pretext 
for national security interests and stabilizing or controlling the Middle East. 
(Interview conducted September 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
F, 24, female, born in the U.S., undergraduate student saw the situation a bit 
more optimistically but still was cautious about the degree of U.S. 
withdrawal: 
As the U.S. is pulling out of the Middle East it has made me a bit more 
relieved, but it has not really affected my daily life. I think the Middle East 
needs a break from the U.S. The Middle East should not be dependent upon 
them. They need to get their crap together. They need some space. They 
need to get themselves together. The only way that they can do that is if they 
can have their country back. (Interview conducted September 3rd, 2013, 
Tampa, FL) 
 Respondents were split on whether the U.S. should involve themselves 
militarily in Syria. In fact, several respondents viewed the Syria situation in 
conflicting ways. This was evident with L, 23, male, undergraduate student who 
said:  
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Everyone always says U.S. is sticking their nose in everyone’s business, but 
to be honest, I do want them to go into Syria. I get it were supposed to be 
the big Brothers who go in fix everything for everyone else but that doesn’t 
work for everyone. Sometimes you have to go and jump in. Just because 
you’re American. It’s you like you’re obligated to. (Interview conducted 
November 12th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
Another respondent, N, 21, female, undergraduate student stated: 
If the US decided to intervene in Syria it would be upsetting because I think 
the best solution is a diplomatic answer. We would be choosing to skip over 
that and go to war and you want to save people who are dying by bombing? 
There is no logic in that. It’s irrational. Yes, it would show that America is 
strong and still has that power. But on the other hand, we are again being 
hypocritical because why did it take us that long? Why Syria and not Bahrain 
or some other places? If we do go, it should be for a very good reason and 
have a coalition of willing countries for it to be successful. It can’t just be 
America. (Interview conducted October 1st, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 Regarding how American Muslims felt about Muslims who resorted to radical 
acts, almost every respondent disproved of these acts. However, opinions varied as 
to why these individuals engage in radical acts. Many respondents responded that 
problems with assimilation caused radicalization. In such cases, respondents 
claimed, it was an issue in which radicals were ostracized, either by themselves or 
the community. For example, several respondents claimed it was an issue caused 
by a financial situation or family situation or education or social issues that caused 
individuals to think that radicalism is the only way forward. In addition, social and 
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family issues were often tied to how people’s families were treated overseas as a 
result of U.S. foreign policy in places like Palestine and Iraq. That is to say, if 
someone lost a family member in one of these countries, respondents believed that 
the individual would have more of a tendency to radicalize. All told, no respondent 
could point to one particular variable that caused radicalization, but there was the 
belief that if one was not assimilating into society and not becoming well-connected 
in their community, they could become radicalized. 
 Many respondents also noted you have much more freedom to practice Islam 
in the United States than you do in the Middle East. In fact, they correctly 
observed, people have much harder time practicing their faith in Middle East 
because of government restrictions. Yet in America, individuals have the freedom to 
practice their faith. Therefore, these respondents claimed that Islamic radicals are 
“delusional” to take it out their anger on America. Rather, they claimed, they should 
appreciate the fact that they have much more freedom in the U.S. than they do in 
the Middle East. 
H, 19, male, undergraduate student stated: 
I don’t know what you would consider radical... Their craziness comes from 
anger and the way that they are treated. It’s also the way the media treats 
them [Muslim Americans]. For instance, the shooting in Los Angeles airport. 
Somebody in my class said that’s probably a Muslim guy or something. When 
you hear things like that it’s hard not get angry. (Interview conducted 
September 17th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
O, 53, male, leader of a local NGO stated: 
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People who resort to radicalism really don’t understand the religion. Islam is a 
religion of peace. It comes from the root word of peace. In Islam there must 
be a balance. It shouldn’t be extreme in either way. Obviously they don’t 
understand the religion at all. These people were probably pushed into a 
corner and did not know how to react. They were not knowledgeable about 
building an organization or lobbying. Violence was the only way that they 
could express themselves. (Interview conducted September 11th, 2013, 
Tampa, FL) 
 All of my Muslim American respondents felt that there is a double standard 
between Muslims who committed extremist acts and non-Muslims who commit 
extremist acts: 
E, 31, female, graduate student stated: 
There is a double standard. If an [non-Muslim] American provokes panic, he 
is sick or mental. If a Muslim does it, he hates America. They’ll be framed as 
wanting to destroy America and kill Americans. That’s how it looks. There is a 
difference. There’s a big difference. They will commit the same exact thing, 
but it means something different. When you look at the people who did 
anthrax they were not Muslim. They were a white militia group. A lot of 
people have a chip on the shoulder. A lot of people have reason to be upset 
when you stereotype a group of people. When you look at all these different 
shooting sprees that have gone on, none of these people look Middle Eastern. 
Radicalism wouldn’t happen, it they weren’t treated with suspicion. We should 
broaden our view of what is a security threat (Interview conducted September 
18th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
Y, age 21, female, born in the U.S., leader of a local Muslim American NGO adds: 
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There is a double standard. You see on the news when a white person 
commits an act. They say he is mentally unstable. If somebody is close to 
looking like a Middle Easterner, they say that he is working in a group, he is a 
terrorist. This is because of the media organizations who are funded by 
different groups. They want the media to portray stuff in a certain way so that 
the audience will think in a certain way. Does that sound like a conspiracy 
theory? That’s how I see it. There is no such thing as an objective media and 
that’s a problem. (Interview conducted October 22nd, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 In sum, Muslim Americans see how they are racialized as a result of the War 
on Terror. Muslims have unofficially been characterized as the enemy in this war. 
Respondents primarily saw the media as promoting this message, not the U.S. 
government. To demonstrate the duality in the War on Terror, “whites” who commit 
the same type of extremist acts are understood as mentally disturbed, not 
terrorists. Whites are able to commit these extremist acts without being labeled as 
terrorists since “white” people are not terrorists. Terrorism happens “over there” by 
Others. The racialized Other in the United States, Muslim Americans, commit 
terrorists acts, just like the Others in the Middle East.  Therefore, Muslim Americans 
have to operate in an environment in which they understand that they are the 
targeted Other. Yet, these same individuals must try to conform to what society 
deems the “good Muslim” or else they will be grouped in with the dangerous Other. 
As such, Muslim Americans are trapped. They cannot freely express their 
disapproval of the U.S. government and its policies due to the fear of being pegged 
as dangerous extremists. Instead, those who want to survive in America during the 
War on Terror must suppress who they are and conform to white America’s view of 
the “moderate” Muslim. 
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Assimilating or Integrating? 
I also asked respondents a series of questions to discern whether they felt that they 
were part of the American national identity. These questions focused on whether 
they were assimilating, becoming part of the larger national identity, or integrating, 
incorporating their religious group into the larger national identity. This is an 
important distinction to make since the former is much more inclusive than the 
latter. However, assimilation as I have noted assimilation is a problematic concept 
which has been adapted in the popular mindset to mean that an immigrant is 
retaining too much of their ethnic identity. Therefore, I refer back to Kymlicka to 
clarify what I mean by assimilation. 
 According to Will Kymlicka, there are differential rights between ethnic and 
national groups. For the former, they are expected to assimilate within the larger 
national culture. This is due to these ethnic groups freely choosing to move to a 
new nation-state for better opportunity. This free movement obligates them, if they 
are to become a citizen, to adopt the majority culture. For the latter, they are pre-
existing within the nation-state. Therefore, these national groups, as a sense of 
justice, deserve the same rights afforded to the larger national majority. Moreover, 
in a liberal society, liberty affords the right to revise conceptions of the good. Only 
by allowing national minority groups the right to debate the good life does their 
culture have an equal opportunity to revise conceptions of the good. 
 A problem arises when within minority groups there is a lack of tolerance, 
and instead the minority imposes its beliefs on its group’s members. As a tenet of 
Liberalism, these national minority groups deserve to have their culture recognized 
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and preserved. However, in some cases these national groups are not Liberal in 
orientation. This means that they find it acceptable to force their members to act in 
a certain way and to retain particular values, even if the members do not 
particularly agree with the group’s conceptions. This situation often arises because 
the minority group believes that if they are to survive externally, they need to be 
homogenous internally. Kymlicka believes that those groups which are not Liberal 
and who will abuse the rights of their internal members should not be afforded 
Liberal protections. Just the same, Kymlicka is against imposing Liberal values on 
illiberal groups. The parallel here is between the minority group imposing its beliefs 
on its group’s members and the larger nation-state imposing its values on others.  
 Therefore, assimilation demands that to find acceptance you are required to 
give up what makes you different and assimilate the characteristics of your host, 
e.g. become like them. Recognition demands that you find acceptance while 
retaining your difference and otherness. Yet, as Kymlicka notes, “the separation of 
state and ethnicity precludes any legal or governmental recognition of ethnic 
groups, or any use of ethnic criteria in the distribution of rights, resources, and 
duties” (Kymlicka, 1995: 7). As such, there is a tension between assimilation and 
recognition given that the state represents the dominant group’s values and beliefs. 
 In distinguishing between assimilation or integration, I asked the subjects a 
series of questions about the American dream. That is to say, I asked if you work 
hard in America, can you achieve any goal that you set your mind to? Again, I 
asked this type of question not because it is somehow good or unproblematic to 
think of American nationalism as necessarily requiring assimilation or integration. 
Rather, I asked this question because it is the dominant, white ideology that 
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implicitly frames American nationalism. That is to say, the American dream is an 
ideological construct that perpetuates the belief that in American anyone can “make 
it,” as long as they assimilate into the dominant culture of the United States. 
Respondents were almost evenly divided in their responses. 
P stated: 
There’s no guarantee, especially in this country. If you put in the time 
and the energy in the effort you were to succeed, you will succeed. 
There are certain jobs that I may not have gotten due to the way I 
look, but that will provide other better other opportunities. The sky’s 
the limit here. It is what you make of it. (Interview conducted August 
26th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 Many other respondents in my study shared this view by P.  Respondents 
were trapped between assimilation and recognition. Muslim Americans were 
conflicted as to whether they should give up what makes them particular and 
accept the dominant view of white America. Of course, this track would increase the 
chance of Muslim Americans to achieve the American dream and to be accepted 
into white America. However, they would be giving up what makes them particular 
to America and losing their identity. The other option for Muslim Americans was to 
choose recognition, and to embrace their otherness. Several respondents did 
choose this track, with the knowledge that they would be operating at a 
disadvantage in America in areas such as employment and equal access to public 
goods. 
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 I also asked respondents whether it was permissible for a Muslim to marry a 
non-Muslim. 92 percent of respondents stated that is impermissible for a Muslim 
woman to marry a non-Muslim man. 72 percent of respondents believed that it is 
permissible for a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim woman. This statement was 
usually caveated with the statement that the woman must “be of the book” or that 
the woman should have the intention of converting to Islam. 
C stated: 
Islam does allow a Muslim male to marry a Jewish or Christian woman. The 
whole idea was that people followed the faith of the father. Nowadays people 
might be more likely to follow the faith of the mother... It is probably better 
to marry someone who is more consistent with your faith-based values. 
(Interview conducted October 23rd, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
X, age 19, female, born in the U.S., undergraduate student stated: 
Women are equal in the eyes of God, but they have different rights and 
responsibilities. They can go to paradise for different reasons. A woman can 
enter into heaven for having a baby, something a man can never do. A man 
can enter into heaven and being a great leader of his family. A man is given 
the burden of having to go out to be the provider. Through the different rules, 
things become balanced. It is something we do out of love and understanding 
for the relationship. For a woman, she is supposed to listen to the man, and 
he listens to God. Therefore, it would only be a make sense for me to marry a 
Muslim, someone who has the same principles as opposed to someone of a 
different religion who has different rules. There would be difficulty in me 
keeping my faith and satisfying their wants. Muslim men can marry people of 
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the book because of his oneness of God. (Interview conducted September 
30th, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 The question of freedom to marry was important to this study since inter-
marriage with non-Muslims, especially with “white religions” such as Christianity or 
Judaism, would facilitate access to white America. As such, I asked this question to 
find out if respondents believed that there was an “escape hatch“5 that they knew 
of to escape this non-white Otherness in America. Overall, most respondents were 
trapped by religion and unable to access the escape hatch. These respondents 
followed the patriarchy of Islam and held that women had to marry within the 
religion. Accordingly, these individuals by not marrying outside of their religion 
could not access white America. Rather, the Otherness of Islam itself reinforced the 
Otherness of these individuals in America. 
 The final questions I asked in this regard was if they changed their physical 
appearance since 9/11. I also asked respondents what were their feelings in regard 
to the hijab. 
As Y claimed: 
When I was younger, I would dress more modestly. I rebelled against my 
parents since they are more secular. I’ve told my friends that of I lived in the 
                                                             
5
 The concept of “mulatto escape hatch” comes from the work of Carl Degler and his comparison of race relations 
in Brazil and the United States (Degler, 1971). Degler held that Mulattos in Brazil can escape the black-white racial 
characterization due to their intermediate social position. Consequently, Mulattos could become white due to the 
racial intermixing in Brazil and their emancipation from and abolition of slavery. These factors meant that lighter 
skinned blacks could become part of a higher socioeconomic strata in Brazil. Although this concept has largely 
been discredited (Telles, 2004) due to a lack of empirical evidence of Mulattos in Brazil, the Mulatto escape hatch 
does retain some symbolic value in that the belief in the concept impedes social group formation. As such, this 
concept is adopted for this research as a way to explain how Muslim Americans may believe that they can escape 
their Otherness and become part of the American national identity. This is not to say that such an “escape hatch” 
exists, but rather to claim that the belief in such a concept alters the perceptions of Muslim Americans. 
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Muslim world, I would not wear the hijab. However, if I was in a country that 
respected Islam, I wear would wear the hijab. I would never want to create 
the impression that says I’m doing this because I was told to. Too many 
people believe that the religion is about their physical appearance. (Interview 
conducted October 22nd, 2013, Tampa, FL) 
 X adds: 
 If you’re living in a society where it’s more dangerous to wear the hijab than 
to not wear, you should use practical logic. God does not want you to put 
yourself in danger for his own sake. I know women who have just worn hats 
or find a way to wear turtlenecks. They’re accomplishing the same intention, 
but there are ways that are more socially acceptable... [Regarding wearing 
the hijab] I know people say things about me. It’s about the passing of the 
eyes. It’s enough for me. It symbolizes so much in such a look of hate and 
disgust. It is hard to smile back, because you know what they are sending off 
and you know what you’re receiving. (Interview conducted September 30th, 
2013, Tampa, FL) 
 Again, the question about the hijab was similar to that regarding marriage. 
The clothing that some Muslim Americans wear reinforces their Otherness. Non-
Muslim Americans easily identify who the enemy in the War in Terror is by the way 
that Muslim Americans dress. If Muslim Americans are to change the way that they 
appear, they would lose one of their symbols of Otherness in America. If they 
choose to retain their modest dress, then Muslim Americans accept that they 
choose the path of recognition. 
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Comparing the Micro to the Macro 
In the Publication Muslim Americans: No Signs Of Growth In Alienation Or Support 
For Extremism, the Pew Research Center interviewed 1,050 Muslim American 
respondents in 2007 and 1,033 Muslim Americans respondents in 2011, asking the 
same set of questions. In the 2007 study, the median age was 25 years old; a ratio 
of 54 percent male to 46 percent female; and a ratio of 50 percent Sunnis to 16 
percent Shia. For the 2011 study there was a median age of 24.75 years; a ratio of 
55 percent male to 45 percent female; and respondents were primarily Sunni (66 
percent) rather than Shia (11 percent) (see table 8).  
Table 8: Sample Demographics 
 2007 sample 2011 sample 2013 sample 
Median age 25 24.75 27 
Male to female 54/46 55/45 14/11 
Sunni to Shia 50/16 66/11 20/5 
 
 I replicated aspects of 2013 Pew study with Muslim Americans from Tampa 
Bay. The first question I asked by which was also asked by the Pew research Center 
in both 2007 and 2011 was: Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, 
has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US, or hasn’t it not changed very 
much? In 2007, 53 percent of Muslim American respondents answered that it has 
become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US; 40 percent stated it hasn’t changed 
very much; and 1 percent claimed it has become easier to be a Muslim in the 
United States. In 2011, 55 percent of Muslim American respondents answered that 
it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the US; 37 percent stated it hasn’t 
changed very much; and 2 percent claimed it has become easier to be a Muslim in 
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the United States. Of my sample from 2013 in the Tampa Bay area, 60 percent 
claimed it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. and 40 percent 
stated that it hasn’t changed very much (see table 9). While conducted on a smaller 
scale, my numbers come within a few percentage points of those from Pew. 
Therefore, I conclude that my numbers are reflective of the nationwide belief 
amongst Muslim Americans that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the 
U.S. since 9/11. However, I cannot draw further conclusions about the Muslim 
American population due to my small sample size.  
Table 9: Has it become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S.? 
 2007 2011 2013 
Since the 
terrorist 
attacks on 
September 
11th, 2001, has 
it become more 
difficult to be a 
Muslim in the 
US, or hasn’t it 
not changed 
very much? 
53% it has become 
more difficult 
________________ 
40% it hasn’t 
changed very much 
________________ 
1% it has become 
easier  
55% it has become 
more difficult 
________________ 
37% it hasn’t 
changed very much 
________________  
2% it has become 
easier  
60% it has become 
more difficult 
________________ 
40% it hasn’t 
changed very much 
 
 Regarding the question, what do you think are the most important problems 
facing Muslims living in the United States today, the top five responses in 2007 are 
as follows: 19 percent stated no problem; 19 percent claimed that the most 
problem is discrimination/racism/prejudice; 15 percent claimed it was being viewed 
as terrorists; 14 percent stated ignorance /misconceptions of Islam; and 12 percent 
said stereotyping/generalizing about all Muslims. In 2011 the top five answers were 
as follows: 19 percent stated discrimination/racism/prejudice; 16 percent no 
problems; 16 percent stereotyping /generalizing about Muslims; 15 percent stated 
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ignorance/misconceptions of Islam; and 9 percent said being viewed as terrorists. 
In my sample of Tampa Bay Muslim Americans the top five responses were: 40 
percent claimed ignorance/misconceptions of Islam; 16 percent said not treated 
fairly/ harassment; 16 percent said discrimination/racism/prejudice; 10 percent 
stated stereotyping/generalizing about all Muslims; and 10 percent said 
hatred/fear/distrust of Islam (see table 10). Perhaps as a result of my small sample 
size my numbers were inflated. However, in comparison to levels of importance, my 
numbers are comparable with those from Pew. 
Table 10: The most important problem facing Muslims? 
 2007 2011 2013 
What do 
you think 
are the 
most 
important 
problems 
facing 
Muslims 
living in 
the 
United 
States 
today? 
19% no problems 
________________  
19% 
discrimination/racism/ 
prejudice 
________________ 
15% being viewed as 
terrorists 
________________  
14% ignorance 
/misconceptions of 
Islam 
________________  
 12% stereotyping/ 
generalizing about all 
Muslims 
19% 
discrimination/racism/prej
udice 
________________ 
16% no problems 
________________ 
16% 
stereotyping/generalizing 
about Muslims 
________________ 
15% 
ignorance/misconceptions 
of Islam 
________________  
9% being viewed as 
terrorists 
40% ignorance/ 
misconceptions of 
Islam 
______________
__ 
16% not treated 
fairly 
______________
__ 
16% 
discrimination/ 
racism/prejudice 
______________
__ 
10% 
stereotyping/ 
generalizing about 
all Muslims 
______________
__ 
10% hatred/fear/ 
distrust of Islam 
 
 135 
 
 In 2011 Pew asked, do you think most Muslims who come to the U.S. today 
want to adopt American customs and ways of life or do you think that they want to 
be distinct from the larger American society? 56 percent of the Pew’s Muslim 
American respondents answered that Muslims who come to the U.S. today should 
adopt America customs; 20 percent stated that they should remain distinct; and 8 
percent said both. In my sample from 2013, 36 percent of respondents claimed that 
Muslims that come to the U.S. should adopt American values; 24 percent said that 
they should remain distinct, and 40 percent stated both (see table 11). 
Table 11: Muslim American integration? 
 2011 2013 
Do you think 
most Muslims 
who come to the 
U.S. today want 
to adopt 
American 
customs and 
ways of life or do 
you think that 
they want to be 
distinct from the 
larger American 
society? 
56% should adopt America customs 
________________  
20% they should remain distinct 
________________  
 8% both 
36 % should adopt 
American values 
________________  
 
24 % should 
remain distinct 
________________  
40 % both 
 
 My numbers do not necessarily compare with the numbers published by Pew 
in 2011. Regarding adopting American culture verses remaining distinct, my 
respondents favored the latter just as did Pew respondents. Based purely on 
speculation, perhaps respondents favored the “both” option because due to a large 
number of them being college students (60 percent). This is a time in which Muslim 
American students are exposed to new ideas and old ideas are challenged. This 
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situation may have influenced their view of how others should acculturate when 
coming to America. 
  In 2007 and 2011, Pew asked respondents: have you been singled out by 
airport security? In 2011, 18 percent of Muslim Americans said that they had been 
singled out by airport security and 81 percent claimed that they had not been 
singled out by airport security. In 2011, 21 percent said that they had been singled 
out by airport security and 77 percent claimed that they had not been singled out 
by airport security. In my sample from 2013, 16 percent said that they had been 
singled out by airport security and 84 percent claimed that they had not been 
singled out by airport security (see table 12). Therefore, my numbers are 
comparable with those published by Pew, but again, I cannot draw larger 
conclusions due to my small sample size. 
Table 12: Airport Security 
 2007 2011 2013 
Have you been 
singled out by 
airport 
security? 
18% have been 
singled out by 
airport security  
________________  
81% have not 
been singled out by 
airport security 
21% have been 
singled out by 
airport security  
________________  
77% have not 
been singled out by 
airport security 
 
16% have been 
singled out by 
airport security  
________________  
84% have not 
been singled out by 
airport security 
 
 In 2007, Pew asked subjects: Do you think of yourself first as an American or 
first as a Muslim? Both and neither were also acceptable responses to this question. 
In 2007, 28 percent of respondents identified first as American, 47 percent first as 
a Muslim, 18 percent as both, and 6 percent as neither. In 2011, 26 percent of 
respondents identified first as American, 49 percent as Muslim, 18 percent as both, 
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and 4 percent as neither. In my sample from 2013, 24 percent of Muslim American 
respondents thought of themselves first as American, 40 percent as Muslim, and 36 
percent as both (see table 13). These numbers are comparable except for the 
“both” category. As with the acculturation question, my respondents are much 
more inclusive. Again, since other variables such as age, religious sect, and sex 
closely match in both surveys, this may be a result of the college experience and 
the open-mindedness that these individuals are exposed to in academia. 
Table 13: Muslim and/or American? 
 2007 2011 2013 
Do you think of 
yourself first as 
an American or 
first as a 
Muslim? 
28% first as an 
American 
________________  
47% first as a 
Muslim 
________________  
18% both 
________________  
6% neither  
26% first as an 
American 
________________  
49% first as a 
Muslim 
________________  
18% both 
________________  
4% neither  
24% first as an 
American 
________________  
40 % first as a 
Muslim 
________________  
36 % both 
 
 Pew also asked Muslim Americans in 2007 if they thought that anti-terrorism 
policies single out Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring. 54 percent of 
Muslim American respondents thought the U.S. government did single out Muslims, 
while 31 percent did not think so. In 2011, 52 percent of Muslim American 
respondents thought that the U.S. government did single out Muslims, and 34 
percent did not think so. From my 2013 sample, 52 percent of respondents thought 
that the U.S. government did single out Muslims, while 48 percent did not think so 
(see table 14).  
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Table 14: Anti-terrorism policies 
 2007 2011 2013 
Do you think 
anti-terrorism 
policies single 
out Muslims for 
increased 
surveillance 
and 
monitoring? 
54% think the U.S. 
government does 
single out Muslims 
________________  
31% do not think 
the U.S. 
government singles 
out Muslims 
52% think the U.S. 
government does 
single out Muslims  
________________  
34% do not think 
the U.S. 
government singles 
out Muslims 
52% think the U.S. 
government does 
single out Muslims  
________________  
 48% do not think 
the U.S. 
government singles 
out Muslims 
 
 The data from both Pew and my own research displays that Muslim 
Americans feel Othered. The data clearly shows an increase since 2007 of more 
Muslim Americans indicating that it is more difficult to be a Muslim in the United 
States. Moreover, when asked, respondents in all three surveys claimed that 
discrimination/racism/prejudice; being viewed as terrorists; and 
stereotyping/generalizing about all Muslims were the three most important 
problems that they faced. Evidently, as the data shows, being a Muslim American 
has become more difficult during the War on Terror. 
 The data also indicates that almost a quarter of Muslim Americans believe 
that immigrants coming to the United States should remain distinct, while almost 
four in ten Muslim Americans view themselves first in religious terms. My sample 
data indicates an increasing trend after 9/11 for Muslim Americans to identify 
religiously first and to embrace their distinctiveness as non-white Americans. The 
trend is only reinforced by the belief amongst Muslim Americans to see themselves 
as targets of U.S. anti-terrorism policies. As such, my data corresponds with the 
national level data indicating a growing racialization of American Muslims, but it is 
not representative of the beliefs of Muslim Americans across the country. 
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Conclusion 
Racialization is not new to America, especially in times of foreign crisis. Just as 
Japanese Americans were not white enough during WWII and as such were grouped 
in with the evil Other, Muslim Americans today have not achieved the status of 
belonging with America, meaning “white” America. Instead, they are seen, as were 
Japanese Americans, as a fifth column within the U.S. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that many American Muslims are having difficulties assimilating into the U.S. In 
fact, there is reluctance both within and outside the community to keep them in a 
separate religious enclave.   
 The pressures from within the community to keep themselves separate from 
mainstream America largely stem from the experience of 9/11. Muslim Americans 
have seen how they were treated in the aftermath of 9/11 and view integration into 
America with caution. No matter their dedication to the state, their fellow white 
citizens have treated Muslim Americans with suspicion. As such, Muslim America 
was brought closer together by their experience of exclusion. These stronger 
Muslim American communities are displaying their resolve by entering into politics, 
through NGO’s and voting. They are also resisting the framing of Muslims as 
terrorist by openly wearing the hijab. Muslim America, although American, is 
carving out their own separate niche within the white America state. Whether this 
niche will one-day incorporate into mainstream America and achieve the status of 
whiteness remains an open question. 
 Moreover, Muslim Americans can see the double lives that they live. They are 
the Other within. Although the U.S. government has gone to great lengths to state 
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that America is not at war with Islam, empirical reality paints a different picture. In 
the past 10 years, America has gone to war against three different Islamic-majority 
countries. The evil Other during these episodes was a revisionist danger to the 
peace. The goodness of America was at war with totalitarian, backwardness. This 
Other, although not explicitly stated by the U.S. government was Islam. Muslim 
Americans, and most Americans, were aware of this framing. They understood that 
they were perceived as dangerous others within virtuous America. Yet, Muslim 
Americans were also aware that they were American citizens. Muslim Americans, 
just as their Japanese American predecessors are living a life of dual consciousness.  
 While understanding their racialized status as non-white, some Muslim 
Americans still attempt to operate with the American political system. The non-
white status of Muslim Americans means that they cannot assimilate into America. 
As such, Muslim Americans must demand recognition, at least in the near term. 
That is not to say that Muslim Americans can never achieve the status of 
“whiteness.” It is to say that in the current racialized environment characterized by 
the War on Terror will cause them to be viewed as less than American (e.g. white) 
while the U.S. is engaged in conflict with Muslim-majority countries. 
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CHAPTER 4: The Views of a Muslim American 
To gain further and deeper insight into the dynamics of the processes of 
racialization, double-consciousness, and identity, I conducted one intensive open-
ended interview, which lasted one hour and forty minutes on October 28, 2011. 
Through this method, I thought to triangulate the already achieved insights, 
hypothesis, and tentative explanations in order to either confirm, reject, or refine 
the explanations I had already gained previously through the shorter and more 
structured interview process. We discussed major U.S. foreign policy episodes 
towards the Middle East since the time she immigrated to America. These events 
include the first and second Iraq Wars, 9/11 and the War on Terror, the Afghanistan 
War, the Libyan intervention, and the Syrian crisis.  
 It is important to uncover what she thinks about American foreign policy, 
because it directly relates to double-consciousness, racialization, Otherness, and 
identity.  As discussed in Chapter 2, racialization happens both outside and within 
groups.  In my case, outside racialization is the way in which the War on Terror 
framed the Other. Again, in this context, the Other is the dark skinned, non-Judeo-
Christian, who is oppressed by their cultural-religious identity. The racialization that 
occurs within emanates from the way in which Muslim America understands the 
framing of the War on Terror. Although American foreign policy is not explicitly anti-
Muslim, if Muslim America perceives American foreign policy to be anti-Muslim than 
that group will see themselves as Othered. That is to say, racialization is also a 
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process of internalization. Therefore, it is critical to understand how Muslim 
Americans are shaped by American foreign policy and how they understand it.    
 The responses from my subject confirm my hypothesis that American foreign 
policy towards the Middle East is Othering Muslim Americans due to the framing of 
who constitutes the dangerous Other. My subject’s responses also confirm a 
secondary hypothesis about when this subjective framing occurred, which to her 
was after September 11th. Finally, the subject also confirms the hypothesis that 
American foreign policy over time has eroded her sense of Americanness. 
 This individual, who I will henceforth refer to as J, is a graduate student, age 
50. She originally immigrated to the United States from Syria at 17 and was born in 
Damascus. During her time in time Damascus, she came from a family that was 
well to do, living a very comfortable life in an upscale neighborhood. She 
immigrated to America since she became married to someone already living in the 
United States. Therefore, she had U.S. immigrant status when she was already 
living in Syria. While living in Syria, J thought about becoming an American citizen. 
These thoughts were due to the conditions in Syria, which were not promising at 
that point in time. Given these conditions, she did not see a future for herself in 
Syria. Rather, she looked to the United States, since as she claims, “it markets 
itself as a democracy, as a place of upward mobility.” 
 As this quote illustrates, at the earliest stage J understood that being an 
American meant that everyone had a chance to advance their lives in America. The 
United States was a place for J that was governed by all of its members. She did 
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not distinguish between being white or Muslim in America. Rather, she accepted the 
premise that America was a place where she too, a Muslim, could succeed.  
 Prior to moving to the U.S., J viewed the United States as a superpower that 
was looking out for its own interests. At the same time, she did not see the United 
States as very friendly to Muslim countries. She did not see the U.S. as friendly to 
Muslim countries as a result of the United States position in the 1967 Six-Day War, 
in which America took the side of Israel. Yet, her perceived position of the U.S. as 
being anti-Islamic did not hinder her Muslim American individuality. J stated that 
she did not have any hindrances in the United States, in that she was able to freely 
attend college, even when the United States was involved militarily with Muslim 
countries in the 1980s. During this time, her belief of American foreign policy 
remained consistent in that the United States was not friendly to Muslims. However, 
it did not affect her views as an American citizen. In fact, J states she did not 
connect the two, meaning domestic and foreign policy, until after September 11th 
occurred. 
 When she got to the United States in 1984, J did not experience any 
discrimination as a Muslim student. Nobody bothered her about her headwear and 
there were no comments about her physical appearance, religion, or ethnicity. 
When her children were young, she stated, her children’s teachers were interested 
in J giving presentations on Islam to the class. She felt that these presentations 
were more about curiosity than hostility. Yet, J also noted that she felt a little out of 
place giving these presentations. This was ascribed to her feeling as though she 
never quite totally conformed to “Americanness.” Despite this feeling, she sidelined 
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her doubts and did not pay heed to them. When asked why she did not feel as 
though he could conform, J stated that it was due to talking differently, dressing 
differently, and not drinking alcohol.  
 J claimed she viewed Americans as narrow-minded and busy with their daily 
lives when asked how she understood Americanness. To J, Americans are not 
concerned with the international community. Americans also have no clue on what 
goes on of the U.S. Further, to J, those that might know what was going on outside 
the U.S. simply did not care. She could not understand this foreign policy 
obliviousness especially since “what happens in the Middle East affects the gas 
prices of Americans.” Despite this negative view of Americanness, J believed that 
America was a very practical place, especially for women in terms of education and 
career advancement.  
 
First Gulf War, Israel, and Policy Ramifications 
With the first Gulf War in 1991, J stated that she cried when missiles began raining 
down in the night on Iraq. She felt that this act was unjustified. Although she did 
not like Saddam Hussein, J believed that the Iraqi people would pay the highest 
price by the war. She also believed that America got involved with Iraq because of 
their oil wealth. As such, it was not surprising to hear her describe American foreign 
policy as “hostile in pursuit of grabbing resources.”  
 J did not perceive a change in American identity with the first Gulf War. 
However, she began to distance herself from American foreign policy because of the 
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1991 Gulf War. She did not believe that America became more bigoted during this 
period. This may be due to her location at that time since she was a college student 
in Virginia where a lot of the professors were against the war. Therefore, as a 
consequence of her environment, she felt she was not the only one against the Iraq 
war.  
 After the First Iraq War, Israel was pressured by the United States to talk 
with the neighboring Middle East regimes in order to seek peace. Although there 
was a peace process that followed, J and many on the “Arab street” never saw the 
leaders of any of these Muslim countries as legitimate. The lack of legitimacy for 
these Middle East leaders is due to none of the leaders in the Muslim world coming 
to power via popular support. Rather, many of these leaders represent small 
segments within their states, and often use their position to hoard the resources of 
the state. Moreover, these same leaders often make state decisions for the benefit 
of their group rather than in the best interest of the state. Since the leadership 
disadvantages the majority of the residents in these states, the population tends to 
not support the decisions made by state leaders. Therefore, whatever happened 
with the peace process would not represent the average Middle Easterner, and as 
such would not be legitimate. At the time, J did not believe that the peace process 
was going to go anywhere and that it was meaningless. She felt that the parties 
chose to engage in the peace process because the United States told them to so. 
She stated her belief that if the Arab leaders did not engage in the peace process, 
the U.S. would replace them. That is to say, to J, these leaders of sovereign states 
“had to obey the master.” J stated that “the master” wants cheap oil prices and 
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hegemony over the region. She went on to state the United States wants puppets 
to do their job for them. 
 To J, U.S.-Middle East foreign policy was not just about Islam or oil. To J, 
U.S.-Middle East foreign policy was also about the sense of being oppressed. In 
particular, American foreign policy for the Middle East was about Muslim values 
being oppressed. When asked to elaborate, J responded that Muslim values are 
justice, equality, and fairness. She viewed American foreign policy as standing in 
contradiction to these Muslim values. However, she did not believe that U.S. foreign 
policy was trying to be anti-Islamic per se. Rather, she said, the U.S. is trying to 
control Muslims, and if they cannot do that, she believed that the United States 
government would oppress Muslims. She also stated her belief that people in the 
Middle East have a common knowledge that America wants control over their 
resources and that the U.S. supports Israel “to be in the best position to control 
them.”  
 This is a clear indicator of racialization in that J felt that Muslim Americans 
are targeted because they are Muslims. These Muslim Americans did not come out 
as enemies of the U.S. state, but since they stood in opposition to the United States 
they were framed as a threat.  Further, Muslim Americans were not only a threat 
because they stood in opposition to U.S. foreign policy, but rather because they 
would not submit to the control of the U.S. state. In J’s view, since Muslims were 
not submitting to this total control, they were being framed as uncontrollable 
Others that could not fit into the racial hierarchy, and therefore had to be kept 
suppressed.  
 147 
 
 When asked why people would to still come to America if it was such an 
oppressive place, J equated it with joining the enemy. However, she separated the 
foreign policy of the U.S. from the American people. Yes, she said, America is a 
democracy, but “the American public does not know what the government does 
overseas.” As such, she wanted to become part of the American people, not part of 
the American government that drafts and carries out U.S. foreign policy. To J, U.S. 
foreign policy toward the Middle East is domineering because domestic lobbies 
control the American government. In particular, she stated that the Israel and oil 
lobbies control the U.S. government. She went on to express that she did not 
believe democracy promotion is in the interest of the United States foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. Instead, democracy promotion was a way of interfering in 
the Middle East and maintaining stability in the Middle East, in particular the 
stability of Israel and the stability of oil prices. She stated that as a consequence of 
this foreign policy, Muslim states in the Middle East were hostile to America.  
 J went on to elaborate feelings regarding Israel. She stated that Israel was 
born on occupied land and that it is in Israel’s best interest to suppress any 
opposition. She stated that rather than the American state being behind this 
objective, Israel leads the United States in this endeavor.  Therefore, to her, Israel 
was able to achieve this objective due to the power of the Israel lobby. She went on 
to express the belief that the United States was shooting itself in the foot with its 
Israel position, and if the U.S. “ditched” Israel or was neutral towards Israel, it 
would achieve much better relations in the Middle East. J also believed that if Israel 
allowed the promotion of true Palestinian democracy, then one day Israel could be 
a legitimate state in the Middle East.   
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 We then discussed the sanctions against the Iraq regime in the 1990’s and 
the Oil-For-Food Program.  United Nations program was extremely corrupt and did 
not affect Saddam Hussein or his inner circle. Rather, United States-led sanctions 
hurt the Iraqi people. Over half a million Iraqi children were killed by the sanctions 
regime. I asked J how she felt about these sanctions and she responded that “as a 
Muslim, it was an unjust action. It only hurt the poor people in Iraq. It did not hurt 
the Iraqi regime.” When I asked why the United States would pursue this action 
even though it would not harm Saddam Hussein, J stated that the U.S. chose this 
plan of action to suppress any opposition to Saddam Hussein within Iraq. She 
believed the United States did not want Saddam Hussein to be removed by his own 
people, which could result in a representative, legitimate government. Instead, J 
believed, the U.S. wanted a puppet to control Iraq since the United States did not 
have a replacement ready for Saddam Hussein.  
 As such, J is expressing, the U.S. foreign policy does not support genuine 
Muslim democracy. The United States does not support or trust Muslims to run their 
own country. Instead, to J, the U.S. needs a strongman to suppress the wild, unruly 
Other. To J, if the United States does not have this pliable dictator ready to implant, 
the U.S. will simply choose to dominate the entire state and keep all Muslims 
subjugated. This view may have parallels domestically. As J mentioned, Muslim 
Americans are not involved domestically in American politics. Since the U.S. state 
does not have a strong representative in Muslim America to speak for all of their 
co-religionists and to lead other Muslims, the United States suppresses Muslim’s 
political activity via the War on Terror. Again, if the United States cannot co-opt and 
control, the American state uses a blanket policy to repress all Muslim Americans. 
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 To J, American citizens at this point time did not care about what was going 
on in Iraq. As a result, to her, there was not a perceivable change in American 
national identity. Yet, at this point time in time she became even more 
disenchanted with American foreign policy. She stated that the face of American 
foreign policy was “getting uglier and uglier. It was becoming more aggressive. 
Before the 1990s, the answer to problems in American foreign policy was not 
simply bombing.” 
 
Almost White Before 9/11 
Moving to September 10, 2001, the day before her identity as an American 
changed, she felt that Muslim Americans were making headways with politicians 
and with the American political scene. She noted how President Clinton recognized 
the Muslim vote and President George W. Bush recognized the importance of the 
Muslim demographic. She felt that Muslim Americans were finally making progress. 
By this time, many Muslim Americans became politicized because of the sanctions 
regime on Iraq and the conflict with Israel. The one mistake, she noted, was that 
Muslim Americans focused on foreign policy, rather than on national politics. To J, 
in hindsight, this was the wrong focus. 
 During this pre-9/11 period, Muslim Americans were becoming more 
politically aware and were getting more involved with political parties. She claimed 
that Muslims were becoming party members, which was not the case before the 
1990’s. She also stated that American foreign policy drew them to the political 
parties.  As J stated, “all politics are local” and she believes that Muslim America 
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should have “first gained a true foothold in the domestic sphere rather than 
jumping all the way to foreign politics.” In practice, she notes, the Muslim American 
community did not have an impact on U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it had the 
opposite effect. Muslim America became seen as the enemy. Politically active 
Muslim Americans were advocating not giving aid to Israel and not bombing Iraq. 
As a consequence, Muslim American views of American foreign policy were simply 
seen as being against the current foreign policy. Muslim Americans were seen as a 
fifth column in America. This point was the zenith of politically active Muslim 
America. 
 J and I also spoke about how in the literature on Muslim America, scholars 
speak about how before 9/11 Muslim Americans almost became “white.” That is to 
say, many scholars believe that Muslim America was almost part of mainstream 
America. In fact, Middle Eastern Americans are considered Caucasian in the U.S. 
census. J mentioned how early Syrian and Lebanese immigrants that came to 
America were Christians, and therefore were considered white. She also claimed 
that many Muslim Americans claimed this white status since they did not want to be 
lumped in with blacks in the United States. This black community was of lower 
racial status and therefore by claiming whiteness, Middle Eastern Americans could 
be part of the mainstream, despite their religious otherness as Muslims.  
 
9/11 and the War on Terror 
J stated that before September 11th, she felt almost white. When asked to define 
being white in America she claimed it meant “being part of the mainstream and 
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acceptable.” This also meant not being looked down upon and not being 
discriminated against in jobs. By contrast, today J feels nonwhite. She has openly 
been called a rag-head, obviously a derisive term for non-whites, and has been 
discriminated against when she has applied for jobs. She stated that it is not 
obvious discrimination. Rather, it is a more subtle discrimination, such as being the 
last one considered when it comes to employment. For instance, she stated: “they 
won’t tell you that you won’t get the job because you’re Muslim, but you know 
that’s why.” That is to say, J found herself behind the veil, in the words of W.E.B. 
DuBois, burdened with the same double-consciousness that characterizes African-
Americans, who also always have to ask themselves if they are being treated badly 
because they are black.  
 Regarding September 11, 2001, she stated that on that day she was outside 
her husband’s office when she heard that a couple of planes crashed into the World 
Trade Center towers. At the time, she thought nothing of it. She thought, perhaps, 
that it was just an accident. It was not until later that evening at dinner that it hit 
her. It was at that point that she saw the magnitude of the problem she would face 
as a Muslim American. 
 At this point, I asked J why she had a delayed reaction to what was about to 
be a foreign policy crisis impacting the American homeland. She responded that 
previously there was the TWA plane crash and the Oklahoma City bombing, both of 
which were not carried out by Muslims, and therefore she really did not think 
anything of it. She did note that with the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 the 
media rushed to say that Muslim extremists carried it out, and she felt it was 
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unfair. It was at that point, with Oklahoma City, that she “woke up to the feeling of 
being discriminated against.” She felt that with the Oklahoma City bombing, 
Muslims were becoming a target, but it was a subtle feeling and the “alarm bells in 
her head were not very loud.” 
 She stated that there were other alarms, but “they are more subtle, like 
being considered different. That’s an alarm.” J felt like all non-European immigrants 
hear this alarm. To her, European immigrants do not hear this alarm since they 
look like Americans, meaning they are white, and probably have the same religion. 
Middle Eastern immigrants will typically not have these same characteristics and 
therefore will always be considered different by the American mainstream. J 
claimed that the imagined face of the Middle Eastern immigrant in mainstream 
America is that of the terrorist. When pressed as to where this image is created, 
she stated that the media promote the terrorist face, which to J is just another arm 
of the U.S. government. 
 Again, while seemingly making the assertion that the government is anti-
Islamic, J denied that this is the case. J did not believe that the U.S needed to be in 
conflict with Islam since “American values are very much compatible with Islamic 
values.” Instead, to her, the foreign policy of the United States is what is not 
compatible with Islam. As such, she felt, if American foreign policy toward the 
Islamic world changed, the United States would not find itself at odds with Muslim 
countries.  
 After the attacks occurred on September 11th, J “definitely” saw a change in 
her American identity. She claimed that what she immediately noticed was the 
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amount of discrimination she faced and witnessed. In fact, gun shots were fired at 
her mosque after 9/11. She also recounted how after 9/11 during a visit to Wal-
Mart people would ridicule her. J stated that out of fear she did not want to leave 
the house. She feared for her physical safety and for the physical safety of her 
friends and loved ones. She did not want to be treated differently within her own 
homeland due to resembling the targeted Other in the War on Terror. 
 She stated that after 9/11 Muslim Americans males were more prone to 
being attacked than were Muslim American females. J believed this due to men 
being seen as more a threat than women, including women who wear the hijab. J  
felt that Muslim men are targeted because the new face of the Other post-9/11 is 
that of a Muslim male terrorists, not a female terrorist. To J, the face of the Muslim 
terrorist is a brown face, any shade of brown, just as long as it is nonwhite. This 
face also has a beard, and possibly wears a turban. Meanwhile, to J, the Muslim 
women’s face in the American popular imagination is that of “an oppressed face,” 
the women behind the veil. 
 After 9/11, J did not change her physical appearance, such as adding or 
removing a hijab, nor did any of her friends or loved ones. However, she was aware 
of others who changed their physical appearance. She believed those that did 
change their physical appearance did so because they were going through turmoil. 
To J, they were experiencing an inner struggle between keeping their faith or 
mixing into mainstream America, essentially a choice between assimilation or 
recognition. She stated that even if she did change her physical appearance she 
would still “be different.” J went on to say:  
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I’m still from the Middle East, so I am still different. I still have a 
foreign name. I can change that, but to what extent do I change 
myself. Do I want to completely lose my identity in order to fit in?  
 J’s quote illustrates the challenge for Muslim Americans post 9-11. Muslim 
Americans realize that they are fundamentally different that the current conception 
of Americanness. Muslim Americans realize that they are different than the 
idealized image of a Muslim American. In fact, Muslim Americans realize that they 
have characteristics which are closer to that of the ambiguous, unnamed enemy in 
the War on Terror. J knows that she is not affiliated with this shadowy enemy. 
However, she sees that other Americans view her as part of the enemy. Therefore, 
J has a choice. She can assimilate due to the racialization caused by the War on 
Terror or she can demand recognition and withstand the assault on her identity. 
The first choice is the easier one to make, but it will mean that J will lose a large 
part of herself in order to fit in, a big sacrifice to make for acceptance. The second 
choice is the more difficult choice. It will mean that J will continue to face 
harassment, but she will remain true to herself. As such, J chooses to embrace her 
Muslim identity despite all of the negative connotations of this identity brought on 
by the War on Terror.  
 J also expressed the observation that in the U.S. Americans have a notion 
that women who wear the hijab are oppressed. She felt that the United States uses 
this notion to vilify the Other. She felt that this notion was used to justify invading 
other states, such as with Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, J recalled, the United States 
claimed it was going to liberate Afghani women. In reality, to J, the U.S.  cared less 
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about women’s rights. To her, it was a simply a means for America’s end goal of 
dominating the Middle East and ensuring rights to their resources.   
 
Foreign Policy at Home 
J claimed that as a result of the War on Terror, the U.S. government had infiltrated 
her Muslim American community. For example, she recounted how a man started 
coming to her mosque following 9/11. She stated that this man was caught holding 
the Koran upside down. Even when he prayed, she stated, he did know how to 
pray, and a couple of months later he disappeared.  Thereafter, he was identified as 
“not belonging here” by her community. 
 J believes that as a result of this and other episodes, her community is being 
singled out by U.S. anti-terrorism policies. However, rather than blame this claim 
on the United States government being anti-Islamic, she believes that this targeting 
t is due to financial purposes. That it is to say, since the United States is going 
through financial hardships, each U.S. bureaucracy is trying to maximize its 
funding. Therefore, to J, the FBI wants to show numbers to justify their funding, 
and a result they are setting up Muslim Americans.   
 J claimed that she did not know of any people who were pushed to be radical 
Muslims due to U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. However, she felt that within the 
United States following the invasion of Afghanistan, America was becoming less 
tolerant of Islam. At this point, J felt as though she was “an Other within my own 
country.” This feeling for J has not changed, as to this day she still feels as an 
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Other. Within America prior to 9/11, she felt some sort of Americanness, but not 
totally American.   
 When asked as to why America was in this current condition with the Muslim 
world, J felt that it was due to the American empire deteriorating. To keep its 
position in the world, she believed the United States was attacking other countries 
in order to keep its position in the world. By dominating these countries, the United 
States could secure resources and ensure their position at the top in the 
international system. Internal issues, like increased corruption, she claimed, caused 
the deterioration of America.  J believed that it is inevitable that the United States 
will eventually lose its position in the international system. When pressed as to 
whether should would like to prevent that fall, J stated that as a Muslim American 
she would absolutely want to help out country.  However, she did not believe that 
she could make an impact since real decisions in America are made by the 
powerful.   
 The impact of this statement is that J sees the United States as needing to 
dominate Others. This domination feeds United States foreign policy. The Middle 
East, the birthplace of Islam, is one area in which the U.S. is currently dominating 
every aspect of life. J feels this domination since she has roots in the Middle East. 
She sees that the people who are being dominated look a lot like her. Therefore, 
how can she not feel as though she is part of the targeted Other? Yet, rather than 
position herself as against the United States government, J also embraces her 
newer identity as an American. She wants to reform the way in which America 
works. However, J believes she cannot affect the policies of the United States since 
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she is not part of the influential in America. As such, J is living two different lives in 
the U.S. At the same time she an Other and part of the “us.” She is part of the 
majority and the minority in America. J is both racialized and privileged. The 
ideational duality for J emerges from the War on Terror, but is caused by the 
racialized construction of the enemy.  
 
Afghanistan 
J was not supportive of the American foreign policy objective in Afghanistan to 
promote democracy. She stated that “democracy comes from below. It’s not a top-
down process.” She added that it is not in Afghanistan’s tradition to have Western-
style democracy. Instead, she believed it should be the United States foreign policy 
objective to let Afghans decide their own form of government.  
  J also viewed the American’s response to 9/11 as naïve. She saw how the 
American public immediately rallied behind the president and the government. J 
saw how the United States’ public was ready to attack the Muslim world without 
any real questioning of going to war.  Yet, she also understood that nobody in 
America wanted to see the September 11th attacks, and it caused them to feel 
“that the attack was a threat to their lifestyle.” Interestingly, J says “their lifestyle,” 
not our lifestyle. This is a clear indication that at this point J does not feel as though 
J is part of the American national identity. She has now disaggregated herself as a 
result of the targeting of Muslim communities following 9/11. 
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 Following the attacks on the World Trade Center, J also began to think of the 
Japanese-American internment camps or how Italians and Germans were treated in 
the United States during World War II. She began to feel that Muslim American 
would experience the same treatment internally as a result of American foreign 
policy. She believed that the War on Terror was going to be “an all-out war in the 
Middle East and all Muslims were to be a target of this war.” 
 When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan about a month after the 9/11 attacks, 
the feeling that J had about American foreign policy did not change. She claimed 
that this invasion was staged to justify U.S. access to resources in Afghanistan, in 
particular running an oil pipeline through that country. Therefore, it hurt J to see 
American soldiers dying for oil rights when they were told that they were fighting 
for their country. 
 Again, J sees herself as belonging to the American culture. She feels the pain 
of American soldiers dying. It saddens and sickens her to see her co-nationals dying 
in a Muslim state under supposedly false pretenses. However, she still sees 
American foreign policy as dominating a Muslim country for no other reason than to 
dominate a Muslim country which will not bend to its will.  She feels conflicted in 
what she believes. She is living a double life as a Muslim and an American.  
 This doubleness may explain J conspiratorial beliefs. Obviously, J is wrestling 
with two identities, between being a religious Muslim or a patriotic, nationalistic 
American, during a time of foreign policy crisis. Unwilling to suppress her Muslim 
identity and needing to justify her American identity, she understands why America 
is invading Afghanistan, yet she is horrified by the deaths of innocent Muslims in 
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Afghanistan. Therefore, J explains the United States foreign policy action as being 
staged, or top put it another way, as not completely real. She understands the 
American foreign policy act more by the spectacle than by the action. For J, this 
rhetorical justification allows her to retain both her religious and national identities 
while avoiding ideational confliction. 
 
Iraq  
J stated that when the United States targeted Saddam Hussein for a second time in 
2003, “it was even more egregious act than in 1990.” She stated: “Saddam Hussein 
had no part in 9/11. What is the justification for that now?” To her, this act against 
Iraq definitely now looked like an oil issue. This foreign policy decision to invade 
Iraq caused her to become “really disgusted with American foreign policy.”  
 To J, Muslims did not have the same feeling of empowerment like they did 
before September 11th. Therefore, Muslim Americans stopped talking to politicians 
about trying to change foreign policy, since they were trying to fend for themselves 
domestically. As such, Muslim America turned inward. J believed that the groups 
that were formed to advocate for Muslim America were now weaker in foreign 
policy matters and stronger in domestic political matters. Yet, J did not perceive a 
change in public opinion toward Islam. To her, there was still negative public 
opinion about Muslims and a perception that they are a threat; that Islam is a 
violent religion; that Islam is oppressive to women; and that Islam is threatening 
the American way of life.  
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  When asked if America’s foreign policy is anti-Islamic, J did not believe that 
was the intent. She specifically mentioned that George W. Bush, the man, was not 
anti-Islamic, since he met with former University of South Florida professor Sami 
al-Arian. Interestingly, J believed that during the George W. Bush administration, 
the War on Terror was a war on Islam. She stated that terrorism was a code word 
for Islam. Therefore, George W. Bush’s foreign policy was anti-Islamic. Put another 
way, J believed, that if Islam stood in the way of American hegemony there was 
going to be a conflict between the two ideological systems. Therefore, what 
determined American foreign policy was resources, and American foreign policy 
used the fight against Islamic extremism as a means to a hegemonic end in an 
effort to secure resources in the Middle East.  
 J recounted that with the insurgency in Iraq, “it showed that America was not 
as strong as it believed.” Showing her desire to be part of America, she saw the 
deaths of American personnel as tragic. She felt disgusted and powerless as young 
men and women lost their lives to the Iraqi insurgency. When asked how she felt 
about Muslim Americans who sign up for the military, she claimed to understand.  J 
believed that after signing up for the military Muslim Americans would be making a 
living, yet due to military indoctrination, their understanding about their 
Americanness would remain incomplete. This was due to Islam and American 
identities being compatible, but in foreign policy at odds with one another. As J 
states: 
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If you go overseas and are fighting a war against Islam, and if you are 
required to kill people, how can you be a Muslim or American? I find it 
very difficult to reconcile. 
 J was asked whether post-War on Terror it would be possible to reintegrate 
Muslim Americans into the American identity. She stated that in order to 
incorporate Muslim Americans, the United States would have to change its entire 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. To her, it would take more than just 
physically leaving these Muslim countries. Rather, the United States would have to 
be sincere about promoting democracy in Middle East. The United States would also 
have to be more transparent and fair when dealing with the Arab-Israeli issue.  
 When asked how she felt when Osama bin Laden was killed, J stated that she 
was relieved and happy that he was out of the picture. She made this assertion 
despite killing not being an Islamic or an American value. J stated: “maybe killing is 
wrong, but it’s one less problem that we [Muslim Americans] have to deal with.”  
She also believed that the larger Muslim American community was relieved that bin 
Laden was killed. Yet, she noted, that  if you go to places like Pakistan, the people 
there are angry that bin Laden was killed since they view him as a man that stood 
up to the United States.  
 Regarding bin Laden, J did not see him as a Muslim. However, she did view 
him as the face of the War on Terror. His was the Muslim face, a Muslim face that 
looked like many faces in America. As such, J was happy bin Laden was killed, 
although it was un-Islamic, since it removed the main image and target, 
internationally and domestically, from the War on Terror. Yet, in reasserting her 
 162 
 
Muslim identity, she was quick to point out that Muslims across the world still 
celebrate bin Laden. Bin Laden was a man who refused to be oppressed and as 
such chose to lead a movement against United States foreign policy. While J does 
not explicitly endorse his movement, she did make sure to add the caveat that bin 
Laden, the man, was not hated everywhere. I interpreted this caveat to mean that 
she feels a division between her Muslim and American identities, a split which was 
accentuated by the War on Terror.  The split for J, was due to being Othered by the 
War on Terror. J does not the United States, rather she hates being targeted as the 
enemy. Accordingly, to J, the simple act of resisting domination by bin Laden was 
an act to be admired since he refused to submit to a lessened non-white, non-
American, non-Judeo-Christian position.  
 
Libya and Syria 
When the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya occurred, J did not believe the 
intervention was due to oil, since relatively speaking Libya has a miniscule amount 
of this resource. She also did not believe that Muammar Qaddafi was a Muslim. She 
agreed with the decision to intervene in Libya since the U.S. had a coalition of 
countries attacking the Qaddafi regime and had U.N. approval. J also approved of 
this foreign policy action since it did not put NATO boots on the ground in a Muslim 
country, and she viewed the intervention as consistent with U.S. foreign policy 
goals of defending democracy. 
 Regarding, America foreign policy toward her country of origin, Syria, J 
stated that the United States should stop dictating what the opposition should do 
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and should not do in Syria. She believed that the Syrian people should decide the 
political solution in Syria and the United States should not dictate who comes to 
power. As a Syrian-American, she was in favor of a U.S. attack against the Assad 
regime in 2012. In fact, J was “so disappointed when the United States backed 
down.” That being said, she did want the United States to remove Assad, only to 
destabilize his capabilities.  
 Accordingly, J is disappointed in the United States foreign policy because of 
its “hypocrisy” regarding Syria. As she notes, American foreign policy wants 
democracy, but in the case of Syria, the U.S. was unwilling to do anything against a 
dictator. Again, she did not want the U.S. to remove Assad. Rather, J believes that 
“American foreign policy can do Syria smarter by promoting democracy on the 
ground and not putting troops on the ground.” For comparison, she noted Iran’s 
spreading of soft power across the Middle East. Specifically in Syria, Iran has been 
spreading its influence through proselytizing the Shia religion, and using cash 
payments for a destitute population as an incentive to convert. Mirroring this soft 
power push, she believes the United States foreign policy in Syria should be 
targeted at promoting values like individualism, free trade, pragmatism, and 
democracy. In promoting these values, she believes that Syrian people would find 
American values very compatible to their own, and as such the Syrian population 
would be less hostile to America.  
 In relation, J believes that there is definitely a sectarian war occurring in the 
Middle East right now between Sunnis and Shiites. However, she does not believe 
that the U.S. is promoting this war. Yet, that is not to say that the U.S. it not 
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influencing this war, possibly unwittingly. J thinks that U.S. foreign policy in the 
region “does not know what it is doing.”  The end result of this foreign policy, or 
lack thereof, is that, to J, Shiites are winning. She noted how with the removal of 
Saddam Hussein, a nominal Sunni himself, the Shiites now have far more influence 
than they did in Iraq.   
 J also found the possible rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran as 
troubling. She believed that the animosity between Iran and the U.S. is “only show 
below the table.”  Instead, she believes that the two countries are not really 
enemies, despite the hateful rhetoric that is espoused from both sides at times. I 
pressed J on why these countries may want to be friends in the open if they could 
remain friends below the table. She expressed the belief that there is “some 
conspiracy against Sunni Muslims, since the West would rather see a Shiite Middle 
East rather than a Sunni Middle East. Why I don’t know... Maybe it’s the Arab 
spring that sparked this friendship. There is now a common enemy, Sunni 
Muslims.” 
 These naive beliefs toward U.S. foreign policy could be a result of J’s Othered 
status within America. She feels under threat in her country, and as a result, feels 
the need to explain her out of the ordinary experience. J cannot make sense of the 
fact that although she is part of the most powerful state on earth, she is also 
somehow part of the enemy. Therefore, J relies on conspiracy to explain her 
situation. She sees the U.S. as wanting to have a Shiite-led Middle East without any 
evidence.  
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 Perhaps, as an explanation, there is a parallel in her experience. The Middle 
East, from where she originates, is a Sunni lead region. Yet, J, a Sunni, feels her 
relatively privileged position slipping away in the Middle East much as it is in 
America. In both places, she is becoming an Other within. In Syria, J, the Sunni-
Muslim is a Syrian national under an Alawite (a quasi-Shia sect) regime. As a 
result, in Syria, J is an enemy terrorist against the state and its own War on Terror.  
In America, J, the Muslim is part of America, yet also the targeted enemy in the 
War on Terror. Table 15 below illustrates this dual life. J is under threat in both of 
her homes, and therefore needs to rationalize this threatening environment by way 
of conspiracy. 
Table 15: Timeline of J in the United States 
Timeline Sense of Americanness 
J arrives in the U.S. (1984) Not American yet, but accepting the 
premise of the “American dream.” 
First Gulf War (1991) Disagreeing with American foreign policy 
but not feeling Othered as a result of it. 
Prior to September 10, 2001 Making headway in America; 
approaching a sense of Americanness. 
War on Terror (September 11, 2001-
current) 
Targeted; pushed out of the American 
identity 
Afghanistan (2001) Conflicted; trying to make sense of her 
Otherness 
Second Gulf War (2003) Conflicted; targeted 
Syria (2012- current) Even more targeted, specifically as a 
Sunni Muslim 
 
Abrahamic America? 
Regarding the future of American national identity, I asked J whether one day the 
U.S. might be able to identify itself as an Abrahamic-nation, meaning a country for 
Christians, Jews, and Muslims. She believed that if such a future was possible, 
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Muslim Americans would “have to do their part in order to change that. I don’t 
know that they’re in a position to do that.” She stated that if the next generation 
can become white, just like Jewish Americans did, they can affect American politics. 
She also expressed the opinion that a lack of engagement in the American 
community is the biggest problem facing Muslim Americans. J believes that 
American Muslims need to find ways to be more represented in American politics.  
  J believes that one reason Muslim Americans are not involved in American 
politics is because they have “the immigrant mentality.”  To her, this means that 
immigrants will always be immigrants, “with their orientation always focused on 
where they came from.” She did not believe that the old country should interfere 
with their current political activism. Despite this belief, J noted that she “knows a 
lot of people around me that care a lot less about what goes on in the local 
community. They’re thinking about what’s going on back home in the Middle East.” 
She believed that this problem has grown in significance due to advancements in 
communication, which allow immigrants to know about what is going on back in the 
homeland. J felt that this technological advancement for immigrants is a hindrance 
to becoming integrated into the American identity.  
 Therefore, to J, for Muslims to make it in America they will have to become 
“white.” To her, Muslim Americans will have to first conquer domestic politics before 
they can worry about international politics. As such, Muslim Americans will have to 
lose their immigrant mentality and integrate into mainstream white America. To J, 
Muslim Americans will have to find their way to Abrahamic America in spite of the 
framing that keeps them labeled as Others in their homeland. 
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Conclusion 
The interview with J displayed a convergence in terms of similarities with other 
Muslim Americans in my sample. Her open-ended responses matched with the 
close-ended responses of my sample. J’s contribution was that she gave depth and 
substance to these responses. She was able to express why specific American 
foreign policies racialized the Muslim American identity. J was also important in 
showing the mind of a long-time Muslim immigrant. Moreover, J exhibited how what 
is happens abroad in American foreign policy impacts the internal formulation of the 
Muslim American community.  
 J was also representative of my sample in that the key event in her life as a 
Muslim American was the 9/11 attacks and the resulting War on Terror. Before this 
event, J was coming ever closer to feeling American. That is to say that she 
believed she was coming closer accessing the white American identity, Although she 
did not believe she would ever become totally American, she thought at some point 
she could approximate a sense of Americanness. Indeed, she believed that she was 
coming closer to that point of white Americanness after the election of George W. 
Bush, a man whose foreign policies she disagrees with but also a man she does not 
believe to be anti-Islamic.  
 J also seemed torn regarding the purpose of U.S. foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. At times, she believed that the American foreign policy was oppressive 
to Muslims. Yet, at other points, she wanted the U.S. to do something in the Middle 
East, such as in Syria. I believe these conflicted desires stem from her identities as 
a Syrian, an American and a Muslim. J, who is a Sunni, does not want to see Assad, 
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an Alawite, continue to dominate her sect. As such, her beliefs about American 
foreign policy in the Middle East are tempered by her personal feelings. I do not 
doubt this feeling is unique to J, as many Americans view United States foreign 
policy in a negative light, yet manage to make an exception or to find a grey area 
when it meets their needs. 
 Finally, another important observation was the conspiratorial views of J. This 
was not uncommon amongst others in my sample. Several respondents felt under 
threat from a force that they could not explain. They saw this force first during the 
War on Terror. J recognizes that Muslim Americans are targeted in America, but she 
cannot explain the force behind the targeting. Despite the conceptual vagueness of 
this threat, J sees how white America has framed her as a dangerous Other. Yet, J 
continues to subscribe to the idea of the American Dream. As such, J is 
experiencing double consciousness. She sees herself as an Other and an American. 
Consequently, J cannot explain the disconnect between the American dream and 
her Muslim American nightmare.   
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CHAPTER 5: Findings and Reflection 
Muslim American Demographics 
American foreign policy towards the Middle East impacts the identity of Muslim 
Americans. My study effectively demonstrates that Muslim Americans in the Tampa 
Bay region feel racialized by U.S. foreign policy. Repeatedly, research subjects 
stated that they have been grouped in with the foreign Other as a result of U.S.-
Middle East foreign policy. Subjects overwhelmingly felt that the turning point at 
which they became racialized was the War on Terror. During this critical foreign 
policy juncture, respondents felt that their Muslim identity was equated with the 
“terror” in the War on Terror. Undoubtedly, my sample of Muslim Americans did not 
ascribe this characteristic unto themselves. The equating of Muslim with terror 
came from outside their group. The equation of these two terms came from the 
dominant group in the U.S., white America.   
 Most respondents did not feel that the U.S. government was explicitly anti-
Muslim or was promoting an anti-Islamic message. Many of these same 
respondents often stated that the foreign policy of the United States dominated 
Muslims in its foreign policy because the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam, 
happened to be the place that also had resources that America wanted to control. 
Therefore, the United States had to dominate the people in the Middle East so that 
they could ensure cheap and easy access to oil. Put another way, white America 
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wanted to retain its privileged access resources. As such, to respondents, the War 
on Terror was a war to subjugate Muslims in order to control their resources.  
 Since Muslim Americans were ascribed a particular identity, either explicitly 
or implicitly, some Muslim Americans during the War on Terror started to borne out 
this identity. That is not to say that these respondents became the evil Other. 
Rather, respondents accepted their religious identity since they were denied the 
“American national identity.” This embrace of their Islamic identity meant that 
although some of my subjects did not outwardly appear to be Muslim, the 
respondents retained cultural aspects of Islam to sustain a communal 
understanding of their group.  
 Accordingly, it was not surprising to hear the majority of my respondents 
represent themselves as Muslim Americans, not American Muslims. My respondent’s 
religious identity comes first. I suspect since Muslim Americans have been 
racialized, it has only caused my respondents to identity less with the American 
national identity. Further, this racialization pushed Muslim Americans closer 
together, thereby giving more prominence to their religious identity. Put another 
way, these individuals are grouping together as Muslims under threat, not as 
Americans under threat. 
 The threatening environment of the War on Terror does not mean that 
America and Islam are incompatible. Respondents overwhelmingly believed that 
Islamic and American values are compatible. What was not compatible was their 
targeting in the War on Terror, which equated Islam with the enemy. Many 
respondents felt that this targeting was implicit and not necessarily driven by the 
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U.S. government. Respondents often saw this framing as being projected by the 
U.S. media. Despite this view, no respondent could empirically explain why the U.S. 
media would choose to target Muslim America.  
 Thus, post-9/11, Muslim American groups have acknowledged their place in 
the racial ordering of America. Muslim Americans understand that they are second 
status citizens within their own country. This fact is in spite of Muslim Americans 
attempting to reach out to the dominant social group to assist in fighting the War 
on Terror. Rather than allow Muslim Americans to be part of “us” and to fight 
against the terrorists, Muslim Americans have been labeled as part of “them,” or 
the target of the War on Terror. This targeting brought on by U.S. foreign policy has 
caused Muslim Americans to have racial epitaphs aimed at them from their co-
nationals and to be discriminated against in employment.  
 Further, Muslim Americans have been racialized to the point that they have 
been implicitly barred from higher public office, thereby keeping American politics 
dominated by whites. Accordingly, it is not surprising to hear respondents remark 
that one of the main problems facing Muslim America is their lack of engagement in 
U.S. public affairs. Being denied access to political participation is simply one more 
symptom of the process of racialization in the United States. A clear way in which 
Muslim in America has been racialized is with the political attacks aimed at 
President Barrack Obama. In order to discredit his message, many white groups 
pushed the narrative that the President is a secret Muslim. While not a substantive 
criticism directed at any particular policy, this narrative was able to convince some 
that the President should not be trusted. As such, a Muslim during the War on 
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Terror is politically equated with evil, insidious, and adversarial. This discrimination 
keeps Muslim Americans largely out of public office and unable to significantly alter 
domestic or foreign policy.  
 Interestingly, there was a difference in my study regarding age in how 
Muslim Americans chose to embrace their identity and how they chose to navigate 
this identity in white America. According to my research, the primary fault line in 
age centered on whether a Muslim American immigrated to the United States or if a 
Muslim American was born in the United States. For the former, foreign policy 
typically did not impact their sense of American identity. Rather, these individuals 
focused on bettering their socioeconomic situation in America. Many of these 
Muslim Americans chose to remain distinct, thereby not assimilating into United 
States culture. Had these Muslim American immigrants been able to access 
resources in the United States, perhaps, then they would have integrated into the 
American identity. However, given their current economic situation, these 
individuals were more impacted by American domestic policy.   
 Young Muslim Americans, meaning those who grew up after 9/11 but during 
the War on Terror, were more able to assimilate into the American national identity. 
These individuals did not have to worry about accessing resources, since their 
immigrant parents provided for their wellbeing. This situation meant that younger 
Muslim Americans could spend more time learning the white American national 
identity, and recalibrating their sense of self in an attempt to fit into the national 
identity. In fact, in some Muslim households, the younger generation was actively 
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encouraged by the older generation to Americanize and to downplay their religious 
identity. 
 Recalibration is central, given that post 9/11, what it meant to be an 
American changed. Muslim Americans were no longer seen as being almost white. 
Rather, they were the non-white Other. In order to re-identify with the “us,” some 
Muslim Americans downplayed their Islamic identity. As some respondents noted, 
Mohammed, became Mike or some Islamic Middle Easterners instead chose to 
identify themselves by another ethnicity, such as Mexican or Italian.  
 These identity modifications were not accessible to all Muslim Americans, 
such as religiously devout women. A Muslim American woman wearing the hijab 
was the embodiment of an idealized notion the Islamic woman. For Muslim 
American women that wore the hijab, there was a belief that to escape from being 
Othered one could remove their headwear. Many Muslim American women were not 
willing to take this step. Rather, these women became the defenders of the Muslim 
faith in America.  
 As such, not all younger Muslim Americans chose to shift their Muslim 
identity. Some Muslim Americans chose to embrace their Otherness. This was 
especially true of those Muslim women that chose to wear the hijab and religiously 
devout men who chose to grow out their beard. Many of these men and women 
became the defenders of their faith. They knew that Muslim Americans were the 
Others in American foreign policy. Yet, these individuals chose to counter the 
perceptions held by some in the American public, reaching out to their communities 
in order to humanize their identity.  Thus, education was extremely important to 
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Muslim Americans since it allowed Muslim Americans to educate a curious public on 
what they are and what they are not. Education was also a way to gain 
consciousness and to break out from behind their double consciousness. Muslim 
Americans saw education as a way of countering negative perceptions of 
themselves and reducing their Othered status. 
 Within my Muslim America sample there was an idea that young people 
should go to college in order to pursue lucrative careers. The thinking by the 
Muslim American community is that post-collegiate career success will provide 
Muslim Americans with an easier life to live in America. Interestingly, economic 
success was seen by some respondents to have an effect on Muslim identity. Some 
respondents held that it caused individuals to become more religious and secure in 
their Muslim identity. In these cases, Muslim Americans were more likely to make 
religious trips back to the Middle East and to tithe more often. Other respondents 
provided contrary anecdotal accounts in which Muslim Americans became less 
religious and more secular as a result of economic success. In these circumstances, 
Muslim Americans would downplay their Islamic identity in order to fit into “white” 
American social circles. 
 My respondents also commented on their interactions with other social 
groups in America. Respondents significantly noted the tension between their belief 
system and how it matched with the platform of the Republican Party, but also how 
the Republican Party due to demographics excludes Muslims. On the other hand, 
respondents noted how they fit with the Democratic Party demographically, but 
ideologically they do not match with the party’s platform. Respondents were also 
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more likely to interact with other Abrahamic religions, e.g. Christianity and 
Judaism, than non-Abrahamic religions. 
 Related to exclusion, many respondents noted the segregation that they 
faced in the United States. The discrimination that Muslim Americans face was 
largely attributed to most Americans misunderstanding Islam. While there is a great 
awareness of Islam post-9/11, the conclusions drawn about Muslim Americans, 
respondents felt, were largely misinformed. Since many non-Muslim Americans had 
tainted views of Islam, they tended to treat it as a violent religion. Thus, due to this 
largely negative perception, there was an effort by some Americans to exclude 
Muslim Americans from employment in the United States or to treat them as 
second status citizens.   
 Interestingly, several respondents made light of the discrimination they face 
in America. I attribute this to Muslim Americans trying to fit in with white America. 
Accordingly, if respondents laughed at the jokes directed at them perhaps by white 
America, then they could be seen as any other American which views Islam in a 
negative light. I believe that many of the Muslim Americans in my study would 
rather play down the daily discrimination they face and rather join with the majority 
through quiescence.  
 
American Foreign Policy and Double Consciousness 
As my study illustrates, although variables such as gender, education, 
socioeconomic status, and age do impact the identity of American Muslims, 
 176 
 
American foreign policy was the primary causal variable that shaped how they are 
viewed and view themselves in the United States. The aforementioned variables: 
gender, education, socioeconomic status, and age were really casual variables of 
second order in that they caused Muslim Americans to view their exclusion via 
American foreign policy through different lenses. Yet, these different lenses all 
operated behind the same veil, in that American Muslims, no matter their 
demographics, were Muslim first and American second. The ordering of Muslim first 
and American second was not self-imposed by many Muslim Americans 
respondents. Rather, this ordering was constructed and externally imposed by the 
dominant white society of America. Consequently, as a result of American foreign 
policy towards the Middle East many Muslim Americans were looking at themselves 
through the eyes of others. 
 However, to the extent that these individuals operated behind this veil, 
Muslim Americans did not necessarily see their difference as a negative quality.  
That is to say, most respondents did not resign themselves to the fact that they 
were not included in white America. Instead, many respondents embraced their 
Islamic identity and wanted to represent it to the dominant white American culture. 
Moreover, the Muslim Americans in my sample wanted to prove to the dominant 
American identity that there is nothing incompatible with Islam and America. 
Indeed, my respondents felt that they were displaying their American identity 
simply by disagreeing with American foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
 Many of the younger respondents in my study noted how the national 
security state and war in the Middle East had become normalized during their 
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lifetimes. These younger individuals had grown up in an America that promoted the 
myth of acceptance and prosperity for all, yet these same individuals experience an 
Otherness that did not allow them to access the American national identity. As 
such, due to the Muslim American identity being excluded from the American 
national identity, some individuals chose to embrace other elements of their 
identity. For these individuals, the simple fact that they were Muslims kept them in 
an Othered condition in which they were the enemy of U.S. foreign policy.  
 For some Muslim Americans, no matter how hard they might try, they could 
not fit in with what it means to “be American.” These individuals instead chose to 
embrace their adverse identification and turn to radicalism. These Muslim 
Americans believe that no matter what they do, their condition as Others will never 
change in the United States. Therefore, these individuals reify what it means to be 
an Othered American Muslim and embrace their oppositional identity. The only 
individuals I had state that he followed this oppositional mentality were two African-
American Muslims. Given that these individuals were doubly Othered, I chose not to 
include them in my research since their experiences were not representative of my 
overall sample.  Nevertheless, these individual’s experiences demonstrate how 
radicalism can emerge from within a community when the Othered community is 
excluded from the national imagined community.  
 As stated, American foreign policy towards the Middle East is symptomatic of 
the U.S. imagined community. Therefore, it was not surprising that of the Muslim 
Americans in my study, all the subjects viewed American foreign policy towards the 
Middle East negatively. I believe their reactions to American foreign policy are 
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reciprocal since due to American foreign policy towards the Middle East, Muslim 
Americans are Othered and since they are Othered they view American foreign 
policy negatively. Therefore, because of this reciprocal relationship, Muslim 
Americans live a double life as both one of “us,” at least in terms of formal 
citizenship and as of “them” in everyday experience. 
 The subjects in my study also believed that Islamic countries were treated 
different than other non-Muslim countries. However, subjects did not usually 
believe that these countries were treated differently because they were Islamic. 
Rather, most held that the reason these countries were treated differently was 
because the U.S. wanted to access and control the resources in those countries. 
Israel was also mentioned frequently as a reason as to why the United States treats 
Islamic countries differently. Again, respondents did not claim that the Muslim 
countries were treated differently because Israel is a Jewish state. Put another way, 
respondents did not buy into a “clash of civilizations” thesis to explain U.S. foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. Instead, respondents held that the relations were 
due to the alliance between the United States and Israel. A final common reason 
held by respondents that the U.S. treats Islamic countries differently than other 
countries was because the Islamic countries in the Middle East did not submit to 
American foreign policy. As such, to respondents, America foreign policy aimed to 
suppress these countries and to maintain permanent bases in the region in order to 
control them. 
 Despite these views of American foreign policy towards the Middle East, my 
subjects were split on whether the U.S. should intervene in the Middle East. 
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Perhaps this was due to respondents buying into the American foreign policy 
narrative that the United States should spread democracy around the world. More 
definitively, respondents tended to see the Middle East as a fractured, dangerous 
place. This condition was often claimed to be a result of American intervention in 
the region. Nonetheless, more intervention by the United States was sometimes 
given as a prescription for the region’s woes! Thus, respondents either wanted the 
United States to leave the region; to intervene only as a last resort; or both.  
 One overriding theme by respondents regarding U.S. foreign policy towards 
the Middle East is that the United States needed to be more thoughtful. This 
criticism came on different levels. First, many respondents claimed that if the U.S. 
was going to be the guarantor of democracy, it needed to be so in every case. That 
is to say, the United States should not be selective as to when to intervene in 
support of democracy. For instance, if the U.S. was going to support democracy in 
Libya then it also needed to do so in Syria. Second, regarding the means of action, 
if the United States was going to intervene in the Middle East, respondents 
preferred that the U.S. not use military power but rather diplomatic and soft power. 
 Respondents tended to view Muslim Americans that resorted to radicalism in 
a negative light. Put another way, respondents did not support those Muslims that 
commit extremist acts. Several respondents noted the irony of extremist Muslims, 
who would not be able to express themselves as freely in their ancestral countries, 
but as a result of the freedom they have in the United States extremist Muslims can 
express their dissatisfaction with American policies.  
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 Subjects claimed that radicalism within the Muslim community was often 
caused by a failure to assimilate. As has been noted, Muslim Americans have been 
denied entry into the larger community due to American foreign policy. Hence, 
subjects believed that since some Muslim Americans were pushed out of this larger 
community via Othering, their response was radicalism. Often times, many 
respondents felt that this Othering was only one casual variable, but a critical 
variable nonetheless, leading to the radicalization of Muslim Americans. This foreign 
policy variable mattered in both how Muslim Americans were treated in America 
and how their fellow Muslims were treated in the Middle East. Other variables 
included finances, family situations, educational issues, and social causes.  
 Unquestionably, respondents claimed that there is a double standard 
between Muslim Americans that commit extremist acts and non-Muslim Americans 
that commit the same type of extremist acts. This disparity is without a doubt a 
product of the War on Terror. As respondents noted, when a Muslim American does 
anything that could be construed as radical, that person is automatically a terrorist 
and part of a larger Islamic terror plot. Conversely, when a non-Muslim goes on a 
shooting rampage, for example, this person is mentally ill. To respondents, there is 
a disconnect in how American’s view terrorism and the type of people that commit 
terrorist acts. 
 As such, Muslim Americans need two faces to survive in the United States. 
They must at once be the good Muslim, while also recognizing that they are being 
viewed as terrorists by their co-nationals.  If a Muslim American deviates from this 
social imposed identity and challenges American foreign policy, then they further 
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embed their Othered status. Therefore, Muslim Americans in the current 
environment of the War on Terror must operate behind a veil.  
 As Muslim Americans are excluded from the sphere of belonging in the United 
States, assimilation post-September is not an option. All of the Muslim Americans I 
interviewed wanted to be accepted as equal co-nationals. Yet, as most respondents 
noted, total assimilation into the dominant culture would require white America 
being open to their inclusion. Therefore, since the since assimilation route is 
currently blocked, many Muslim Americans are demanding recognition by the 
dominant culture. Recognition of Muslim America means that white America accepts 
their difference. While Muslim America’s Otherness may eventually find acceptance, 
it does not mean that Muslim Americans will receive the same rights, resources, 
and duties of the dominant culture. 
 Blocked access to the dominant culture means that Muslim Americans will not 
be able to access the mythological “American dream.” Rather, since Muslim 
Americans are demanding recognition, they are instead pursuing the Muslim 
American dream. Accordingly, Muslim Americans have a choice. They can chose to 
give up what makes them distinct and try to become “American” or they can retain 
their Othered identity, while remaining true to themselves, and continue operate at 
a disadvantage relative to white America. 
 Thus, many Muslim Americans are simply asking for recognition. To Charles 
Taylor, recognition is for those that have been left outside the nationalist project 
and are demanding rights and recognition. Taylor states that over time, many 
minority groups have been misrecognized by the majority culture thereby 
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oppressing their sense of self. Taylor argues that these people have the right to 
“purge themselves of this imposed and destructive identity,” and thus Taylor 
emphasizes that any liberal society must also follow the liberal tenet of equal 
respect.  
 Taylor also states that within liberal democracies not all voices are heard. 
This is due to a culture’s standard of worth which judges the hegemonic culture to 
be the most worthy. Accordingly, any other culture which is a measured against 
this metric will fall short and thus is not deserving of promotion or protection. This 
troubles Taylor, who posits that in any multicultural society multiple voices and 
views must be heard. As a sense of justice, people also have the right to have their 
minority culture affirmed by the majority culture. This means that the majority 
culture must protect minority rights for Muslim Americans (Taylor, 1994).  
 Returning to the choice between assimilation or recognition, I asked 
respondents about marrying someone outside their religion. I asked this question 
for two reasons. First, someone who marries outside of their religion and into the 
dominant religion of the country is has more of a chance to assimilate and become 
more like “us.” Secondly, knowing that Islam is a very patriarchical religion, if 
Muslims Americans chose to marry outside their religion then it shows that they are 
adopting American customs, such as marital openness. As such, if Muslim 
Americans did choose to marry outside of Islam then they could access the religious 
escape hatch and become like the dominant culture.   
 Unsurprisingly, respondents displayed the patriarchical nature of Islam in 
their responses. Most claimed that it was okay for a man to marry outside of Islam, 
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while also overwhelmingly claiming that it is impermissible for a Muslim woman to 
marry a non-Muslim man. In the cases where respondents did make exceptions, 
they claimed that if a non-inter-Islamic marriage did take place it should be to 
someone else of the book (e.g. Christian or Jewish) with the intention of converting 
their partner to Islam. Clearly, most Muslim Americans in my study were not 
incorporated the American custom that it is okay to marry whomever you love. 
 A final question I asked respondents about assimilation and recognition was 
whether they changed their physical appearance post-September 11. Several 
respondents stated that if they are in physical danger, religiously they are not 
required to wear Islamic dress. As such, some respondents selectively wore the 
hijab because of the danger posed by the War on Terror. Other respondents chose 
to embrace their Otherness and to wear the hijab. They were also aware of the fear 
and hatred that the hijab causes other co-nationals. While aware of these negative 
repercussions, some Muslim American women have chosen recognition of their 
difference.  
 
Pew Research 
The these responses by my sample converged in terms of similarities and attitudes 
with what has been reported in the responses to the 2007 and 2011 Pew surveys. 
For example, the Muslim Americans in my sample largely matched the 
demographics of the Pew surveys. In my sample, the media age was 27 years, 
while in 2007 it was 25 years and in 2011 it was 24.75 years. Based on age, my 
sample was 60 percent male and 40 percent female, while for Pew in 2007 it was 
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54 percent male and 46 percent female and in 2011 it was 55 percent male and 45 
percent female.  
 Regarding sectional differences, my sample did not as closely approximate 
the Pew study. However, I do not believe that this has an impactful difference on 
my results since Muslim Americans are Othered equally in American regardless of 
sect. In my sample, I had 80 percent Sunni Muslims and 20 percent Shia Muslims. 
For the 2007 Pew sample there was 50 percent Sunni Muslims and 16 percent Shia 
Muslims, while in 2011 there was 66 percent Sunni Muslims and 11 percent Shia 
Muslims.  
 These numbers and the responses given by respondents come extremely 
close to the research done by Pew. For instance, regarding the question, Since the 
terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, has it become more difficult to be a 
Muslim in the US, or hasn’t it not changed very much?, 60 percent of my 
respondents claimed that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the United 
States since 9/11. This number compares with Pew’s polling in 2007 (53 percent) 
and in 2011 (55 percent). Not only do my sample numbers closely match Pew’s 
numbers, they also showed that the number of American Muslims that are having 
more difficulty in the United States is increasing over time. 
 Regarding the question asked in my research project and by Pew: What do 
you think are the most important problems facing Muslims living in the United 
States today?, my respondents placed more emphasis on ignorance/misconceptions 
of Islam (40 percent) than did those in Pew studies from 2007 (14 percent)  and 
2011 (15 percent). My respondents were comparable on another choice, 
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discrimination/racism/ prejudice (16 percent), while Pew in 2007 was 19 percent 
and in 2011 was (16 percent). My respondents also matched closely on 
stereotyping/generalizing about all Muslims (10 percent), since Pew in 2007 was 12 
percent and in 2011 was 16 percent. The other two choices made by my 
respondents, not treated fairly (16 percent) and hatred/fear/distrust of Islam (10 
percent), did not rank in the top five choices with Pew. Unfortunately, data is not 
available from Pew to show if Muslims were experiencing the same problems before 
September 11th. Therefore, regarding this question, I cannot conclusively state 
that it is because of U.S. foreign policy that American Muslims are experiencing 
particular problems. However, I can state that the Muslim Americans in my sample 
are still experiencing discrimination and problems associated with being Muslim in 
the United States today. 
 A third question I replicated from the Pew study was: Do you think most 
Muslims who come to the U.S. today want to adopt American customs and ways of 
life or do you think that they want to be distinct from the larger American society? 
This question was important to ask given that it would measure Muslim American’s 
sense of inclusion in the American national identity. In my study, 36 percent of 
respondents stated that Muslim immigrants should adopt American values; 24 
percent said that they should remain distinct; and 40 percent said both. In the 
2011 Pew study, 56 percent said that Muslim immigrants should adopt American 
customs; 20 percent said that they should remain distinct; and 8 percent said both. 
While the numbers in both studies do not match, they do show that there is a 
common belief that Muslim immigrants should either adopt American customs or 
retain some of their original customs while adopting some American values. 
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Therefore, this response shows that amongst Muslim Americans, there is 
widespread belief that immigrants should try to adopt, at least partially, an 
American identity. 
 I also replicated the question asked by Pew in 2007 and 2011, Have you 
been singled out by airport security? This question measures whether American 
Muslims believed that they were singled because of their Islamic identity. My 
numbers matched closely with those of Pew. Yet, the interesting point about the 
data is the small amount of American Muslims that feel that they have been singled 
out at the airport. I assumed prior to asking this question that I would record 
something higher than 16 percent of respondents feeling they have been singled 
out by airport security, and that Pew would have higher numbers that 18 percent 
(2007) and 21 percent (2011). Therefore, this question may not be a good way to 
measure exclusion from the American national identity. 
 A question which does get to the core of the identity question is Do you think 
of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim? 24 percent of my respondents 
thought of themselves first as an American; 40 percent first as a Muslim; and 36 
percent as both. These responses were comparable to Pew’s in 2007 (28 percent 
first as an American; 47 percent first as a Muslim; and 18 percent both) and 2011 
(26 percent first as an American; 49 percent first as a Muslim; and 18 percent 
both). These numbers show that since 2007, almost half of Muslim Americans have 
consistently thought of themselves first in religious terms, while only about a 
quarter of those in the sample see themselves first in nationalist terms. 
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 Finally, my responses matched closely with those of Pew for the question: Do 
you think anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims for increased surveillance and 
monitoring? 52 percent of my respondents believe that the U.S. government does 
single out Muslims, while 48 percent do not believe that the U.S. government 
singles out Muslims. These numbers closely match to the 2007 sample with 54 
percent believing that the U.S. does single out Muslims and 31 percent not 
believing that U.S government singles out Muslims. The numbers remained steady 
for 2011 with 52 percent believing that the U.S. government does single out 
Muslims and 34 percent not believing that the U.S. government singles out 
Muslims. These responses show that the Muslims in the United States do feel that 
U.S. government during the War on Terror singles them out because of their 
religious identification. As such, it provides compelling evidence that U.S. Muslims 
feel that the American government has Othered them during the War on Terror. 
  
A Face of Muslim America  
As my discussion with J demonstrates, September 11th was the definitive moment 
in the identities of Muslim Americans. J was an ideal subject for this research 
project given that she has lived in the United States through several American 
foreign policy crises (e.g. Operation Desert Storm, War on Terror). Accordingly, J 
was able to demonstrate that over time, American foreign policy towards the Middle 
East is what Othered Muslim Americans. She was also able to demonstrate that this 
Othering occurred after 9/11. Finally, she was able to reveal that this Othering 
occurred because of the way in which the War on Terror is framed. This last point 
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on framing is important because it means that American foreign policy, implicitly or 
explicitly, has socially constructed all Muslims as the evil Other. Therefore, to J, 
American foreign policy has created the perception that the United States is at war 
with Islam. 
 As 9/11 approached, J felt that Muslim Americans were making headway in 
American politics, and indeed, they were almost “white.” This status changed with 
9/11 and the resulting War on Terror. With the War on Terror, J felt explicitly 
targeted. While she cannot explicitly point to an organized plot by the U.S. 
government to Other Muslims, she does feel that as a result of the War on Terror, 
she was lumped in with the targeted Other.  
 As a targeted Other, J has chosen to move away from the American national 
identity and closer to her Islamic identity. She knows that she could change her 
identity, but it would be extremely costly to sense of self. Instead, J has chosen to 
remain true to herself and to face the harassment and intolerance brought on by 
the War on Terror. She now recognizes that she is the Other within her own country 
because she does not have certain American features and characteristics. 
 As an Other within America, J feels conflicted with current American foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. She does not believe that the U.S. is intervening in 
Muslim majority countries for security interests. Rather, she believes that the 
United States is intervening in places like Iraq in order to suppress Muslims so that 
it can control their resources. Despite these misgivings, J still wishes to access the 
American national identity. This desire is evident when she states that she feels 
horrible when she sees U.S. servicemen and women dying in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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 J remains skeptical that her Othered status will change in the near future 
given that the United States continues to target Muslim countries. Yet, she does 
believe that if the identity of Muslim Americans does change, it will have to come 
through the political efforts of Muslim Americans. She also believes that Muslim 
Americans will have to overcome their “immigrant mentality” and assimilate into 
the American imagined community. These efforts, to J, may one day create the 
conditions in which Muslims are not framed as the evil Other in American foreign 
policy. 
 
Critiquing the Theoretical Literature 
As this research shows, US foreign policy towards the Middle East is a significant 
contributing factor to the racialization of Muslim Americans. Returning to the 
literature on American foreign policy, this term, American form policy, eschews 
easy definition. Given that the United States has two branches of government that 
are involved in foreign policy decision-making, it is impossible to say that the 
United States speaks with a singular voice regarding American foreign policy. 
Therefore, I return to the works by McDonnell and Hastedt on American Foreign 
Policy, to identify stages and patterns in U.S foreign policy. McDonnell and Hastedt 
speak to the “American national style” to identify what makes up the U.S. national 
interest. This approach describes U.S. national interest in terms of past actions and 
contingencies in the present. Despite this conceptual ambiguity, the Muslim 
American in my sample understood what American foreign policy towards the 
Middle East is today. 
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 The Muslim Americans in my sample did not need to know about these 
subjectively drawn patterns of U.S. foreign policy. My research subjects knew, as 
their responses indicate, that the U.S. frequently involves itself internationally. Yet, 
the myth of the U.S. as an isolationist country is perpetuated to this day. However, 
as history indicates, the United States has never been an isolationist country. 
Rather, this myth shows the rhetorical framing of U.S. foreign policy. Supposedly, 
the U.S. kept to its own hemisphere throughout much of its history in order to 
balance against the European powers. In reality, the U.S. was just as involved in 
overseas adventurism as the European powers. The distance between the rhetorical 
framing and empirical evidence is enormous. 
 This enormous gap draws parallels between what Muslim Americans are told 
about U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and what they experience. As 
evidence of this rhetorical framing by white American elites, Americans were 
presented with a vague concept called the War on Terror. Americans were told that 
this War on Terror was to kill or capture the Al Qaeda operatives that were 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks, or “to rid the world of evil.” To those with 
unquestioned loyalty to the white American nation-state this seems simple enough. 
However, the War on Terror was much more. The War on Terror was nation 
building in Afghanistan and democracy promotion in the greater Middle East. The 
2003 Iraq war also was lumped in with the War on Terror. Stronger support for 
Israel in the Middle East was somehow part of the War on Terror. As the list grew 
as to what actually constitutes the War on Terror, Muslim Americans realized that 
Islamic countries were the targets. This realization brings back the question of what 
the American nation is. 
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 The easiest way to define American nation is by identifying what it is not. The 
American nation is generally not a political space for peoples of non-European 
origins. While exceptions to this rule can be made out of political necessity, it 
generally excludes peoples of Middle Eastern ancestry.  Yet, the American nation 
does simply exclude by nation of origin, race, or ethnicity. The idea of the American 
nation excludes to maintain the privilege of the white elite. Therefore, whiteness is 
understood as privilege. This privilege does not necessarily equate to skin color, in 
that there are many whites with “white skin color” that are privileged and there are 
peoples with “non-white skin color” that are part of the privileged elite, and vice-
versa. Whiteness as a privilege corresponds to social status. Social status can 
include being part of a higher socioeconomic class, but that identification is not 
sufficient. Rather, whiteness as status means the ability to wield power. Therefore, 
the War on Terror was a strategy by a nation-state ruled by whites to retaliate 
against a non-white people that broken the status quo, and then to maintain their 
power over non-white people.   
 As such, many of the Muslim Americans in my study realized that the War on 
Terror had little to do with fighting terrorism. They realize that the War on Terror 
was about maintaining a global racial hegemony. However, the Muslim Americans 
subjects also realize how close they were to becoming part of that racial hegemony 
before the attacks of 9/11. While it is impossible to say that Muslim Americans 
would have become “white” had 9/11 never happened, there is a belief both within 
the literature on Muslim Americans and within my sample that Muslim Americans 
were on the precipice of becoming white in America. This belief may have been an 
illusion. As I have already acknowledged, America is an elitist democracy where 
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ideas such as freedom and liberty are spread, not because it is accessible to all 
citizens within the state, but rather because it helps the white, elitist group retain 
their position. These ideas of freedom and liberty keep hope alive for those that 
have not yet quite “made it” in America. This American dream keeps non-whites 
from challenging the status quo, all the while keeping the hope alive that they too 
can one day become part of the select few within the American “democracy.” As 
such, many Muslim Americans bought into this American dream. As my research 
describes, some within my Muslim American sample still cling this dream, while 
others have awoken from the dream and realize the Othering they experience in 
today’s world. This is not to say that this Othering did not occur before 9/11 or that 
it is not more deeply embedded in American nationalism. Rather, it is to say, that 
some of the Muslim Americans in my sample became cognizant of the Othering in 
the United States post-9/11. 
 Tying a growing awareness to the racialization Muslim Americans 
experienced after 9/11 and the stages or patterns of U.S. foreign policy, one can 
distinguish a connection between how elite’s frame U.S. foreign policy and the 
objective of keeping non-European peoples in a state of submission. Hastedt’s 
patterns of unilateralism, legalism, and moral pragmatism as well as McDougall’s 
“New Testament” of American foreign policy stages including progressive 
imperialism, internationalism, containment, and global meliorism clearly speak to 
long-term project of keeping white nations, particularly the U.S., as the dominant 
actors in the world. Synthesizing the approaches of Hastedt and McDougall, the 
U.S., founded by white Europeans, has tacitly kept European peoples ascendant 
and Other, non-Europeans submissive. This racial contract between European 
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whites has divided the world into those that matter (whites) and peoples who do 
not matter (non-whites). This racial contract has become institutionalized through 
colonialism and corresponds to the internationalism and legalism stages described 
by Hastedt and McDougall.  
 In the other stages described by Hastedt and McDougall, the U.S. with other 
European powers was forcefully implementing white-majority rule across the globe 
in the stages corresponding to unilateralism, moral pragmatism, and progressive 
imperialism. In the stages after which the racial contract was implemented globally, 
U.S. foreign policy corresponds with the stages of containment and global 
melorism. In these stages, the U.S. framed its foreign policy in terms of fighting 
communism and global meliorism. In the stage of containment, the U.S. went to 
the corners of the globe to fight against non-white peoples, supposedly to contain 
the spread of communism. As history has shown, these battles against communism 
are highly suspect, and show that the United States wanted to suppress the rights 
of non-whites peoples that simply wanted their own nation-state. That is to say, the 
United States wanted to continue dominating non-white peoples, sometimes after 
their white European partners had lost similar battles in suppressing nationalist 
aspirations. Regarding global meliorism, the U.S. unrestrained by other powers, has 
become the patriarch to the non-white world. The U.S. in this foreign policy stage 
knows how to best solve the problems of non-white peoples. That is to say, the 
U.S. has a solution to continue dominating these countries, be it through 
democracy promotion or the Washington Consensus. In either case, the solution is 
to try and be more like the U.S., or ,more simply to impose cultural hegemony. Of 
course, this solution keeps the narrative alive that there is a hope to become 
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privileged like the United States. Only when the non-white world looks past these 
illusory policies will they realize the United States hegemonic aspirations, which 
equate to ruling by consent rather than by coercion. 
 The foreign policy stages of U.S. domination are closely linked with 
racialization, nationalism, and Othering.  In dominating non-white peoples, the U.S. 
racializes entire nation-states. The backwardness ascribed to the Middle East is case 
in point. The Middle East is viewed as the exotic Other. The Middle East is portrayed 
as a place where women are dominated by men, and violence is the way political 
disputed are resolved. Further, the narrative extends, the Middle East is a place 
that is undemocratic because of its culture. Clearly, the Middle East is much more 
complex that this stereotypical portrayal. Nevertheless, this convenient portrayal is 
used to justify United States intervention into the Middle East due to the racialized 
narrative. 
 The portrayal is racialized in that the non-white peoples of the Middle East 
are ascribed characteristics such as fanatic, undemocratic, patriarchical, and 
violent. These characteristics supposedly describe an entire group of ill-defined 
people. Therefore, the U.S. uses this understanding to oppose the racialized 
characteristics ascribed to the Middle East. The U.S. as a “civilized” nation brings 
enlightenment to these non-white peoples.  
 While Muslim Americans in the United States may ascribe to American culture 
and values, which itself is a racialized concept understood as whiteness, these 
individuals are grouped in with the dangerous Others of the Middle East. Some 
Muslim Americans have embraced this racialized identity, which may explain their 
 195 
 
violent acts. The majority of other Muslim Americans, as this study illustrates, see 
the racialization brought on by the War on Terror, but refuse to act out the 
racialized part ascribed to them. Rather, these individuals are attempting to 
understand and negotiate their place within the American nation-state. 
 Hence, the imagined community of the United States is highly racialized. The 
United States projects itself as a nation- state for all, regardless of race or religion. 
In reality, these founding myths are simply window dressing. The idea of a liberal 
America is prompted by white elites to keep racial minorities suppressed. The aim 
of this American dream is to keep minorities suppressed with hope so that they will 
be less likely to revolt against the white-dominated system. Therefore, the idea of 
what is the nation is key in keeping the idea of an inclusive America alive.   
 Elites that control the media are able to disseminate stories about minorities 
achieving the American dream. Elites are able to repress media stories about 
racialized discord in the American nation. Further, elites are able to project images 
of what America looks like, thereby normalizing the conception. Yet, the most 
important tool elites have in shaping the American nation is the ability to frame the 
complex social world that everyone inhabits. Framing by elites displays and rewards 
“good” behavior, while stigmatizing and marking deviant behavior which challenges 
notion of the American nation. Again, the media is key to controlling what the 
“good citizen” is in America.  
 So, what can be done for Muslim Americans, and other minorities for that 
matter, if they are unable to access the privileged social status of whiteness in 
America? Moreover, with the illusion now exposed, should they want to become 
part of the white majority group? These are not easy questions to answer, nor are 
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there necessarily answers to them. Nevertheless, I return to the literature to 
address these questions.   
 The ethnic difference that Muslim Americans are now more aware of post-
9/11 demonstrates that they are not part of (white) America identity. Following the 
work by Mamdani and Waters, ethnicity difference arises from groups that on the 
periphery. When groups are in the core, everyone is like “us” there and everyone 
belongs. The ethnic difference that Muslim Americans are now more aware of takes 
the form of non-Europeanness. Accordingly, those who were in the United States 
before Muslim Americans belong. They are part of the old, European immigration. 
These immigrants defined what America is. Those that came after, and in 
particular, those not from Europe, are viewed disparagingly since they do not 
reflect old American values. This difference is known as ethnic difference. 
 To reiterate, whiteness is not simply defined in terms of skin color. Whiteness 
is defined in terms of inclusion, recognition, privilege, power, and possibility socio-
economic opportunity. These characteristics have never been open to all individuals 
in America. Minority groups want to become white so that they can access these 
status benefits. American nationals want to preserve their status, and if this status 
is open to all, it diminishes their privileges. As such, the American identity 
continues to erect roadblocks to exclude Others from becoming part of “us.” 
Racializing Muslim American is just one more roadblock to keep them from 
becoming white. Consequently, the War on Terror was a coincidental roadblock that 
allowed white America to keep Muslim Americans out of their social status. While it 
is speculation, I believe that had the War on Terror not occurred, white America 
would have found another way to exclude Muslim Americans.  
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 The idea of an exclusive American identity makes assimilation and 
integration into the American national identity problematic, if not impossible. 
Muslim Americans, if they are understood as an ethnic group, are expected to 
assimilate into the larger national group. As Kymlicka holds, if individuals 
voluntarily immigrate to a new nation-state they are obligated to adopt the majority 
culture. However, as noted, assimilation into nation-states defined in terms of 
whiteness does violence to the identities of non-white minority groups. It follows 
that a second option for Muslim Americans is to demand recognition in America. 
Notionally, recognition would mean that Muslim Americans find acceptance within 
white America. Given the case I have presented, recognition is also untenable for 
Muslim Americans. Recognition means that white America gives up some social 
status to a non-white group. Any loss in social status for whites redistributes 
privilege in America. Hence, since assimilation and recognition are currently 
untenable, what is needed is increased group awareness amongst Muslim 
Americans. Muslim Americans need to become conscious that recognition in the 
American national identity, at least as it is currently understood, is impossible. The 
War on Terror was simply the symptom to the exclusionary disease of American 
nationalism. As a result, for Muslim Americans, the cure must not treat the 
symptoms, but address the deeply-rooted disease of America nationalism. 
 
Future Research 
In future research on the same research topic, I would like to add more in-depth, 
open-ended interviews. J provided exceptional insights into the Muslim American 
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experience. Moreover, J showed the impact of American foreign policy on her 
identity over time, thereby demonstrating the saliency of the foreign policy variable 
on her identity.  
 Another addition I would like to include is an ethnographic component. I 
believe it would add validity to my study to record how Muslim Americans within 
their social-religious groups construct their identity in relation to American foreign 
policy. Accessing these groups is extremely time consuming, and therefore, given 
time constraints I was unable to create trusting relationships with these groups. If I 
was able to record how these Muslim American groups operate internally, it would 
strengthen my findings as it would give me another vantage point from which to 
view how Muslim Americans are impacted within by American foreign policy. 
 Accessing data prior to 9/11 would also be extremely rewarding. This data 
would allow me to strengthen the finding that a shift in how Muslim Americans view 
themselves occurred because of the War on Terror. As it stands in this research 
project, I am relying on anecdotal accounts of how Muslim Americans viewed 
themselves prior to 9/11. Obviously, this calls into question whether individual’s 
memory is reliable. Having access to data recorded before the 9/11 event would 
eliminate this problem.  
 Finally, in future research I would like to collect data on class consciousness 
of subjects. While it is difficult for many to assess what class they belong to, I 
believe it would be beneficial to discover how the socioeconomic levels of 
respondents affects their identity. This data would also allow me evaluate 
connections between social status, recognition, and class. Currently, in this 
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research I view class identity as a possible characteristic of social status. With more 
resources in future research, I could determine whether social status and class are 
at opposite end of the (mis)recognition spectrum, and how it impacts how Muslim 
American interpret American foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
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Appendix A: Research Questions 
1. Please tell me about yourself (age, gender, political affiliation, ethnicity, 
religious sect) 
2. Do you belong to any political groups? If so, how does your group influence 
Americans politics? 
3. Are there differences in how older Muslim Americans understand their 
American identity when compared to younger Muslim Americans? 
4. Are there differences in how male (or female) Muslims understand their 
identity when compared to female (or male) Muslims? 
5. Do you think formal education influences how Muslim Americans view their 
American identity?   
6. Do you think that economic class influences how Muslim Americans view their 
American identity? 
7. What is the primary influence on your identity as an American? 
8. What are all the ways in which you would describe American identity? 
9. Is it possible to be both a Muslim and an American at the same time? 
10.Are certain groups (political or otherwise) more accepting of your Muslim 
identity? 
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11.How do you feel about Central Command being located in Tampa? Does it 
affect you personally? 
12.How do you think most non-Muslim Americans perceive Muslim Americans? 
13.Do you feel as though you are treated equally? If not, what are some 
experiences you have had with discrimination? 
14.Has there been a change in your view of American identity over the past 12 
years? 
15.How did you feel as an American prior to 9/11? 
16.What are all the ways in which you would describe American foreign policy? 
17.Does American foreign policy treat Islamic countries different than other 
countries? 
18.With the U.S. beginning to transition out of the Middle East, has it affected 
how you feel as an American? 
19.If you could change anything about American foreign policy what would it be? 
20.How would you feel as an American if the U.S. decided to intervene in Syria? 
21.How do you view Muslim Americans who have resorted to radicalism within 
the U.S.? What do you think caused this? 
22.Is there a double standard with Muslims who commit extremist acts and non-
Muslims who commit extremist acts? 
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23. Which comes closer to your view? (One) Most people who want to get ahead 
can make it if they’re willing to work hard, or (Two) Hard work and 
determination are no  guarantee of success for most people. 
24. Do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim? (both and 
neither are also acceptable options) 
25. For those who attend mosque regularly (once a week or more/one or twice a 
month/ few times a year/ seldom never), do you think of yourself first as an 
American or first as a Muslim? (both and neither are also acceptable options) 
26. Do you think Americans coming to America today should adopt American 
customs/ remain distinct from U.S. society/ both/ neither? 
27. Do you think Muslims in the U.S. are becoming more religious/less religious/ 
not changing/don’t know? 
28. Is it okay for a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim? 
29. Is it more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. since Sept. 11? 
30. What is the most important problem facing U.S. Muslims? 
(Discrimination/racism/prejudice, Being viewed as terrorists, Ignorance about 
Islam, Stereotyping, Negative media portrayals, Not treated fairly/harassment, 
Religious/cultural problems, War/U.S. foreign policy, Radical Islam/extremists, 
Hatred/fear/distrust of Muslims, Jobs/financial problems, Lack of 
representation/not involved in community, Other, Don’t know, No problems) 
31. Do anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims? 
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32. Are you worried that women wearing the hijab will be treated poorly? 
33. How often have you been treated with suspicion in the past year/called 
offensive names/been singled out by police/been physically attacked or 
threatened?  
34. Have you been singled out by airport security in the past year? 
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Appendix B: Anthropology Principles of Professional Responsibility 
Anthropology—that most humanistic of sciences and scientific of humanities—is an 
irreducibly social enterprise. Among our goals are the dissemination of 
anthropological knowledge and its use to solve human problems. Anthropologists 
work in the widest variety of contexts studying all aspects of the human 
experience, and face myriad ethical quandaries inflected in different ways by the 
contexts in which they work and the kinds of issues they address. What is 
presented here is intended to reflect core principles shared across subfields and 
contexts of practice. 
These core principles are expressed as concise statements which can be easily 
remembered for use by anthropologists in their everyday professional lives. Each 
principle is accompanied by brief discussions placing that principle in a broader 
context, with more detailed examinations of how each affects or may be helpful to 
anthropologists in different subfields or work contexts. These examinations are 
accompanied by resources to assist anthropologists in tackling difficult ethical 
issues or the new situations that inevitably arise in the production of knowledge. 
As a social enterprise, research and practice always involve others— colleagues, 
students, research participants, employers, clients, funders (whether institutional, 
community-based or individual) as well as non-human primates and other animals, 
among others (all usually referred to as ‘research participants’ in this document). 
Anthropologists must be sensitive to the power differentials, constraints, interests 
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and expectations characteristic of all relationships. In a field  of such complex 
rights, responsibilities, and involvements, it is inevitable that misunderstandings, 
conflicts, and the need to make difficult choices will arise. Anthropologists are 
responsible for grappling with such difficulties and struggling to resolve them in 
ways compatible with the principles stated here. These principles provide 
anthropologists with tools to engage in developing and maintaining an ethical 
framework for all stages of anthropological practice – when making decisions prior 
to beginning projects, when in the field, and when communicating findings and 
preserving records. 
These principles address general circumstances, priorities and relationships, and 
also provide helpful specific examples, that should be considered in anthropological 
work and ethical decision-making. The individual anthropologist must be willing to 
make carefully considered ethical choices and be prepared to make clear the 
assumptions, facts and considerations on which those choices are based. 
Ethics and morals differ in important ways. The complex issues that anthropologists 
confront rarely admit to the simple wrongs and rights of moral dicta, and one of the 
prime ethical obligations of anthropologists is to carefully and deliberately weigh the 
consequences and ethical dimensions of the choices they make — by action or 
inaction. Similarly, ethical principles and political positions should not be conflated; 
their foci of concern are quite distinct. Finally, ethics and law differ in important 
ways, and care must always be taken in making these distinctions. Different 
processes are involved in making ethical versus legal decisions, and they are 
subject to different regulations. While moral, political, legal and regulatory issues 
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are often important to anthropological practice and the discipline, they are not 
specifically considered here. These principles address ethical concerns.1 
Although these principles are primarily intended for Association members, they also 
provide a structure for communicating ethical precepts in anthropology to students, 
other colleagues, and outside audiences, including sponsors, funders, and 
Institutional Review Boards or other review committees. 
The American Anthropological Association does not adjudicate assertions of 
unethical behavior,2 and these principles are intended to foster discussion, guide 
anthropologists in making responsible decisions, and educate. 
Notes 
1. Murray L. Wax, “Some Issues and Sources on Ethics in Anthropology,” 
in Handbook on Ethical Issues in Anthropology, ed. Joan Cassell and Sue-
Ellen Jacobs, Special Publication of the American Anthropological Association 
23 (Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1987).  (back) 
2. Commission to Review the AAA Statements on Ethics, Final Report of the 
Commission to Review the AAA Statements on Ethics (1995); Janet E. Levy, 
“Life is Full of Hard Choices: A Grievance Procedure for the AAA?” 
Anthropology News 50, no. 6 (2009):7–8; Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, “Guiding 
Principles over Enforceable Standards.” Anthropology News 50, no. 6 
(2009):8–9.  
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1. Do No Harm 
A primary ethical obligation shared by anthropologists is to do no harm. It is 
imperative that, before any anthropological work be undertaken — in communities, 
with non-human primates or other animals, at archaeological and 
paleoanthropological sites — each researcher think through the possible ways that 
the research might cause harm. Among the most serious harms that 
anthropologists should seek to avoid are harm to dignity, and to bodily and material 
well-being, especially when research is conducted among vulnerable populations. 
Anthropologists should not only avoid causing direct and immediate harm but also 
should weigh carefully the potential consequences and inadvertent impacts of their 
work.  When it conflicts with other responsibilities, this primary obligation can 
supersede the goal of seeking new knowledge and can lead to decisions to not 
undertake or to discontinue a project. In addition, given the irreplaceable nature of 
the archaeological record, the conservation, protection and stewardship of that 
record is the principal ethical obligation of archaeologists. Determining harms and 
their avoidance in any given situation is ongoing and must be sustained throughout 
the course of any project. 
Anthropologists may choose to link their research to the promotion of well-being, 
social critique or advocacy. As with all anthropological work, determinations 
regarding what is in the best interests of others or what kinds of efforts are 
appropriate to increase well-being are value- laden and should reflect sustained 
discussion with others concerned. Anthropological work must similarly reflect 
deliberate and thoughtful consideration of potential unintended consequences and 
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long-term impacts on individuals, communities, identities, tangible intangible 
heritage and environments. 
2. Be Open and Honest Regarding Your Work 
Anthropologists should be clear and open regarding the purpose, methods, 
outcomes, and sponsors of their work. Anthropologists must also be prepared to 
acknowledge and disclose to participants and collaborators all tangible and 
intangible interests that have, or may reasonably be perceived to have, an impact 
on their work. Transparency, like informed consent, is a process that involves both 
making principled decisions prior to beginning the research and encouraging 
participation, engagement, and open debate throughout its course. 
Researchers who mislead participants about the nature of the research and/or its 
sponsors; who omit significant information that might bear on a participant’s 
decision to engage in the research; or who otherwise engage in clandestine or 
secretive research that manipulates or deceives research participants1 about the 
sponsorship, purpose, goals or implications of the research, do not satisfy ethical 
requirements for openness, honesty, transparency and fully informed 
consent.2 Compartmented research3 by design will not allow the anthropologist to 
know the full scope or purpose of a project; it is therefore ethically problematic, 
since by definition the anthropologist cannot communicate transparently with 
participants, nor ensure fully informed consent. 
Anthropologists have an ethical obligation to consider the potential impact of both 
their research and the communication or dissemination of the results of their 
research. Anthropologists must consider this issue prior to beginning research as 
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well as throughout the research process. Explicit negotiation with research partners 
and participants about data ownership and access and about dissemination of 
results, may be necessary before deciding whether to begin research. 
In their capacity as researchers, anthropologists are subject to the ethical principles 
guiding all scientific and scholarly conduct. They must not plagiarize, nor fabricate 
or falsify evidence,4 or knowingly misrepresent information or its source. However, 
there are situations in which evidence or information may be minimally modified 
(such as by the use of pseudonyms) or generalized, in order to avoid identification 
of the source and to protect confidentiality and limit exposure of people to risks. 
Notes 
1. Charlotte Allen, “Spies Like Us: When Sociologists Deceive Their Subjects,” 
Lingua Franca 7, no. 9 (1997).  (back) 
2. David Calvey, “The Art and Politics of Covert Research: Doing ‘Situated 
Ethics’ in the Field,” Sociology 42, no. 5(2008):905-918.  (back) 
3. In this document, when we use the term “compartmented,” we are referring 
generally to any research project in which the principal investigator is part of 
a research project, conducted on behalf of a third party, in which researcher 
has neither control nor knowledge about the overall goals, structure, 
purpose, sponsors, funding, and/or other critical elements of a project. Such 
projects may have government or private funding and may or may not entail 
classified information. 
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Any research project that limits the anthropologist’s access to decisions, 
information and/or documentation that enables her/him to understand and 
responsibly explain the structure, goals, risks, and benefits of the research to 
potential subjects is problematic. This is because the researcher’s limited 
understanding and control makes it impossible to present potential participants with 
a clear and honest statement of risks, benefits, and outcomes.  (back) 
4. Department of Health and Human Services, “42 CFR Parts 50 and 93: Public 
Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct,” Federal Register 70, no. 
94(2005):28370-28400.  (back) 
3. Obtain Informed Consent and Necessary Permissions 
Anthropological researchers working with living human communities must obtain 
the voluntary and informed consent of research participants. Ordinarily such 
consent is given prior to the research, but it may also be obtained retroactively if so 
warranted by the research context, process, and relations. The consent process 
should be a part of project design and continue through implementation as an 
ongoing dialogue and negotiation with research participants. Normally, the 
observation of activities and events in fully public spaces is not subject to prior 
consent. 
Minimally, informed consent includes sharing with potential participants the 
research goals, methods, funding sources or sponsors, expected outcomes, 
anticipated impacts of the research, and the rights and responsibilities of research 
participants. It must also include establishing expectations regarding anonymity1 
and credit2. Researchers must present to research participants the possible impacts 
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of participation, and make clear that despite their best efforts, confidentiality may 
be compromised or outcomes may differ from those anticipated. These expectations 
apply to all field data, regardless of medium. Visual media in particular, because of 
their nature, must be carefully used, referenced, and contextualized. 
Anthropologists have an obligation to ensure that research participants have freely 
granted consent, and must avoid conducting research in circumstances in which 
consent may not be truly voluntary or informed. In the event that the research 
changes in ways that will directly affect the participants, anthropologists must 
revisit and renegotiate consent. The informed consent process is necessarily 
dynamic, continuous and reflexive. Informed consent does not necessarily imply or 
require a particular written or signed form. It is the quality of the consent, not its 
format, which is relevant. 
Anthropologists working with biological communities or cultural resources have an 
obligation to ensure that they have secured appropriate permissions or permits 
prior to the conduct of research. Consultation with groups or communities affected 
by this or any other type of research should be an important element of the design 
of such projects and should continue as work progresses or circumstances change. 
It is explicitly understood that defining what constitutes an affected community is a 
dynamic and necessary process. 
Notes 
1. Sue-Ellen Jacobs, “Case 6: Anonymity Revisited,” in Handbook on Ethical 
Issues in Anthropology, ed. Joan Cassell and Sue-Ellen Jacobs, Special 
 220 
 
Publication of the American Anthropological Association 23 (Washington, 
D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1987).  (back) 
2. Sue-Ellen Jacobs, “Case 5: Anonymity Declined,” in Handbook on Ethical 
Issues in Anthropology, ed. Joan Cassell and Sue-Ellen Jacobs, Special 
Publication of the American Anthropological Association 23 (Washington, 
D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1987).  (back) 
4. Weigh Competing Ethical Obligations Due Collaborators and Affected 
Parties 
Anthropologists must weigh competing ethical obligations1 to research participants, 
students, professional colleagues, employers and funders, among others, while 
recognizing that obligations to research participants are usually primary.2In doing 
so, obligations to vulnerable populations are particularly important. These varying 
relationships may create conflicting, competing or crosscutting ethical obligations, 
reflecting both the relative vulnerabilities of different individuals, communities or 
populations, asymmetries of power implicit in a range of relationships, and the 
differing ethical frameworks of collaborators representing other disciplines or areas 
of practice. 
Anthropologists have an obligation to distinguish the different kinds of 
interdependencies and collaborations their work involves, and to consider the real 
and potential ethical dimensions of these diverse and sometimes contradictory 
relationships, which may be different in character and may change over time. When 
conflicts between ethical standards or expectations arise, anthropologists need to 
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make explicit their ethical obligations, and develop an ethical approach in 
consultation with those concerned. 
Anthropologists must often make difficult decisions among competing ethical 
obligations while recognizing their obligation to do no harm. Anthropologists must 
not agree to conditions which inappropriately change the purpose, focus, or 
intended outcomes of their research. Anthropologists remain individually 
responsible for making ethical decisions. 
Collaborations may be defined and understood quite differently by the various 
participants. The scope of collaboration, rights and responsibilities of the various 
parties, and issues of data access and representation, credit, acknowledgment and 
should be openly and fairly established at the outset.3 
Notes 
1. Joan Cassell, “Case 17: The Case of the Damaged Baby,” in Handbook on 
Ethical Issues in Anthropology, ed. Joan Cassell and Sue-Ellen Jacobs, 
Special Publication of the American Anthropological Association 23 
(Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1987).  (back) 
2. Joan Cassell, “Case 20: Power to the People,” in Handbook on Ethical Issues 
in Anthropology, ed. Joan Cassell and Sue-Ellen Jacobs, Special Publication of 
the American Anthropological Association 23 (Washington, D.C.: American 
Anthropological Association, 1987).  (back) 
3. Concerns Before You Start 
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When you begin considering an employment opportunity, there are a few 
documents to carefully review before agreeing to become an employee. First, most 
organizations will have an employment contract, personnel manual or some type of 
document that governs the relationship between the employee and the 
organization. Read this document(s) carefully. It usually spells out the conditions of 
employment, the employer’s responsibilities and the employee’s responsibilities. In 
these documents you should also find rights and responsibilities about data and 
publications. This is where you need to be clear about ownership of data, what is 
considered data, who has the right to review publications and final clearance on 
documents for distribution. If you believe that the terms are inappropriate, you 
should speak directly to the employer about your concerns. Be aware however, that 
the employer does not have to change their position; these documents have been 
carefully developed and reviewed by a variety of professional resources. In some 
situations, you may find these documents can be modified and it is an opportunity 
to help to educate the employer about your concerns and the issues raised by this 
code of ethics. You may be able to negotiate terms that you find appropriate based 
on this code of ethics. In any case, it will be up to you to work with the employer to 
modify the terms of employment. If you review these documents carefully before 
becoming an employee, you will be fully informed and can then make a considered 
decision about whether to accept an offer of employment. 
If you are applying for a grant or contract there will be language in the application 
forms that spells out the rights and responsibilities of the funder and the 
grantee/contractor. These documents should be carefully reviewed so that you are 
clear about the conditions of award that you will agree to if your proposal is 
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successful and you accept the grant or contract. If there are conditions which are 
contrary to the principles in this code, you can bring it to the attention of the funder 
and attempt to negotiate appropriate language in the grant or contract. However, 
the funder has in most cases carefully considered their requirements, has obtained 
professional reviews and believes that the terms and conditions best serve their 
needs. You may find that many funders, particularly foundations are eager to have 
their work disseminated and you find willing partners. At the same time you may 
find that some funders place restrictions on how you may use the data collected 
and who controls review of reports or articles submitted for publication. It is your 
responsibility to carefully review the terms and conditions of the grant or contract 
award before you sign the document. 
As examples, the full citation for FAR: 52.227-14 Rights in Data—General is 
provided in order to give the reader a clear understanding of the completeness and 
detail that becomes incorporated into an federal RFP or contract concerning “Rights 
in Data.” A second document provides examples of contract and grant language 
regarding Rights in Data from a Non-profit organization and a foundation. These 
last two examples represent actual contract/grant language.  
5. Make Your Results Accessible 
Results of anthropological research should be disseminated in a timely fashion. It is 
important to bear in mind that these results may not be clear cut, and may be 
subject to multiple interpretations, as well as susceptible to differing and 
unintended uses. In some situations, limitations on dissemination may be 
appropriate where such restrictions will protect participants or their cultural 
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heritage and/or tangible or intangible cultural or intellectual property. In some 
cases, dissemination may pose significant risks because once information is 
disseminated, even in a limited sphere, there is great likelihood that it will become 
widely available.1 Thus, preventing dissemination may sometimes be the most 
ethical decision. Dissemination and sharing of research data should not be at the 
expense of protecting confidentiality. 
Anthropologists should not withhold research results from research participants, 
especially when those results are shared with others. However, restrictions on 
disclosure may be appropriate and ethical, such as where study participants have 
been fully informed and have freely agreed to limited dissemination, or where 
restrictions have been placed on dissemination to protect the safety, dignity, or 
privacy of research participants or to minimize risk to researchers. Proprietary, 
classified or other research with limited distribution raises ethical questions which 
must be resolved using these ethical principles. 
Relevant sections in ethics codes of other organizations: 
1) Association of American Geographers 
2) Register of Professional Archaeologists 
3) American Sociological Association 
4) American Educational Research Association 
5) American Historical Association 
6) American Psychological Association 
7) Archaeological Institute of America 
8) American Political Science Association 
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9) National Council on Public History 
10) Oral History Association 
11) National Association for the Practice of Anthropology 
12) American Association of Physical Anthropologists 
Notes 
1. Joan Cassell, “Case 22:Forbidden Knowledge,” in Handbook on Ethical Issues 
in Anthropology, ed. Joan Cassell and Sue-Ellen Jacobs, Special Publication of 
the American Anthropological Association 23 (Washington, D.C.: American 
Anthropological Association, 1987).  (back) 
6. Protect and Preserve Your Records 
Anthropologists have an ethical responsibility1 for ensuring the integrity, 
preservation, and protection of their work. This obligation applies both to individual 
and collaborative or team research. An anthropologist’s ability to protect and use 
the materials collected may be contingent upon complex issues of ownership and 
stewardship.2 In situations of disagreement, contestation, or conflict over 
ownership, the primary assumption that the researcher owns her or his work 
product applies, unless otherwise established. Other factors (source of funding, 
employment agreements, negotiated agreements with collaborators, legal claims, 
among others) may impact ownership of records.3 Anthropologists should 
determine record ownership relating to each project and make appropriate 
arrangements accordingly as a standard part of ethical practice. This may include 
establishing by whom and how records will be stored, preserved, or disposed of in 
the long term. 
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Further, priority must be given to the protection of research participants, as well as 
the preservation and protection of research records. Researchers have an ethical 
responsibility to take precautions that raw data and collected materials will not be 
used for unauthorized ends.  To the extent possible at the time of data collection, 
the researcher is responsible for  considering and communicating likely or 
foreseeable uses of collected data and materials as part of the process of informed 
consent or obtaining permission. Researchers are also responsible for consulting 
with research participants regarding their views of generation, use and 
preservation  of research records. This includes informing research participants 
whether data and materials might be transferred to or accessed by other parties; 
how they might be transformed or used to identify participants; and how they will 
be stored and how long they will be preserved.4 
Researchers have a responsibility to use appropriate methods to ensure the 
confidentiality and security of field notes, recordings, samples or other primary data 
and the identities of participants. The use of digitalization and of digital media for 
data storage and preservation5 is of particular concern given the relative ease of 
duplication and circulation. Ethical decisions regarding the preservation of research 
materials must balance obligations to maintain data integrity with responsibilities to 
protect research participants and their communities against future harmful impacts. 
Given that anthropological research has multiple constituencies and new uses such 
as by heritage communities, the interests of preservation ordinarily outweigh the 
potential benefits of destroying materials for the preservation of confidentiality. 6 
Researchers generating object collections have a responsibility to ensure the 
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preservation and accessibility of the resulting materials and/or results of analyzed 
samples, including associated documentation. 
Notes 
1. Sydel Silverman, “Why Preserve Anthropological Records?” CoPAR Bulletin 1 
(n.d.); see also the following in Sydel Silverman and Nancy J. Parezo, 
eds., Preserving the Anthropological Record, 2nd ed. (New York: Wenner-
Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1995): Victor Golla, “The 
Records of American Indian Linguistics“; John Van Willigen, “The Records of 
Applied Anthropology“; Sue E. Estroff, “The Records of Medical 
Anthropology”; Michael A. Little, Jane E. Buikstra, and Frank Spencer, “The 
Records of Biological Anthropology“; Don D. Fowler and Douglas R. Givens, 
“The Records of Archaeology.”  (back) 
2. The National Science Foundation now requires prospective Principal 
Investigators to submit a Data Management Plan with all proposals. See 
National Science Foundation, “Data Management and Sharing Frequently 
Asked Questions.” The University of Connecticut provides helpful background 
about this requirement (“Why Create a Data Management Plan?“) and advice 
about “Writing a Data Management Plan“; further guidance and resources are 
available from the University of California’s DMPTool. 
The National Institutes of Health requires data sharing (“NIH Data Sharing Policy“). 
In 1999, the Office of Management and Budget issued a revision to OMB Circular A-
110, which requires that Federal agencies that award research and development 
dollars ensure that all data be available to the public under the requirements of the 
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Freedom of Information Act. A discussion of the changes and the text of the 
revision, which went into effect in November 1999, is available at: Office of 
Management and Budget, “OMB Circular A-110: Uniform Administrative 
Requirements for Grants and Agreements With Institutions of Higher Education, 
Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations,” Federal Register 64, no. 
195(1999):54926-54930. 
Anthropologists who pursue federal projects that result in the development of 
intellectual property, particularly those which generate licenses and/or patents, 
should be aware of the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 
popularly known as the Bayh-Dole Act, as well as their own institutions’ policies 
regarding intellectual property and technology transfer. Bayh-Dole is the 1980 
legislation that enabled universities to assume exclusive control over intellectual 
property resulting from federally-funded research and development, for the purpose 
of further development, transfer to industry, commercialization and provision to the 
public. 
30 Bayh-Dole – Driving Innovation commemorates the enactment and assesses the 
impact of the Bayh-Dole Act. The University of California Technology Transfer Office 
has republished a COGR-developed overview of the history and impact of the Bayh-
Dole Act:. Council on Governmental Relations, “The Bayh-Dole Act: A Guide to the 
Law and Implementing Regulations” (1999). The National Council of University 
Research Administrators has published a monograph on intellectual property issues 
in university research: Ann M. Hammersla, A Primer on Intellectual Property 
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(Washington, D.C.: National Council of University Research Administrators, 
2006).  (back) 
3. David H. Price, “Anthropological Research and the Freedom of Information 
Act,” Cultural Anthropology Methods 9, no. 1 (1997):12-15.  (back) 
4. Mary Elizabeth Ruwell, “The Physical Preservation of Anthropological Records” 
in Sydel Silverman and Nancy J. Parezo, eds., Preserving the Anthropological 
Record, 2nd ed. (New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological 
Research, 1995).  (back) 
5. Hugh Gusterson, “What’s in a Laptop?” Anthropology Now 4, no. 1 
(2012):26-31.  (back) 
6. For informational and instructional materials on archiving and preserving 
qualitative data, see the following resources: 
Irish Qualitative Data Archive and Tallagt West Childhood Development Initiative. 
“Best Practice in Archiving Qualitative Data.” 
UK Data Archive. “Create and Manage Data.” 
Denise Thomson, Lana Bzdel, Karen Golden-Biddle, Trish Reay & Carole A. 
Estabrooks. “Central Questions of Anonymization: A Case Study of Secondary Use 
of Qualitative Data.” FQS: Forum: Qualitative Social Research 6(1). 
For information on anonymization software, see: 
University of Pennsylvania Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health page 
on QualAnon software 
and the Irish Qualitative Data Archive (IQDA) Qualitative Data Anonymizer. 
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For information on data repositories, visit: 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, the Qualitative Data 
Repository, and the UK Data Service.  (back) 
7. Maintain Respectful and Ethical Professional Relationships 
There is an ethical dimension to all professional relationships.1 Whether working in 
academic or applied settings, anthropologists have a responsibility to maintain 
respectful relationships with others. In mentoring students, interacting with 
colleagues, working with clients, acting as a reviewer or evaluator, or supervising 
staff, anthropologists should comport themselves in ways that promote an 
equitable, supportive2 and sustainable workplace environment. They should at all 
times work to ensure that no exclusionary practices be perpetrated on the basis of 
any nonacademic attributes. 
Anthropologists may gain personally from their work, but they must not exploit 
individuals, groups, animals, or cultural or biological materials. Further, when they 
see evidence of research misconduct, they are obligated to report it to the 
appropriate authorities.3 
Anthropologists must not obstruct the scholarly efforts of others when such efforts 
are carried out responsibly. In their role as teachers and mentors, anthropologists 
are obligated to provide instruction on the ethical responsibilities associated with 
every aspect of anthropological work. They should facilitate, and encourage their 
students and research staff to engage in dialogue on ethical issues, and discourage 
their participation in ethically questionable projects. Anthropologists should 
appropriately acknowledge all contributions to their research, writing, and other 
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related activities, and compensate contributors justly for any assistance they 
provide. They are obligated to give students and employees appropriate credit for 
the authorship of their ideas,4 and encourage the publication of worthy student and 
employee work. 
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Appendix C: Methodology of 2007 Pew Research study, Muslim Americans: 
Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream 
Muslim Americans constitute a population that is rare, dispersed, and diverse. It 
includes many recent immigrants from multiple countries with differing native 
tonagues who may have difficulty completing a public opinion survey in English. The 
intense attention paid to Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11 may have made them 
more reluctant to cooperate with a survey request from an unknown caller.  
 Collectively, these characteristics present a significant challenge to anyone 
wishing to survey this population. Despite the challenges, the Pew study was able 
to complete interviews with 1,050 Muslim American adults 18 years old and older 
from a probability sample consisting of two sampling frames. Interviews were 
conducted by telephone between January 24 and April 30, 2007 by the research 
firm of Schulman, Ronca & Bucuvalas, Inc. (SRBI). After taking into account the 
complex sample design, the average margin of sampling error on the 1,050 
completed interviews with Muslims is +/-5 percentage points at the 95% level of 
confidence. This chapter describes how the study was designed and executed. 
1. Sample Design 
 In random digit dial (RDD) surveys of the English-speaking U.S. population, 
roughly one-half of one percent of respondents typically identify themselves as 
Muslim in response to a question about religious tradition or affiliation. This 
 233 
 
extremely low incidence means that building a probability sample of Muslim 
Americans is difficult and costly. The demographic diversity of the population – 
especially with respect to race and national origins – adds to the challenge. 
Moreover, analysis of previous research indicates that the Muslim population is not 
concentrated in a few enclaves but is highly dispersed throughout the U.S.  
 Pew’s sample design attempted to address the low incidence and dispersion 
of the population by employing two separate sampling frames: 
1. An RDD frame divided into five strata, four of which were based on the estimated 
density of the Muslim population in each county of the United States as determined 
through an analysis of Pew’s database of more than 125,000 survey respondents 
and U.S. Census Bureau data on ethnicity and language. To increase the efficiency 
of the calling, the lowest density stratum – estimated to be home to approximately 
5%-21% of U.S. Muslims – was excluded. A disproportionate sampling strategy was 
employed to maximize the effective sample size from the other three geographic 
strata (total N=354). The fifth stratum was a commercial list of approximately 
450,000 households believed to include Muslims, based on an analysis of first and 
last names common among Muslims. This stratum yielded completed interviews 
with 533 respondents. 
2. A sample of previously identified Muslim households drawn from Pew’s interview 
database and other RDD surveys conducted in recent years. Recontacting these 
respondents from prior surveys yielded 163 completed interviews for this study. 
 The strength of this research design was that it yielded a probability sample. 
That is, each adult in the U.S. had a known probability of being included in the 
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study. The fact that some persons had a greater chance of being included than 
others (e.g., because they live in places where there are more Muslims) is taken 
into account in the statistical adjustment described below (section 4). One 
limitation of this design is that the samples were of landline telephone numbers. 
Thus, Muslims living in homes with no telephone or who only have a cell phone had 
no chance of being sampled for the study. To account for this, we used the most 
recent government data on telephone service to adjust our estimate of the total 
size of the Muslim population. 
 
RDD Geographic Strata 
 Pew Research Center surveys conducted in English typically encounter a little 
more than four Muslim respondents per thousand interviews, an unweighted 
incidence rate of 0.42%. This rate has varied somewhat over the past seven years, 
ranging from a high of 0.57% thus far in 2007 to 0.33% in 2005. The rate is also 
very similar to that encountered by other national surveys (for instance, see Tom 
Smith’s “The Muslim Population of the United States: The Methodology of 
Estimates” in Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 2002). This low incidence means that 
the costs of building an RDD sample of Muslim Americans by screening a general 
public sample are prohibitive. Accordingly, it was necessary to develop alternative 
approaches that would allow for estimation of the probabilities of selection but 
increase the yield from screening. 
 An analysis of the geographic distribution of the Muslim population was 
undertaken, using several different sources of data. A key resource was the Pew 
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Research Center database of more than 125,000 telephone interviews conducted 
between 2000 and 2006 (when planning for this project was completed); it was 
used to estimate the density of Muslims in each U.S. county. Another resource was 
data from large government surveys. The U.S. Census Bureau does not collect 
information about religion, but it does include measures of ancestry, nationality for 
immigrants, and languages spoken. These measures were used to analyze the 
geographic distribution of adults who are from (or whose parents are from) 
countries with significant or majority Muslim populations, or who speak languages 
commonly spoken by Muslims. This yielded additional county-level estimates of the 
density of Muslims. 
 These measures were highly correlated and were used to sort counties into 
four different groups based on the estimated incidence of Muslims in each county. 
We refer to these mutually exclusive groups as the geographic strata. The lowest 
density stratum accounts for 5% of all Muslim interviews conducted by Pew over 
the past seven years; the second lowest accounts for 29% of Muslim interviews; 
the medium density stratum accounts for 51%; and the highest density stratum 
accounts for 15%. 
 Drawing on the analysis of previous Pew surveys, Census Bureau data, and 
the results of a pilot test, an optimal sampling allocation plan was developed for the 
RDD geographic strata. The sampling plan called for conducting roughly 33% of all 
RDD screening interviews in the lower density stratum, 53% of all RDD screening 
interviews in the medium density stratum, and 14% in the high density stratum. In 
 236 
 
total, 57,549 screening interviews were completed, and the distribution of 
completed interviews was nearly identical to the original allocation plan.  
 The lowest density stratum, which included 5% of all U.S. Muslims in Pew 
surveys (and up to 21% as based on estimates derived from U.S. Census Bureau 
data), also includes 47% of the total U.S. population. As a practical matter, the 
analysis of the Pew database indicated that 25,000 screening interviews would have 
to be conducted in this stratum to yield an estimated 10 Muslim respondents. In 
order to put the study’s resources to the most efficient use, this stratum was 
excluded from the geographic strata of the RDD sample design, although persons 
living in these counties were still covered by the list stratum and recontact frame.  
 The danger in excluding this very low density stratum is that the individuals 
excluded may be significantly different from the rest of the population. To assess 
this potential bias, interviews from the list stratum and the recontact frame were 
used to compare Muslims in the lowest density stratum (the excluded area) with 
those living in the higher density areas. Muslims in the excluded area are more 
satisfied with their financial situation, somewhat more tolerant of homosexuality, 
less likely to say that it has become harder to be a Muslim in the U.S. since 9/11, 
and somewhat more secular in their approach to religion. However, Muslims living 
in the lowest density stratum comprise a relatively small proportion of all U.S. 
Muslims, and these differences are not so large that their exclusion would be 
expected to significantly affect the overall  estimates. 
RDD List Stratum 
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 Within the RDD frame of U.S. telephone numbers, we used a targeted, 
commercial list to identify roughly 450,000 numbers that had a relatively high 
probability of belonging to a household with a Muslim adult. We defined this list as 
its own stratum within the RDD frame. This list was constructed from a commercial 
database of households where someone in the household has a name commonly 
found among Muslims. The list was prepared by Experian, a commercial credit and 
market research firm that collects and summarizes data from approximately 
110,000,000 U.S. households. The analysis of names was conducted by Ethnic 
Technologies, LLC, a firm specializing in multicultural marketing lists, ethnic 
identification software, and ethnic data appending services. According to Experian, 
the analysis uses computer rules for first names, surnames, surname prefixes and 
suffixes, and geographic criteria in a specific order to identify an individual’s 
ethnicity, religion and language preference. 
 In late 2006, Pew purchased Experian’s database of more than 450,000 
households thought to include Muslims. This list consists of contact information, 
including telephone numbers. A test of the list, combined with the results of the 
screening interviews conducted in the course of the main survey, found that the 
Experian list was a highly efficient source for contacting Muslims; roughly one-third 
of households screened from the Experian list included an adult Muslim. The list 
does not, however, by itself constitute a representative sample of American 
Muslims. Muslims in the Experian database earn higher incomes, are better 
educated, are more likely to be of South Asian descent and are much less likely to 
be African American compared with Muslim Americans as a whole. 
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 By combining the Experian list with the RDD frame, however, the list can be 
used as one component of a probability sample.3 All telephone numbers drawn for 
the geographic strata of the RDD frame were compared to the entire Experian list of 
numbers. Any numbers that appeared in both the RDD geographic sample and the 
Experian list were removed from the former, and were available to be sampled only 
as part of the list stratum. This method makes it possible to determine the 
probability that any given Muslim has of being sampled, regardless of whether he or 
she is included in the Experian list. It also permits estimation of the proportion of all 
Muslims in the U.S. who are covered by the Experian list, which in turn makes it 
possible, in the final analysis, to give cases from the Experian sample an 
appropriate weight. More details on the statistical procedures used to incorporate 
the list into the overall sample are provided below. 
Recontact Frame 
 In addition to contacting and interviewing a fresh sample of Muslim 
Americans, the phone numbers of all Muslim households from previous Pew surveys 
conducted between 2000 and 2006 were called. Adults in these households were 
screened and interviewed in the same manner used for the RDD frame. No attempt 
was made to re-interview the same respondent from earlier surveys. Pew’s survey 
partners, Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI) and SRBI, 
also provided lists of Muslims interviewed in the course of other national surveys 
conducted in recent years. In total, the recontact frame consisted of phone 
numbers for 796 Muslims interviewed in recent national surveys; 309 of these 
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households were successfully screened, resulting in 163 completed interviews with 
Muslims. 
 The greatest strengths of the recontact frame are that it consists entirely of 
respondents originally interviewed in the course of nationally representative 
surveys based on probability samples and that it includes respondents who live in 
the geographic stratum that was excluded from the RDD sample. However, there 
also are certain potential biases of the recontact frame. Perhaps most obviously, 
since all of the previous surveys from which the recontact frame was drawn were 
conducted either entirely in English, or in English and Spanish, Muslims who do not 
speak English (or Spanish) are likely absent in the recontact frame. Another 
potential source of bias relates to the length of time between when respondents 
were first interviewed and the current field period; respondents still residing in the 
same household in 2007 as in an earlier year may represent a more established, 
less mobile population compared with those from households that could not be 
recontacted. 
 Analysis of the survey results suggests that there are some differences 
between Muslims in the recontact frame and those in the RDD frame. Not 
surprisingly, Muslims from the recontact frame are more likely than others to own 
their home. They express somewhat higher levels of satisfaction with their own 
financial situations, report lower levels of mosque attendance and religious salience, 
and express somewhat higher levels of dissatisfaction with the direction of the 
country. These differences, however, are not sufficiently large so as to be able to 
substantially affect the survey’s estimates.  
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2. Questionnaire Design 
 The principal goal of the study is to provide a broad overview of the Muslim 
population in the U.S. since very little is known about it. Among the key topics of 
interest are the demographics of the population, their religious beliefs and 
practices, social and political attitudes, and their experiences as Muslims living in 
the U.S. Thus, the questionnaire needed to cover a wide range of topics, but also 
needed to be short so that respondents would be willing to finish the interview. 
Where possible, questions were taken from Pew’s U.S. and Global Attitudes Project 
surveys to provide comparisons with the U.S. public and Muslim publics in many 
other nations, including those in Western Europe. 
 From its initial planning stages, the project sought the advice of scholars and 
experts in the field of Islamic studies. The project created a panel of eight leading 
experts on Muslim Americans, headed by Princeton University Assistant Professor 
Amaney Jamal, which met twice in Washington to provide advice on the project. 
Two members of the advisory panel conducted six focus groups of Muslim 
Americans in four U.S. cities to explore topics and potential reactions to questions 
for the survey. These groups included Arab Americans in the Detroit area, African 
American Muslims in Atlanta, a mixed group of Muslim Americans in Washington, 
D.C., and Iranian Americans in the Los Angeles area. 
 Because this population includes many immigrants who have arrived in the 
U.S. relatively recently, the survey was translated and conducted in three 
languages (aside from English) identified as the most common among Muslim 
immigrants -- Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi. Census Bureau data, considered in 
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conjunction with the results of the survey, make it possible to estimate the 
proportion of Muslims in the U.S. who speak these languages and cannot speak 
English well. Analyzing these data produces an estimate that between 9% and 22% 
of Muslims in the U.S. fall into this category. A total of 131 of the 1050 interviews 
were conducted in these languages, or 17% of the weighted cases. 
 All three translated instruments were back-translated by native speakers. 
Project staff and the back-translators then compared the original English and the 
back-translated versions, and the back-translators also compared the translated 
versions. On the basis of this review, several changes were made and the 
translated instruments were modified accordingly. 
 After a draft questionnaire was constructed, two extensive English-language 
pretests were conducted, along with a separate test of several open-ended 
questions. 
Another issue confronted in the questionnaire design was the sensitivity of the 
population to being interviewed. The survey clearly shows that many Muslim 
Americans believe they are targeted by the government for surveillance. Many are 
also concerned about stereotyping and prejudice directed toward them. These 
attitudes plausibly lead to greater reluctance to be interviewed and thus a potential 
nonresponse bias. Several aspects of the study were tailored to deal with this. 
 The initial phase of the questionnaire included neutral or innocuous questions 
about satisfaction with the community, personal happiness, and personal 
characteristics such as home ownership, entrepreneurship, and newspaper 
subscription. After these items, respondents were asked about their religious 
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affiliation, choosing from a list that included major Western traditions such as 
Protestantism and Catholicism but also non-Western traditions of Buddhism, 
Hinduism, and Islam. Respondents who identified as Muslim proceeded to the 
substantive portion of the questionnaire, and those who were not Muslim were 
asked if anyone in the household practiced a different religion; in 58 households 
where a non-Muslim answered the phone, it was determined that there was a 
Muslim living in the household, and 52 of these subsequently yielded a completed 
interview. 
 After identifying as a Muslim, a respondent was told that: “As mentioned 
before, this survey is being conducted for the Pew Research Center. We have some 
questions on a few different topics, and as a small token of our appreciation for 
your time, we would like to send you $50 at the completion of this survey.” After 
this introduction, a relatively short series of questions followed (including 
presidential approval and political and social values such as homosexuality, 
immigration and poverty, and opinions about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan). At 
the conclusion of this series, respondents were told that “The Pew Research Center 
conducts many surveys on religion and public life in the United States. Earlier, you 
mentioned that you are a Muslim, and we have some questions about the views and 
experiences of Muslims living in the United States. I think you will find these 
questions very interesting.” 
 The logic for revealing the principal focus of the study – a practice not 
common in survey research – was that Muslim respondents would quickly discover 
that the study was focused on Muslims and Islam, and that there would be a 
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greater chance of establishing a bond of trust by revealing the intent of the study 
earlier. Indeed, in initial pretesting of the study without the early presentation of 
the goal, some respondents expressed suspicion about the purpose of the study 
and eventually broke off the interview. 
 These efforts to convince Muslims to complete the survey were reasonably 
successful: overall, 79% of respondents who identified as Muslim eventually 
completed the interview. This compares with an average of 85% to 90% in other 
Pew Research Center surveys. Given that the average survey length was 30 
minutes, a slightly higher-than-normal breakoff rate was not unexpected. (The 79% 
completion rate does not include respondents who dropped off during the short 
screener interview prior to answering the religion question; this was approximately 
3% of households that answered at least the first question in the screener.) 
 Whether this nonresponse results in a bias in our estimates is difficult to 
determine. For the most part, nonresponse in well-designed surveys has not been 
shown to create serious biases because the reasons for nonresponse are not related 
to the key survey measures.4 But because of the motivation for some of the 
nonresponse in the Muslim community, it is possible that reluctant Muslims hold 
different views on key questions than those who easily consented to the interview. 
To assess this possibility, we compared respondents in households who completed 
the survey easily (i.e., within the first four attempts) with respondents with whom it 
was more= difficult to obtain a completed interview (i.e., a successfully completed 
interview was obtained only after five or more attempts). 
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 This analysis revealed some differences between the two groups. On many 
questions, respondents who were more difficult to interview were somewhat more 
likely to express no opinion. (This may reflect, in part, that respondents interviewed 
in foreign languages were more numerous among the group who required five or 
more attempts compared with respondents who spoke English). And respondents 
who required multiple attempts appear to be somewhat more traditional in their 
approach to the practice of Islam. Approximately half (51%) of those requiring five 
or more attempts pray all five salah daily, compared with 33% of those requiring 
fewer attempts. The harder to reach are also more likely to interpret the Koran 
literally (67% versus 53% among the easier to reach). Muslims requiring five or 
more attempts before completing the interview were no more likely than others to 
say suicide bombing is justifiable or to express favorable views of al-Qaeda, nor 
were they more likely to doubt the sincerity of the war on terror. And they seem to 
be about as content with their lives as are other Muslims, expressing comparable 
levels of personal happiness and agreement with the belief that those who work 
hard can get ahead. 
 Nonresponse bias can also be assessed by comparing the opinions expressed 
early in the questionnaire by Muslims who did not complete the interview with the 
views of those who did complete the interview. Here, there were only minor 
differences; there was no evidence that the survey estimates were affected by 
respondents breaking off the interview. Those who terminated the interview 
expressed slightly higher levels of personal happiness; 34% reported being “very 
happy” compared with 28% among those who completed the interview. They also 
were slightly more likely to express belief that those who work hard can get ahead. 
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And, as might be expected, those who eventually terminated the interview are 
more likely than others to offer no opinion in response to many questions. All in all, 
though, the substantive views of those who terminated the interview appear to be 
comparable with those who completed the interview. 
3. Issues in Survey Administration 
 The administration of this survey posed four challenges. First, the volume of 
interviewing was very large. The survey firm that conducted the interviewing, SRBI, 
estimated that 20,800 interviewer hours within a 14-week timeframe would be 
needed, with the bulk of this devoted to screening to locate this rare population. A 
total of 59,770 households were screened, with 560,863 unique phone numbers 
and 1,737,509 phone dialings made over a period of 14 weeks. This was achieved 
by deploying 357 English-speaking and 6 foreign language-speaking interviewers. 
 Recruitment, supervision, and training of foreign language interviewers posed 
another operational challenge. SRBI has four interviewing centers, but the center 
with the greatest success in recruiting highly educated foreign language 
interviewers was located in the university city of Huntington, West Virginia. The six 
interviewers (who spoke Arabic, Farsi or Urdu) recruited for the study were highly 
educated and motivated. All had college degrees. As a data quality check, foreign 
language interviewers monitored each other’s performance, and many of the 
foreign language interviews were recorded and reviewed by Pew’s project staff who 
spoke the relevant languages. 
 Building trust with respondents was critical for the survey’s success. For the 
RDD sample, fewer than 1 out of 100 households screened included a Muslim. This 
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made it extremely important to minimize mid-interview terminations. Hence, it was 
important for all of the interviewers – Muslim and non-Muslim – to have experience 
in interviewing this population. To achieve this, all interviewers worked on the 
Experian list sample first; after having completed a few interviews with Muslim 
respondents, they were allowed to dial the RDD geographic sample.  
 To compensate respondents for their time and to make participation in the 
survey more attractive, an incentive of $50 was offered for completing the 
interview. The study began with $25 incentive, but this was subsequently increased 
to $50 to further minimize mid-interview termination. Three-quarters of the 
respondents provided name and address information for receiving the incentive 
payment. 
 In addition, for the RDD sample, all qualified Muslim households and Muslim 
language barrier cases (Arabic, Urdu, Farsi) that we were unable to complete during 
the initial calls were sent, where possible, a letter explaining the purpose and scope 
of the study. All language-barrier letters were translated into the respective 
languages. A total of 258 such letters were mailed. 
 Determining and achieving an accurate balance of male and female 
interviews was a further challenge. Pew Research Center surveys have found that a 
significant majority of Muslim American respondents are male (about 67% in Pew 
polls conducted since the beginning of 2000); this finding has been corroborated by 
other survey organizations and also noted in the 2004 NEP exit polls. An analysis of 
Census Bureau data on adult immigrants from the countries thought to provide the 
largest numbers of Muslim immigrants found that a majority of these immigrants 
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are male. The final results of the study indicate that there likely are, in fact, more 
Muslim American adult males than females in the population (54% male, 46% 
female), but the imbalance is not as great as indicated by the male-female 
distribution among respondents in the earlier surveys. But cultural differences in 
willingness to be interviewed may still be important. To mitigate any potential bias 
in this respect, the interviewing protocols attempted to match male interviewers 
with male respondents, and female interviewers with female respondents, a 
practice that is common among survey researchers conducting face-to-face 
interviews in majority Muslim nations. After a period of testing the default strategy 
of asking first for males (the Pew Research Center practice with U.S. general public 
samples), it was determined that gender matching was yielding higher levels of 
cooperation. Accordingly, the experiment was terminated and all further contacting 
entailed men asking for men and women asking for women. If a respondent of the 
interviewer’s gender was not available, the interviewer asked for the youngest 
available adult of the other gender. 
 Response rates for the study were comparable with other RDD surveys 
conducted by the Pew Research Center. A response rate of 27% was achieved for 
list sample, 58% for the recontact sample and 29% for RDD sample, using the 
Response Rate 3 definition devised by the American Association for Public Opinion 
Research (AAPOR). Detailed AAPOR sample disposition reports are provided at the 
end of this section.  
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4. Weighting 
 Several stages of statistical adjustment (weighting) were needed to account 
for the use of multiple frames and higher sampling rates in certain geographic 
areas. The first stage involved identifying all of the adults (Muslims and non-
Muslims) who completed the screener in the RDD frame. These cases were 
adjusted, based on their probability of being sampled for the survey. This 
adjustment accounted for three factors: (1) the percent of telephone numbers that 
were sampled in the stratum; (2) the percent of residential numbers that were 
completed screeners in the stratum; and, (3) the number of adults in the 
household. This can be written as: 
bwhi=(Nh/nh)*(Rh/Ch)*Ahi 
where Nh is the number of telephone numbers in the frame in stratum h, nh is the 
number of telephone numbers sampled, Rh is the number of telephone numbers 
that are determined to be residential, Ch is the number of completed screener 
interviews, and Ahi is the number of adults in household i in stratum h. As noted 
earlier, telephone numbers on the Experian list (irrespective of whether they were 
sampled) were excluded from the RDD geographic strata. 
 Whenever a substantial proportion of the population is not sampled due to 
expected low incidence of the target population, the method of adjusting the 
estimates to account for the exclusion is important and yet difficult because of the 
lack of data from the survey itself. As noted earlier, the lowest density stratum 
(those areas that were identified as having very low incidence rates of Muslim 
Americans), were excluded from the RDD sample. The base weights for the RDD 
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sample were adjusted differentially depending on whether the respondent was 
Muslim American. The coverage adjustment for those who were not Muslim 
Americans was 1.64 and for those who were Muslim Americans it was 1.25. The 
1.25 factor was derived from the proportion of the entire Experian list that fell into 
the areas that were excluded from the RDD sample; this proportion was consistent 
with the 2000 Census counts of U.S.-born persons whose ancestors lived in 
predominantly Muslim countries, but higher than the Census counts of persons born 
in predominantly Muslim countries and speaking Muslim languages. The coverage 
factor for those who were not Muslim Americans was determined by examining the 
percentage of all adults in the excluded areas from the Census (47%), and the 
percentage of all RDD interviews in previous Pew studies in the excluded areas 
(53%). The factor was further adjusted to account for the fact that the Experian list 
did not exclude these areas. The Experian list and recontact cases did not require 
coverage adjustment because they did not exclude any areas of the country. 
 These cases from the RDD frame (including both Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike) were then statistically adjusted to match (weighted to) known totals for all 
U.S. adults. The cases were balanced on sex, age in categories, education 
categories, race/ethnicity and region. This set of respondents and weights was used 
to estimate the total number of Muslims and the proportion of all adults in the U.S. 
that are Muslim. Only cases from the RDD frame were used to estimate population 
totals. 
 Having estimated population totals, the next objective was to estimate 
characteristics of the Muslim American population (e.g., percent Sunni). First, all 
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non-Muslim cases were dropped from the analysis at this point. We sought to 
increase the precision of estimates for Muslim Americans by combining cases from 
the RDD frame with the recontact cases. Prior to this combining, it was necessary 
to address several outstanding issues. 
 The outstanding issue in the RDD and list samples was residual nonresponse 
bias. Based on screener information, it was clear that certain segments of the 
Muslim population were overrepresented in the combined RDD and Experian 
sample. In particular, the estimate from the screener respondents was that 61% of 
adult Muslims were male, but household roster questions indicated that only 54% 
of the American Muslim population is male. We attempted to correct for this 
disparity by aligning (raking) the distribution of gender*education level among all 
Muslims screened with this distribution among Muslims completing the full 
interview. This adjustment relies on the problematic assumption that the 
respondent education distribution by sex is the same as the education by sex 
distribution for the entire U.S. Muslim population. That said, this adjustment seems 
the most reasonable given limited alternatives. Large-scale government surveys, 
which are the most common source for such population distribution estimates, do 
not collect data on religious affiliation. This realignment was sample-based, so it 
retained the variability in the estimates of the number and type of Muslims 
observed in the screening estimates. 
 One outstanding issue in the recontact sample was accounting for the 
probability of selection into the Muslim American study. Recall that the recontacts 
are Muslim adults who live in households in which a Muslim had previously been 
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interviewed for an unrelated survey conducted between 2000 and 2006. Each of 
these previous surveys was based on an independent, equal probability RDD 
sample. For weighting purposes, we assume that the population totals did not vary 
over the 2000-2006 time period. The initial adjustment for the recontact cases 
accounts for two factors: (1) the standardized weight from the previous survey; 
and, (2) the sample size of the previous survey. This can be written as: 
bwi=100* (wstd,i/Ni) 
where wstd,i is the standardized weight for household i in the previous survey and 
Ni is the sample size of the previous survey in which the household participated. 
This formula essentially created weights from the previous surveys as if the 
previous surveys all had the same sample size. An attempt also was made to adjust 
for differences in response rates between recontacts from the older versus the 
more recent surveys. There were too few recontact cases, however, for this 
adjustment to be fine-tuned. 
 At this point, we had accounted for the selection probabilities in both 
sampling frames. The penultimate step in the process was aligning the recontact 
cases with sample-based control totals for the entire Muslim American population. 
We derived the control totals from the RDD and list samples and weighted up the 
recontact cases to match them. This ensured that the totals for the categories of 
sex, race/ethnicity, region, and education were consistent with the estimates from 
the RDD and list samples. 
 Finally, we combined the RDD frame with the recontact frame. Had we simply 
added them together, they would have estimated twice the Muslim American 
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population total. Rather than dividing the weights of both frames by 2 (equally 
weighting the samples), we used a factor that was proportional to the effective 
sample sizes. This worked out to be 0.8 for the RDD frame and 0.2 for the 
recontact cases. 
 Due to the complex design of the Muslim American study, formulas 
commonly used in RDD surveys to estimate margins of error (standard errors) are 
inappropriate. Such formulas would understate the true variability in the estimates. 
Accordingly, we used a repeated replication technique, specifically jackknife 
repeated replication (JRR), to calculate the standard errors for this study. Repeated 
replication techniques estimate the variance of a survey statistic based on the 
variance between sub-sample estimates of that statistic. The sub-samples 
(replicates) were created using the same sample design, but deleting a portion of 
the sample, and then weighting each subsample up to the population total. The 
units to be deleted were defined separately for each of the three samples (RDD 
geographic strata, list, recontacts), and within each frame by the strata used in the 
sampling. A total of 100 replicates were created by combining telephone numbers 
to reduce the computational effort. A statistical software package designed for 
complex survey data, WesVar 4.2, was used to calculate all of the standard errors 
and test statistics in the study. 
5. Assessing bias and other error 
 Surveys whose target population includes large numbers of immigrants may 
be subject to sources of bias in addition to those known to have the potential to 
affect even those surveys with relatively few immigrants. It is important, for 
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instance, for this survey to accurately reflect the views of Muslims born in a wide 
variety of countries, as well as the views of those who do not speak English. 
 It is possible to assess the degree to which screening interviews included 
respondents from a variety of countries. Analysis of the U.S. government’s 2005 
American Community Survey (ACS) makes it possible to estimate the proportion of 
all Americans born outside of the U.S. In order to compare these estimates with the 
results of the survey, the analysis of the ACS is restricted to respondents who 
speak English at least well or very well. The ACS indicates that among English 
speaking people in the U.S., 88% were born in the U.S.; nearly 5% were born in 
Latin America (including Mexico, Central America, South America, and the 
Caribbean); roughly 2% were born in Europe; and 2% were born in Asian countries 
outside of South Asia. Perhaps most important for the purposes of this survey, the 
ACS estimates that 0.1% of the population was born in Iran; 0.3% were born in 
Arab countries; and nearly 1% were born in South Asian nations. Overall, the 
screener interviews for this survey closely match the ACS estimates for these 
countries, providing confidence that the survey adequately covers the immigrant 
population. 
 The ACS data also make it possible to estimate the proportion of Muslims 
who do not speak English. These analyses suggest that between 78% and 91% of 
Muslims in the U.S. speak English well enough to complete a survey in English; the 
lower estimate assumes that only those people who speak English at least very well 
could be interviewed in English, while the higher estimate assumes that all those 
who speak English at least well could be interviewed in English. The weighted 
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results of the survey line up closely with these projections; 83% of interviews were 
conducted in English, 11% in Arabic, 3% in Farsi, and 3% in Urdu. 
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Appendix D: Methodology of 2011 Pew Report, Muslim Americans No Signs 
Of Growth In Alienation Or Support For Extremism 
Muslim Americans constitute a population that is rare, dispersed, and diverse. It 
includes many recent immigrants from multiple countries with differing native 
tongues who may have difficulty completing a public opinion survey in English. The 
intense attention paid to Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and 
increased attention to Islamic extremism may have made them more reluctant to 
cooperate with a survey request from an unknown caller. Collectively, these 
characteristics present a significant challenge to anyone wishing to survey this 
population.  
 Despite the challenges, the Pew Research Center study was able to complete 
interviews with 1,033 Muslim American adults 18 years old and older from a 
probability sample consisting of three sampling frames. Interviews were conducted 
by telephone between April 14 and July 22, 2011 by the research firm of Abt SRBI. 
Interviews were conducted in English, Arabic, Farsi and Urdu. After taking into 
account the complex sample design, the average margin of sampling error on the 
1,033 completed interviews with Muslims is +/- 5.0 percentage points at the 95% 
level of confidence. This section describes how the study was designed and 
executed. 
Sample Design 
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 In random digit dial (RDD) surveys of the English-speaking U.S. population, 
roughly one-half of one percent of respondents typically identify as Muslim in 
response to a question about religious tradition or affiliation (or about 5 out of 
every 1,000 respondents). This extremely low incidence means that building a 
probability sample of Muslim Americans is difficult and costly. The demographic 
diversity of the population – especially with respect to race and national origins – 
adds to the challenge. Moreover, analysis of the 2007 survey and other previous 
research indicates that the Muslim population is not concentrated in a few enclaves 
but is highly dispersed throughout the U.S. And since 2007 the proportion of people 
who can be reached only by cell phone has grown. 
 The sample design attempted to address the low incidence and dispersion of 
the Muslim American population, as well as cell phone coverage, by employing 
three sampling sources: an RDD landline sample, an RDD cell phone sample and a 
sample of previously identified Muslim households. 
1. Landline RDD: The landline RDD frame was divided into five strata, four of 
which were based on the estimated density of the Muslim population in each county 
of the United States as determined through an analysis of Pew Research’s database 
of more than 260,000 survey respondents and U.S. Census Bureau data on 
ethnicity and language. To increase the efficiency of the calling, the lowest density 
stratum – estimated to be home to approximately 8%-19% of U.S. Muslims – was 
excluded. A disproportionate sampling strategy was employed to maximize the 
effective sample size from the other three geographic strata; a total of 131 
interviews were completed in the three strata included. The fifth stratum was a 
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commercial list of 608,397 households believed to include Muslims, based on an 
analysis of first and last names common among Muslims. This stratum yielded 
completed interviews with 501 respondents. 
2. Cellular RDD: The cellular RDD frame was divided into the same four 
geographic strata as the landline RDD frame based on the estimated density of the 
Muslim population. As with the landline frame, the lowest density stratum was 
excluded in order to increase data collection efficiency. All Muslim adults reached in 
the cell sample were interviewed, regardless of whether or not they also had a 
landline. The fact that people with both types of phones had a higher chance of 
selection was adjusted for in the weighting as discussed below. The incidence rate 
of Muslim Americans was roughly three times higher in the cell frame than the 
landline frame (excluding the list stratum). A total of 227 interviews were 
completed in the cell RDD frame. 
3. Recontact sample: In addition, a sample of previously identified Muslim 
households was drawn from Pew Research Center’s interview database and other 
RDD surveys conducted in recent years. This sample contained both landline and 
cell phone numbers. Recontacting these respondents from prior surveys yielded 174 
completed interviews for this study. 
The strength of this research design was that it yielded a probability sample. That 
is, each adult in the U.S. had a known probability of being included in the study. 
The fact that some persons had a greater chance of being included than others 
(e.g., because they live in places where there are more Muslims) is taken into 
account in the statistical adjustment described below. 
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RDD Geographic Strata 
 Pew Research Center surveys conducted in English (and some with a Spanish 
option) typically encounter about five Muslim respondents per 1,000 interviews, an 
unweighted incidence rate of 0.5%. The rate is also very similar to that 
encountered by other national surveys (for instance, see Tom Smith’s “The Muslim 
Population of the United States: The Methodology of Estimates” in Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Fall 2002). This low incidence means that the costs of building an RDD 
sample of Muslim Americans by screening a general public sample are prohibitive. 
Accordingly, it was necessary to develop alternative approaches that would allow 
for estimation of the probabilities of selection but increase the yield from screening. 
 An analysis of the geographic distribution of the Muslim population was 
undertaken, using several different sources of data. A key resource was the Pew 
Research Center database of more than 260,000 telephone interviews conducted 
between 2007 and 2011; it was used to estimate the density of Muslims in each 
U.S. county. Another resource was data from the American Community Survey 
(ACS), which is the U.S. Census Bureau’s replacement for the decennial census long 
form. The Census Bureau does not collect information about religion, but the ACS 
does include measures of ancestry, nationality for immigrants, and languages 
spoken. These measures were used to analyze the geographic distribution of adults 
who are from (or whose ancestors are from) countries with significant or majority 
Muslim populations, or who speak languages commonly spoken by Muslims. This 
yielded additional county-level estimates of the density of Muslims. 
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 These measures were highly correlated and were used to sort counties into 
four different groups based on the estimated incidence of Muslims in each county. 
We refer to these mutually exclusive groups as the geographic strata. The lowest 
density stratum accounts for 8% of all Muslim interviews conducted by the Pew 
Research Center over the past five years; the second lowest accounts for 30% of 
Muslim interviews; the medium density stratum accounts for 38%; and the highest 
density stratum accounts for 24%. Drawing on the analysis of previous Pew 
Research surveys, ACS data, and the results of a pilot test, an optimal sampling 
allocation plan was developed for the RDD geographic strata. In total, 41,599 
screening interviews in the RDD geographic strata were completed: 21% in the high 
density stratum, 52% in the medium density stratum and 27% in the low density 
stratum. 
 The lowest density stratum, which included 8% of all U.S. Muslims in Pew 
Research surveys (and up to 19% as based on estimates derived from ACS data), 
also includes 45% of the total U.S. population. As a practical matter, the analysis of 
the Pew Research database indicated that 15,000 screening interviews would have 
to be conducted in this stratum to yield an estimated 10 Muslim respondents. In 
order to put the study’s resources to the most efficient use, this stratum was 
excluded from the geographic strata of the RDD sample design, although persons 
living in these counties were still covered by the list stratum and recontact frame (a 
total of 113 interviews were completed in the lowest density areas from the list 
stratum and recontact frame). 
List Stratum 
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 Within the landline RDD frame of U.S. telephone numbers, a targeted, 
commercial list was used to identify 608,397 numbers that had a relatively high 
probability of belonging to a household with a Muslim adult. This list was defined as 
its own stratum within the landline RDD frame. This list was constructed from a 
commercial database of households where someone in the household has a name 
commonly found among Muslims. The list was prepared by Experian, a commercial 
credit and market research firm that collects and summarizes data from 
approximately 113,000,000 U.S. households. The analysis of names was conducted 
by Ethnic Technologies, LLC, a firm specializing in multicultural marketing lists, 
ethnic identification software, and ethnic data appending services. According to 
Experian, the analysis uses computer rules for first names, surnames, surname 
prefixes and suffixes, and geographic criteria in a specific order to identify an 
individual’s ethnicity, religion and language preference. 
 In 2011, Abt SRBI purchased Experian’s database of more than 608,000 
households thought to include Muslims. This list consists of contact information, 
including telephone numbers. A test of the list, combined with the results of the 
screening interviews conducted in the course of the main survey, found that the 
Experian list was a highly efficient source for contacting Muslims; roughly three-in-
ten households screened from the Experian list included an adult Muslim. The list 
does not, however, by itself constitute a representative sample of American 
Muslims. Muslims on the Experian list are somewhat better educated, more likely to 
be homeowners, more likely to be foreign born and of South Asian descent and 
much less likely to be African American or to have converted to Islam compared 
with Muslim Americans as a whole. 
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 By combining the Experian list with the RDD frame, however, the list can be 
used as one component of a probability sample.3 All telephone numbers drawn for 
the geographic strata of the landline RDD frame were compared to the entire 
Experian list of numbers. Any numbers that appeared in both the landline RDD 
geographic sample and the Experian list were removed from the former, and were 
available to be sampled only as part of the list stratum. This method makes it 
possible to determine the probability that any given Muslim has of being sampled, 
regardless of whether he or she is included in the Experian list. It also permits 
estimation of the proportion of all Muslims in the U.S. who are covered by the 
Experian list, which in turn makes it possible, in the final analysis, to give cases 
from the Experian sample an appropriate weight. More details on the statistical 
procedures used to incorporate the list into the overall sample are provided below. 
Recontact Frame 
 In addition to contacting and interviewing a fresh sample of Muslim 
Americans, the phone numbers of all Muslim households from previous Pew 
Research surveys conducted between 2007 and 2011 were called. Adults in these 
households were screened and interviewed in the same manner used for the RDD 
samples. No attempt was made to reinterview the same respondent from earlier 
surveys. Pew Research’s survey partners, Abt SRBI and Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International (PSRAI), also provided lists of Muslims interviewed in the 
course of other national surveys conducted in recent years. In total, the recontact 
frame consisted of phone numbers for 756 Muslims (552 landline numbers and 204 
cell phone numbers) interviewed in recent national surveys. From this frame, 262 
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households were successfully screened, resulting in 174 completed interviews with 
Muslims. 
 The greatest strengths of the recontact frame are that it consists entirely of 
respondents originally interviewed in the course of nationally representative 
surveys based on probability samples and that it includes respondents who live in 
the geographic stratum that was excluded from the landline and cell RDD samples. 
However, there also are certain potential biases of the recontact frame. Perhaps 
most obviously, all of the households previously interviewed in the recontact frame 
were interviewed in English, or for a small number, in Spanish. Another potential 
source of bias relates to the length of time between when respondents were first 
interviewed and the current field period; respondents still residing in the same 
household in 2011 as in an earlier year may represent a more established, less 
mobile population compared with those from households that could not be 
recontacted. 
 Analysis of the survey results suggests that there are some differences 
between Muslims in the recontact frame and those in the landline and cell RDD 
frames. For example, Muslims from the recontact frame are more likely to be a 
homeowner, less satisfied with national conditions, and less likely to have worked 
with others in their community to solve a problem compared with Muslims as a 
whole. These differences, however, are not sufficiently large so as to be able to 
substantially affect the overall survey’s estimates. 
Questionnaire Design 
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 As with the 2007 Muslim American survey, the goal of the study was to 
provide a broad description of the characteristics and attitudes of the Muslim 
American population. Thus, the questionnaire needed to cover a wide range of 
topics but be short enough that respondents would be willing to complete the 
interview. 
 Much of the content was drawn from the 2007 survey so that any changes in 
attitudes could be tracked. New questions also were taken from the Pew Research 
Center’s U.S. surveys and the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s surveys to provide 
comparisons with the U.S. public, U.S. Christians and Muslim publics in other 
countries.  
 Because this population includes many immigrants who have arrived in the 
U.S. relatively recently, the survey was translated and conducted in three 
languages (in addition to English) identified as the most common among Muslim 
immigrants -- Arabic, Farsi and Urdu. Translation of the questionnaire was 
conducted by a professional translation service under the direction of Abt SRBI. A 
three-step process was used including translation by a professional translator, back 
translation to English by a second translator, followed by proofreading and review 
for quality, consistency and relevance. The translated questionnaires were 
independently reviewed by translators retained by the Pew Research Center, and 
revisions were made based on their feedback. A total of 925 interviews were 
conducted in English, 73 in Arabic, 19 in Farsi and 16 in Urdu. Another issue 
confronted in the questionnaire design was the possibility that members of this 
population are reluctant to reveal their religious identification because of concerns 
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about stereotyping and prejudice. Both the 2007 and 2011 surveys show that many 
Muslim Americans believe they are targeted by the government for surveillance and 
some also report personal experiences with discrimination and hostility. Several 
features of the questionnaire were tailored to deal with these concerns. 
 The initial questions were chosen to be of a general nature in order to 
establish rapport with respondents, asking about satisfaction with the community, 
personal happiness,  and personal characteristics such as home ownership, 
entrepreneurship, and college enrollment. After these items, respondents were 
asked about their religious affiliation, choosing from a list that included Christian, 
Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist or “something else.” Respondents who identified as 
Muslim proceeded to the substantive portion of the questionnaire, and those who 
were not Muslim were asked if anyone in the household practiced a different 
religion; in 39 households interviews were conducted with someone other than the 
person who was originally selected. If there was no Muslim in the household, the 
respondent was asked a short set of demographic questions to be used for 
weighting. 
 At this point in the interview, respondents were told that: “As mentioned 
before, this survey is being conducted for the Pew Research Center. We have some 
questions on a few different topics, and as a token of our appreciation for your 
time, we would like to send you $50 at the completion of this survey.” After this 
introduction, a series of questions followed (e.g., satisfaction with the state of the 
nation, presidential approval, civic involvement, everyday activities, opinions about 
political and social issues). At the conclusion of this series, respondents were told: 
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“Just to give you a little more background before we continue, the Pew Research 
Center conducts many surveys on religion and public life in the United States. 
Earlier, you mentioned that you are a Muslim, and we have some questions about 
the views and experiences of Muslims living in the United States. I think you will 
find these questions very interesting.” 
 The logic for revealing the principal research focus of the study – a practice 
not common in survey research – was that respondents would quickly discover that 
the study was focused on Muslims and Islam, and that there would be a greater 
chance of establishing trust and rapport by revealing the intent of the study before 
asking questions specific to experiences as a Muslim or about the Islamic faith. 
Indeed, in initial pretesting of the 2007 study without the early presentation of the 
study’s purpose, some respondents expressed suspicion and eventually broke off 
the interview. 
 As was true with the 2007 survey, a high percentage of respondents 
identified in the screening interview as Muslim – 78% -- eventually completed the 
survey. This completion rate is somewhat lower than average for other Pew 
Research Center surveys, where completion rates of 85% to 95% are more 
common. But given that the mean survey length was 32 minutes (12 minutes 
longer than the average survey conducted by the center), a somewhat higher-than-
normal breakoff rate was not unexpected. The 78% completion rate does not 
include respondents who dropped off during the short screener interview prior to 
answering the religion question. 
Pilot Test and Pretest 
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 For the pilot test of selected questions from the survey, 97 interviews were 
completed with Muslim American adults sampled from the Experian list. The 
interviews were conducted March 10-13, 2011; interviews were conducted in 
English. Among households completing the screener, the Muslim incidence was 
32%. The completion rate among qualified Muslims was 82%. The average 
interview length for pilot test interviews with Muslims was 14 minutes. Based on 
the results of the pilot test, a number of changes were made to the questionnaire 
and interviewer training procedures. 
 The pretest of the full survey resulted in 21 completed interviews with 
Muslim American adults sampled from the Experian list. The interviews were 
conducted March 31-April 3, 2011; interviews were conducted in English. Among 
households completing the screener, the Muslim incidence was 36%. The 
completion rate among qualified Muslims was 60%. The average interview length 
for pretest interviews with Muslims was 29 minutes. Additional changes were made 
to the questionnaire and interviewer training procedures based on the results of the 
pretest. 
Survey Administration 
 The administration of this survey posed several challenges. For example, the 
volume of interviewing was very large. The survey firm that conducted the 
interviewing, Abt SRBI, devoted 24,500 interviewer hours to the study over a 14-
week timeframe, with the bulk of this spent screening for this rare population. A 
total of 43,538 households were screened, with 706,945 unique phone numbers 
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dialed over the field period. This was achieved by deploying 480 English-speaking 
and 12 foreign language-speaking interviewers. 
 Multilingual interviewers on staff were utilized for the project. Additional 
multilingual interviewers were recruited, first tested by an accredited vendor on 
their language proficiency then evaluated and scored before being interviewed and 
hired by Abt SRBI. All Non-English interviewers first go through the standard Abt 
SRBI initial training process that all interviewers go through. Bilingual interviewers 
with more proficiency and interviewing experience were given supervisory roles and 
worked with the interviewers in their language monitoring surveys, assisting in 
training and debriefing. 
 Building trust with respondents was critical for the survey’s success. For the 
landline RDD sample, fewer than 1 out of 200 households screened included a 
Muslim. This made it extremely important to minimize mid-interview terminations. 
Hence, it was important for all of the interviewers – Muslim and non-Muslim – to 
have experience in interviewing this population. To achieve this, all interviewers 
worked on the Experian list sample first; after having completed a few interviews 
with Muslim respondents, they were allowed to dial the landline and cell RDD 
geographic samples. 
 An incentive of $50 was offered to respondents near the beginning of the 
survey, after it was determined that the respondent identified as Muslim in a 
response to a question about religious affiliation. The decision to offer an incentive 
was based on two principal considerations. First, the survey entailed a substantial 
commitment of time for respondents. The mean length of an interview was 
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approximately 32 minutes (considerably longer than the average of 20 minutes for 
other Pew Research Center surveys). And about 18% of the interviews lasted 40 
minutes or longer. Second, incentives have been repeatedly shown to increase 
response rates, a critical consideration in studies of rare populations where 
substantial effort is devoted to locating qualified respondents.4 The use of 
incentives has been shown to be particularly helpful in improving participation 
among reluctant respondents. Most respondents (84%) provided a name and 
address information for receiving the incentive payment. 
 In addition, all qualified Muslim households and Muslim language barrier 
cases (Arabic, Urdu, Farsi) that were unable or unwilling to complete the interview 
during the initial calls were sent, where possible, a letter explaining the purpose 
and scope of the study. All language-barrier letters were translated into the 
respective languages. A total of 705 such letters were mailed. 
 To mitigate potential gender biases in the composition of the sample, the 
interviewing protocols for landline households attempted to match male 
interviewers with male respondents and female interviewers with female 
respondents. This practice is common among survey researchers conducting face-
to-face interviews in majority Muslim nations. Interviewer/respondent gender 
matching was not implemented, however, when calling cell phone numbers because 
cell phones are predominantly used as a personal (rather than household) device. 
 The screening effort yielded a response rate of 22% for the geographic 
landline RDD sample, 20% for the cell RDD sample, 18% for the list sample, and 
54% for the recontact sample, using the Response Rate 3 definition devised by the 
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American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). Detailed AAPOR sample 
disposition reports are provided at the end of this section. 
 The completion rate for qualified Muslim respondents was 78% for the 
geographic landline RDD sample (excluding the list), 81% for the cell RDD sample, 
74% for the list stratum of the RDD sample, and 90% for the recontact sample. 
Weighting 
 Several stages of statistical adjustment (weighting) were needed to account 
for the use of multiple sampling frames and higher sampling rates in certain 
geographic areas. The first stage involved identifying all of the adults (Muslims and 
non-Muslims) who completed the screener in the landline (geographic + list strata) 
and cell RDD samples. These cases were adjusted, based on their probability of 
being sampled for the survey. This adjustment accounted for four factors: (1) the 
percent of telephone numbers that were sampled in the stratum; (2) the percent of 
telephone numbers sampled in the stratum for which eligibility as a working and 
residential number was not determined; (3) the percent of residential numbers that 
were completed screeners in the stratum; and, (4) the number of eligible adults in 
the household. This can be written as: 
bwhi=(Nh/nh)*( Eh+ EUhˆ/Eh)*(Rh/Sh)*Ahi 
where Nh is the number of telephone numbers in the frame in stratum h, nh is the 
number of telephone numbers sampled, Uh E ˆ is the estimated number of working 
residential numbers among those with unknown eligibility, Rh is the number of 
telephone numbers that are determined to be residential, Sh is the number of 
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completed screener interviews, and Ahi is the number of eligible adults in 
household i in stratum h. 
 The value of Ahi depended not just on the composition of the household but 
also on whether the number dialed was for a landline or a cell phone. For landline 
cases with no Muslim adults in the household, Ahi is simply the total number of 
adults in the household. For cell phone cases with no Muslims, however, no within-
household selection was performed and so the Ahi adjustment equaled 1. For cell 
phone cases in which the person answering the phone was Muslim, there was also 
no within-household selection performed, and so the adjustment also equaled 1. In 
instances where the initial cell respondent was non-Muslim but reported that there 
was a Muslim adult in the household, one Muslim adult was randomly selected. The 
Ahi adjustment in these cases equaled the number of Muslim adults in the 
household. Similarly, for all landline cases in which there was at least one Muslim 
adult in the household, the Ahi adjustment equaled the number of Muslim adults in 
the household. 
 The probability of selection adjustment for recontact sample cases was 
computed differently. Recall that the recontacts are Muslim adults who live in 
households in which a Muslim had previously been interviewed for an unrelated 
survey conducted between 2007 and 2011. Each of these previous surveys was 
based on an independent, equalprobability national RDD sample. For weighting 
purposes, we assume that the population totals did not vary over the 2007-2011 
time period. The base weighting for the recontact cases accounts for two factors: 
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(1) the standardized weight from the previous survey and (2) the sample size of 
the previous survey. This can be written as 
100*wstd,i/Ni 
where wstd,i is the standardized weight for respondent i in the previous survey and 
Ni is the sample size of the previous survey in which the household participated. 
The standardized weights were computed by dividing the final weight for 
respondent i in the original survey by the average of the final weights in the original 
survey. 
 After the calculation of the base weights, the next step was to account for 
the overlap between the landline and cell RDD frames. Adults with both a 
residential landline and a cell phone (“dual service”) could potentially have been 
selected for the survey in both frames. The dual service respondents from the two 
frames were integrated in proportion to their effective sample sizes. The first 
effective sample size was computed by filtering on the dual service cases in the 
landline RDD sample (list + geographic strata) and computing the coefficient of 
variation (cv) of the final screener base weight. The design effect for these cases 
was approximated as 1+cv2. The effective sample size (n1) was computed as the 
unweighted sample size divided by the design effect. The effective sample size for 
the dual service cases in the cellular RDD sample (n2) was computed in an 
analogous way. The compositing factor for the landline frame dual service cases 
was computed as n1/(n1 + n2). The compositing factor for the cellular frame dual 
service cases was computed as n2/(n1 + n2). Separately, we integrated the dual 
service cases in the recontact sample. The process for computing the compositing 
 272 
 
factor for these cases was analogous to the process described above for the fresh 
RDD plus Experian cases. 
 Once the landline and cell RDD samples were integrated, we sought to 
address the fact that adults living in counties assigned to the lowest density 
stratum had been excluded from the landline RDD and cellular RDD geographic 
samples. Whenever a substantial proportion of the population is not sampled due to 
expected low incidence of the target population, the method of adjusting the 
estimates to account for the exclusion is important and yet difficult because of the 
lack of data from the survey itself. To adjust for these exclusions, the base weights 
for the RDD geographic samples were adjusted differentially depending on whether 
the respondent was Muslim or non-Muslim. 
 The coverage factor for those who were not Muslim Americans was 
determined by examining the percentage of all adults in the excluded areas 
(44.6%) based on 2009 county-level figures from the Census Population Estimates 
Program. The adjustment for non-Muslim cases was 1/(1-.446)=1.81. The coverage 
adjustment for Muslim cases was compiled from several sources. According to 
2005-2009 ACS counts of U.S.-born persons whose ancestors lived in 
predominantly Muslim countries, about 19.2% of Muslims live in the excluded 
areas. This is higher than the estimates based on ACS counts of persons born in 
predominantly Muslim countries (13.5%) and speaking Muslim languages (15.2%). 
Taking the most conservative estimate of 19.2% exclusion, the adjustment that we 
used for Muslim cases was 1/(1-.192)=1.24. The Experian list and recontact cases 
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did not require coverage adjustment because they did not exclude any areas of the 
country. 
 The dual frame RDD sample of non-Muslims and Muslims was then balanced 
to control totals for the US adult population. The sample was balanced to match 
national population parameters for sex, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, region 
(U.S. Census definitions), and telephone usage. The basic weighting parameters 
came from a special analysis of the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey’s 
2010 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) that included all households 
in the continental United States. The cell phone usage parameter came from an 
analysis of the July-December 2010 National Health Interview Survey.5 After this 
calibration was performed, all the non-Muslim cases were dropped from the 
analysis. 
 The next step in the weighting process was to evaluate whether some Muslim 
adults were more likely to complete the survey than others. Specifically, we 
investigated the possibility that Muslim males were more likely to participate than 
Muslim females by using responses to questions about the total number of adult 
Muslim men and adult Muslim women in the household. We used this distribution, 
which was computed with a household-level weight, to develop an adjustment for 
propensity to respond by gender. The adjustment aligns the respondent sample to 
the roster-based distribution for gender as well as respondent reported data on 
education. Large-scale government surveys, which are the most common source for 
such population distribution estimates, do not collect data on religious affiliation. 
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This realignment was sample-based, so it retained the variability in the estimates of 
the number and type of Muslims observed in the screening estimates. 
 After the dual frame RDD Muslim cases were calibrated to the US population 
controls and adjusted for residual nonresponse, we estimated control totals for the 
adult Muslim American population. We then calibrated the base weighted recontact 
sample to those estimated totals. This ensured that the totals for the categories of 
age, gender, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, region, and phone service were 
consistent with the estimates from the dual frame RDD sample. 
 The recontact and combined RDD cases were then integrated in proportion to 
their effective sample sizes. The final weighted sample aligns with the sample-
based totals for the Muslim American adult population. Had we simply added them 
together, they would have estimated twice the Muslim American population total. 
Rather than dividing the weights of both frames by 2 (equally weighting the 
samples), we used a factor that was proportional to the effective sample sizes. This 
worked out to be 0.858 for the dual frame RDD cases and 0.142 for the recontact 
cases. 
 Due to the complex design of the Muslim American study, formulas 
commonly used in RDD surveys to estimate margins of error (standard errors) are 
inappropriate. Such formulas would understate the true variability in the estimates. 
Accordingly, we used a repeated replication technique, specifically jackknife 
repeated replication (JRR), to calculate the standard errors for this study. Repeated 
replication techniques estimate the variance of a survey statistic based on the 
variance between sub-sample estimates of that statistic. The sub-samples 
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(replicates) were created using the same sample design, but deleting a portion of 
the sample, and then weighting each sub-sample up to the population total. The 
units to be deleted were defined separately for each of the three samples (landline 
RDD, cell RDD, recontacts), and within each frame by the strata used in the 
sampling. A total of 100 replicates were created by combining telephone numbers 
to reduce the computational effort. A statistical software package designed for 
complex survey data, Stata v11, was used to calculate all of the standard errors 
and test statistics in the study. 
Assessing Bias and Other Error 
 A key question in assessing the validity of the study’s findings is whether the 
sample is representative of the Muslim population. If Muslims who are difficult to 
locate or reluctant to be interviewed hold different opinions than those who are 
more accessible or willing to take part in the survey, a bias in the results could 
occur. For most welldesigned surveys, nonresponse has not been shown to create 
serious biases because people who do not respond are similar to those who do on 
key measures in the survey. Whether that is true for the Muslim American 
population is difficult to determine. To assess this possibility, we compared 
respondents in households who completed the survey easily with respondents with 
whom it was more difficult to obtain a completed interview. Comparisons were 
made between respondents reached within the first few attempts and those who 
required substantially more attempts. Comparisons also were made between 
respondents in households where at least one attempt to interview was met with a 
refusal and those that never refused to participate. In effect, reluctant and 
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inaccessible respondents may serve as a rough proxy for individuals who were 
never reached or never consented to be interviewed. 
 This analysis indicates that there are few significant differences between 
amenable and accessible respondents, on the one hand, and those who were harder 
to interview. Respondents who required more call attempts were somewhat more 
likely to be interviewed in one of the three foreign languages used in the study, an 
unsurprising 5 result given the necessity to first identify a language barrier case 
and then to arrange a mutually convenient time for an Arabic, Farsi or Urdu-
speaking interviewer to administer the interview. Perhaps related to this, harder to 
reach respondents were somewhat more likely to be born outside the U.S., to say 
they arrived in the U.S. after 1999 and to have a higher level of religious 
commitment. On the majority of questions in the survey, however, the differences 
between the hard to reach and other respondents were modest. 
 Nonresponse bias also can be assessed by comparing the opinions expressed 
early in the questionnaire by Muslims who did not complete the interview with the 
views of those who did complete the interview. About half of those who quit the 
interview did so in the first five minutes, prior to the point when the purpose of the 
study was revealed. Those who broke off were somewhat more likely to own their 
own home and to be selfemployed or a small business owner. As is true in many 
surveys of the general public, those who broke off were somewhat less likely to 
report following what’s going on in government and public affairs “most of the 
time.” But on the available attitude questions for comparison, the differences were 
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mostly small and non-systematic. All in all, the substantive views of those who did 
not complete the interview appear to be comparable to those who did. 
Assessing Possible Sample Bias 
 The validity of studies of groups with large immigrant populations depends in 
part on the extent to which the sample accurately reflects the diversity of the 
countries of origin and languages spoken by the groups. Overall, this sample 
conformed closely to expectations based on government surveys. 
 Data from the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) provides estimates 
of the proportion of all Americans born outside the U.S. In order to compare these 
estimates with the current survey, the analysis of the ACS data is based on 
respondents who speak English at least well or very well or who speak Arabic, Farsi 
or Urdu. Focusing on areas with large Muslim populations, the ACS estimates that 
0.4% of the U.S. population were born in the Middle East or North Africa, 0.2% 
were born in Iran, 0.1% were born in Pakistan, and 0.8% were born in other South 
Asian countries. Overall, the screener interviews for this survey closely match these 
ACS estimates, indicating that the survey adequately covers the potential Muslim 
immigrant population. 
 Analysis of the survey in comparison to ACS data also suggests that people 
who speak Arabic or Farsi were screened at appropriate rates; those who speak 
Urdu were screened at rates slightly below what was expected. The ACS data 
suggest that of the U.S. population who speaks one of the four languages in which 
interviewing was conducted, 99.76% of the population speaks English very well, 
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and 99.91% of the population speaks English well; by comparison, 99.79% of the 
screening interviews for this survey were conducted in English. 
 The ACS data estimate that between 0.05% and 0.13% of the target 
population speaks Arabic (and speaks English less than well or very well); 0.17% of 
screening interviews were done in Arabic. The ACS data estimate that between 
0.03% and 0.07% of the population speaks Farsi (compared with 0.04% of 
screeners completed in Farsi), and that between 0.02% and 0.04% of the 
population speaks Urdu (compared with 0.01% of screeners completed in Urdu). 
These findings also indicate that the survey provided adequate coverage of these 
non-English speaking populations. 
 Finally, the ACS data make it possible to estimate the proportion of Muslims 
who do not speak English. Analysis suggests that between 83% and 93% of 
Muslims in the U.S. speak English well or very well, compared with between 4% 
and 10% who speak Arabic, 1-2% who speak Farsi, and 2-6% who speak Urdu. 
With the exception of a small underrepresentation of Urdu speakers, the weighted 
results of the survey line up closely with these projections. 
Verifying Religious Affiliation 
As an additional check on the quality of the data, a validation study was conducted 
to verify the religious preference of survey respondents. The study was fielded by 
Abt SRBI from June 2-July 24, 2011. A random subset of respondents was selected 
for the study among those who had completed the original survey in English, had 
accepted the incentive and were not part of the recontact sample who had 
completed a previous survey. Those selected were recontacted by telephone after 
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they had received the incentive for their participation in the original survey. A total 
of 153 validation interviews were completed (82 by landline and 71 by cell phone). 
The validation rate for religious preference was 98%; only 3 of the 153 respondents 
to the validation study did not choose Muslim when asked about their religious 
affiliation (two chose a different religion and one refused to provide a response). 
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